Supreme Court Decisions:
Declaration of Presumptive death (Republic of the Phils., vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., December 9, 2005
SECOND DIVISION: G.R. No. 159614
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIP-PINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION) and ALAN B. ALEGRO,
Respondents.
Promulgated: December 9, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton.
In an Order1 dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for hearing on May 30, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. and directed that a copy of the said order be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Samar, and that a copy be posted in the court’s bulletin board for at least three weeks before the next scheduled hearing.
The court also directed that copies of the order be served on the Solicitor General, the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan, through counsel, and that copies be sent to Lea by registered mail. Alan complied with all the foregoing jurisdictional requirements.
2 On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss
3 the petition, which was, however, denied by the court for failure to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
4 At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.
5 He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to go back to her parents.
6 Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found.
7 Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents’ house in Bliss, Sto. Niño, Catbalogan, Samar.
8 However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the house of Lea’s parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was not there. He also went to the house of Lea’s friend, Janeth Bautista, at Barangay Canlapwas, but he was informed by Janette’s brother-in-law, Nelson Abaenza, that Janeth had left for Manila.
9 When Alan went back to the house of his parents-in-law, he learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been to their house but that she left without notice.
10 Alan sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends of Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail.
11 Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan agreed.
12 However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him that she had not seen her.
13 He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.
14 On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station.
15 The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001.
16 Alan also reported Lea’s disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July 9, 2001.
17 Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declared that on February 14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired from him if Lea passed by his house and he told Alan that she did not. Alan also told him that Lea had disappeared. He had not seen Lea in the barangay ever since.
18 Lea’s father, who was his compadre and the owner of Radio DYMS, told him that he did not know where Lea was.
19 After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioner’s absent spouse ROSALIA JULATON is hereby declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the purpose of the petitioner’s subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absent spouse.
SO ORDERED.
20 The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the decision of the RTC.
21 The CA cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.
22 The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CA’s decision alleging that respondent Alan B. Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead.
23 It averred that the respondent failed to exercise reasonable and diligent efforts to locate his wife. The respondent even admitted that Lea’s father told him on February 14, 1995 that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. The OSG pointed out that the respondent reported his wife’s disappearance to the local police and also to the NBI only after the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The petitioner avers that, as gleaned from the evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and locate Lea.
Finally, the petitioner averred: In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with.
There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well.
It is even possible that those who cannot have their marriages x x x declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary nature of its proceedings.
It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family.
Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the petition for declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of Appeals.
24 The petition is meritorious.
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
25 The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage.
The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.
26 Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth.
Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions.
27 competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
28 Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco,
29 the Court warned against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
It is also the maxim that "men readily believe what they wish to be true."
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain Juan Magat.
The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony.
On the other hand, the respondent admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law on February 14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there but that she left without notice.
The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he chided her for coming home late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it would be better for her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never returned.
Neither did she communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because of her resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a month after their marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC.
It could have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea’s whereabouts considering that Lea’s father was the owner of Radio DYMS.
The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondent’s petition.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
**********************************************************
Records, p. 1.
2Exhibits “C” to “H” and “H-1,” folder of exhibits, pp. 10-21.
3Records, pp. 3-6.
4Id. at 9.
5Exhibit “A,” folder of exhibits, p. 5.
6TSN, 20 September 2001, p. 6.
7Id. at 9.
8Id. at 7.
9TSN, 20 September 2001, p. 12.
10Id. at 16.
11Id. at 13-15.
12Id. at 16.
13Id. at 17-19.
14Id. at 20-21.
15Exhibits “I” and “I-1,” folder of exhibits, p. 22.
16Exhibit “J,” Id. at 23.
17Exhibit “K,” Id. at 24.
18TSN, November 5, 2001, pp. 4-6.
19Id. at 8.
20Records, pp. 23-24.
21Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Noel G. Tijam, concurring; rollo, pp. 33-40.
22G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20.
23Rollo, p. 17.
24 Id. at 26-28.
25 Emphases supplied.
26 Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 633.
27 Tyrrell v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 115 A.L.R., 392 (1937), citing In re: Hurlburt’s Estate,35 L.R.A. 794 68 Vt.366, 35 A.77.
28 Gall v. Gall, 69 Sickels 109, 21 NE 106 (1889).
29 Supra, note 19.
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
Saturday, October 18, 2008
Supreme Court Decisions: Land Titles: irregularly issued title can be cancelled administratively by LRA
Supreme Court Decisions:
Land Titles: irregularly issued title can be cancelled administratively by LRA (Severino M. Manotok IV, et al. vs. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, represented by Teresita Barque Hernandez, December 12, 2005)
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANO-TOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANO-TOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR. and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK,
represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ,
Respondents.
Promulgated: December 12, 2005
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review assail, in G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision1 of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision2 of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481, and the LRA to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals4 are as follows:
Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in 1988. In support of the petition, petitioners submitted the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real estate tax receipts, tax decla-rations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property.
Upon being notified of the petition for administrative recon-stitution, private respondents (petitioners herein) filed their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their reconsti-tuted title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners’ predeces-sors-in-interest is spurious.
On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer, denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 2101775 on grounds that:
1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;
2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious docu-ment as categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated February 19, 1997.6
Respondents’ motion for recon-sideration was denied in an order7 dated February 10, 1998 hence they appealed to the LRA.
The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of documents other than the owner’s duplicate certificate of title as bases in denying the petition and should have confined himself with the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. 8
The LRA further declared:
Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and convincing evidence that TCT NO. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the original of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 .... The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost .... The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed and not salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 ....
It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands ....
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is mandatory.
9….
It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy
through levy on real property; and (2) by judicial action.22 Under Section 25723 and 25824 of the LGC, the basic real property tax constitutes as a lien on the property subject to the tax which may be levied upon through the issuance of a warrant. The local government unit concerned may also enforce the collection of the basic real property tax by civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction. 25
Respondents levied on a portion of the MAGRA to satisfy the tax delinquency of PNOC-EDC. However, the land being levied is classified as inalienable. It is owned by the government and thus, cannot be sold at public auction. Likewise, the machineries, equipment and other infrastructures in the MAGRA cannot be levied and sold at public auction because it is not the property that is subject to the tax.
The personal liability for the tax delinquency, is generally on whoever is the owner of the real property at the time the tax accrues; where, however, the tax liability is imposed on the beneficial use of the real property such as those owned but leased to private persons or entities by the government, or when the assessment is made on the basis of the actual use thereof, the personal liability is on any person who has such beneficial or actual use at the time of the accrual of the tax. 26
In the case at bar, PNOC-EDC is the beneficial user, however, since respondents cannot avail of the administrative remedy through levy, they can only enforce the collection of real property tax through civil action.
PNOC-EDC also claims that the real property tax assessment is not yet final and executory. It avers that prior resort to administrative remedies before seeking judicial remedies is not necessary considering that the issue raised is purely a question of law. Consequently, it need not appeal the assessment to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals or to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals as provided under Sections 22627 and 22928 of the LGC.
We disagree. It is well-settled in Systems Plus Computer College of Caloocan City v. Local Government of Caloocan City29 that all adminis-trative remedies must be exhausted before availing of the judicial remedies.
Thus:
The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-trative remedies. Hence, when the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein. Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes.
If PNOC-EDC was not satisfied with the assessment of its property, it should have appealed to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals within 60 days from receipt of the written notice of assessment. Instead, it waited until the issuance of a warrant of levy before it filed a petition for injunction in the regional trial court, which was not in accordance with the remedies provided in the LGC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The September 8, 2004 Decision and the January 10, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan City, Branch 17, in Civil Case No. 2003-14, are AFFIRMED insofar as it declared PNOC-EDC liable to pay the real property tax accruing from its use of the MAGRA. Respondents however are DIRECTED to refrain from levying on the buildings, infrastructures and machineries of PNOC-EDC to satisfy the payment of the real property tax delinquency.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
*********************************************************
1 Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 113-118. Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
2 Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 56-66. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz and Danilo B. Pine. Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., dissented.
3 Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 71-73.
4 In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 56-57.
5 Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 86.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 87.
8 Id. at 90.
9 Id. at 91. 22Sec. 256, Local Government Code.
23 SECTION 257. Local Government’s Lien. – The basic real property tax and any other tax levied under this Title constitutes a lien on the property subject to tax, superior to all liens, charges or encumbrances in favor of any person, irrespective of the owner or possessor thereof, enforceable by administrative or judicial action, and may only be extinguished upon payment of the tax and the related interests and expenses.
24 SECTION 258. Levy on Real Property. – After the expiration of the time required to pay the basic real property tax or any other tax levied under this Title, realty property subject to such tax may be levied upon through the issuance of a warrant on or before, or simultaneously with, the institution of the civil action for the collection of the delinquent tax. …
25 Sec. 266, Local Government Code.
26 Vitug, Jose C. and Acosta, Ernesto D., Tax Law and Jurisprudence [2000 ed.], p. 490.
27 SECTION 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. – Any owner or person having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal.
28 SECTION 229. Action by the Local Board of Assessment Appeals. –
(a) The Board shall decide the appeal within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of receipt of such appeal. …….
(c) … The owner of the property of the person having legal interest therein or the assessor who is not satisfied with the decision of the Board, may, within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision of said Board, appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, as herein provided. The decision of the Central Board shall be final and executory.
29 G.R. No. 146382, August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 494, 499.
Land Titles: irregularly issued title can be cancelled administratively by LRA (Severino M. Manotok IV, et al. vs. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, represented by Teresita Barque Hernandez, December 12, 2005)
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANO-TOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANO-TOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR. and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK,
represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ,
Respondents.
Promulgated: December 12, 2005
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review assail, in G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision1 of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision2 of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481, and the LRA to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals4 are as follows:
Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in 1988. In support of the petition, petitioners submitted the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real estate tax receipts, tax decla-rations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property.
Upon being notified of the petition for administrative recon-stitution, private respondents (petitioners herein) filed their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their reconsti-tuted title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners’ predeces-sors-in-interest is spurious.
On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer, denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 2101775 on grounds that:
1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;
2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious docu-ment as categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated February 19, 1997.6
Respondents’ motion for recon-sideration was denied in an order7 dated February 10, 1998 hence they appealed to the LRA.
The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of documents other than the owner’s duplicate certificate of title as bases in denying the petition and should have confined himself with the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. 8
The LRA further declared:
Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and convincing evidence that TCT NO. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the original of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 .... The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost .... The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed and not salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 ....
It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands ....
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is mandatory.
9….
It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy
through levy on real property; and (2) by judicial action.22 Under Section 25723 and 25824 of the LGC, the basic real property tax constitutes as a lien on the property subject to the tax which may be levied upon through the issuance of a warrant. The local government unit concerned may also enforce the collection of the basic real property tax by civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction. 25
Respondents levied on a portion of the MAGRA to satisfy the tax delinquency of PNOC-EDC. However, the land being levied is classified as inalienable. It is owned by the government and thus, cannot be sold at public auction. Likewise, the machineries, equipment and other infrastructures in the MAGRA cannot be levied and sold at public auction because it is not the property that is subject to the tax.
The personal liability for the tax delinquency, is generally on whoever is the owner of the real property at the time the tax accrues; where, however, the tax liability is imposed on the beneficial use of the real property such as those owned but leased to private persons or entities by the government, or when the assessment is made on the basis of the actual use thereof, the personal liability is on any person who has such beneficial or actual use at the time of the accrual of the tax. 26
In the case at bar, PNOC-EDC is the beneficial user, however, since respondents cannot avail of the administrative remedy through levy, they can only enforce the collection of real property tax through civil action.
PNOC-EDC also claims that the real property tax assessment is not yet final and executory. It avers that prior resort to administrative remedies before seeking judicial remedies is not necessary considering that the issue raised is purely a question of law. Consequently, it need not appeal the assessment to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals or to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals as provided under Sections 22627 and 22928 of the LGC.
We disagree. It is well-settled in Systems Plus Computer College of Caloocan City v. Local Government of Caloocan City29 that all adminis-trative remedies must be exhausted before availing of the judicial remedies.
Thus:
The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-trative remedies. Hence, when the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein. Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes.
If PNOC-EDC was not satisfied with the assessment of its property, it should have appealed to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals within 60 days from receipt of the written notice of assessment. Instead, it waited until the issuance of a warrant of levy before it filed a petition for injunction in the regional trial court, which was not in accordance with the remedies provided in the LGC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The September 8, 2004 Decision and the January 10, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan City, Branch 17, in Civil Case No. 2003-14, are AFFIRMED insofar as it declared PNOC-EDC liable to pay the real property tax accruing from its use of the MAGRA. Respondents however are DIRECTED to refrain from levying on the buildings, infrastructures and machineries of PNOC-EDC to satisfy the payment of the real property tax delinquency.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
*********************************************************
1 Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 113-118. Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
2 Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 56-66. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz and Danilo B. Pine. Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., dissented.
3 Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 71-73.
4 In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 56-57.
5 Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 86.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 87.
8 Id. at 90.
9 Id. at 91. 22Sec. 256, Local Government Code.
23 SECTION 257. Local Government’s Lien. – The basic real property tax and any other tax levied under this Title constitutes a lien on the property subject to tax, superior to all liens, charges or encumbrances in favor of any person, irrespective of the owner or possessor thereof, enforceable by administrative or judicial action, and may only be extinguished upon payment of the tax and the related interests and expenses.
24 SECTION 258. Levy on Real Property. – After the expiration of the time required to pay the basic real property tax or any other tax levied under this Title, realty property subject to such tax may be levied upon through the issuance of a warrant on or before, or simultaneously with, the institution of the civil action for the collection of the delinquent tax. …
25 Sec. 266, Local Government Code.
26 Vitug, Jose C. and Acosta, Ernesto D., Tax Law and Jurisprudence [2000 ed.], p. 490.
27 SECTION 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. – Any owner or person having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal.
28 SECTION 229. Action by the Local Board of Assessment Appeals. –
(a) The Board shall decide the appeal within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of receipt of such appeal. …….
(c) … The owner of the property of the person having legal interest therein or the assessor who is not satisfied with the decision of the Board, may, within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision of said Board, appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, as herein provided. The decision of the Central Board shall be final and executory.
29 G.R. No. 146382, August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 494, 499.
Tuesday, October 14, 2008
Supreme Court Decisions: Defamation and Freedom of the Press
Supreme Court Decisions:
Defamation and Freedom of the Press (Phil. Journalists, Inc. et al. vs. Francis Thoenen, December 13, 2005).
Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the remand of the reconstitution case (LRC No. Q-5405) to the Court of origin with instructions that Ortigas’ and the Solicitor General’s appeals from the judgment rendered therein, which were wrongly disallowed, be given due course and the records forthwith transmitted to the appellate tribunal.
This, in fact, is a relief alternatively prayed for by petitioner Ortigas. Considering however the fatal infirmities afflicting Molina’s theory or cause of action, evident from the records before this Court, such a remand and subsequent appeal proceedings would be pointless and unduly circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not possible for Molina’s cause to prosper. To defer adjudication thereon would be unwarranted and unjust.
The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As already discussed, the validity of respondents’ and petitioners’ title have been squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which factual findings are no longer reviewable by this Court.
A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA, et al.,
40 where this Court, as claimed by petitioners, have affirmed their title over the disputed property, would reveal that the sole issue resolved therein is whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties.
41 There was no adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot even be discerned if the property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the property subject of the instant controversy.
There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of "their property" without due process of law when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the RTC.
As already discussed, there is no need to remand the case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of respondents and petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority to pass judgment on their title.
All the evidence presented was duly considered by these tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners’ claim that they were deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due process. As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:
42 Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution of certificates of title, the parties acquiesced in submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the said petition, and they were given the full opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of ownership was valid and binding.
The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners’ title which was irregularly and illegally issued in the first place.
43 As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite:
44 The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.
In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property is indefeasible because of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report … that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis …….
Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system does not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.
Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly reconstituted certificates of title secured through fraud and misrepresentation cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.
45 WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481, and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Quisumbing,JJ., concur.
Carpio, J. The Dissenting Opinion
Azcuna,J. I concur in separate opinion.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143372
PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. (PEOPLE’S JOURNAL), ZACARIAS NUGUID, JR. and CRISTINA LEE,
Petitioners,
- versus -
FRANCIS THOENEN,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
December 13, 2005
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For almost a century, this Court has sought that elusive equilibrium between the law on defamation on one hand, and the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press on the other. This case revisits that search.
On 30 September 1990, the following news item appeared in the People’s Journal, a tabloid of general circulation:
Swiss Shoots Neighbors’ Pets
RESIDENTS of a subdivision in Parañaque have asked the Bureau of Immigration to deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots wayward neighbors’ pets that he finds in his domain.
The BF Homes residents through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara complained that the deportation of Francis Thoenen, of 10 Calcutta BF Homes Phase III, could help "prevent the recurrence of such incident in the future."
Angara explained that house owners could not control their dogs and cats when they slip out of their dwellings unnoticed.
An alleged confrontation between Thoenen and the owner of a pet he shot recently threatens to exacerbate the problem, Angara said.
Cristina Lee
1 The subject of this article, Francis Thoenen, is a retired engineer permanently residing in this country with his Filipina wife and their children.
Claiming that the report was false and defamatory, and that the petitioners acted irresponsibly in failing to verify the truth of the same prior to publication, he filed a civil case for damages against herein petitioners Philippine Journalists, Inc., Zacarias Nuguid, Jr., its publisher, and reporter Cristina Lee.
Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect and admiration he enjoyed in the community, and that since it had been published, he and his wife received several queries and angry calls from friends, neighbors and relatives.
For the impairment of his reputation and standing in the community, and his mental anguish, Thoenen sought P200,000.00 in moral damages, P100,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees.
The petitioners admitted publication of the news item, ostensibly out of a "social and moral duty to inform the public on matters of general interest, promote the public good and protect the moral public (sic) of the people," and that the story was published in good faith and without malice.
2 The principal source of the article was a letter3 by a certain Atty. Efren Angara addressed to Commissioner Andrea Domingo of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID, now Bureau of Immigration), which states:
Dear Madame:
We would like to request your office to verify the true status/authenticity of the residency in the Philippines of a foreign national (a Swiss) by the name of Francis Thoenen who is presently residing at No. 10 Calcuta cor. Beirut Street, BF Homes (PH. III), Parañaque, Metro Manila. I received (sic) complaint from my clients residing around his vicinity that this foreigner had (sic) been causing troubles ever since he showed up.
He is too meticulous and had (sic) been shooting dogs and cats passing his house wall everytime.
Such act which (sic) is unacceptable to the owners especially if inspite (sic) of control their pets slips (sic) out unnoticed.
A confrontation between him and the owner of the dog he shoot, (sic) already occurred last time. In some instances this guy had been always driving his car barbarously inside the subdivision with children playing around (sic) the street.
Before my clients petitioned themselves with the endorsement of the Homeowners Association and filed to your office for deportation we’re respectfully seeking your assistance to investigate this alien to prevent further incident occurrence (sic) in the future. He should not be allowed to dominate the citizens of this country.
Very truly yours,
Atty. Efren B. Angara
The petitioners claim that Lee, as the reporter assigned to cover news events in the CID, acquired a copy of the above letter from a trusted source in the CID’s Intelligence Division. They claimed to "have reasonable grounds to believe in the truth and veracity of the information derived (from their) sources."
4 It was proven at trial that the news article contained several inaccuracies. The headline, which categorically stated that the subject of the article engaged in the practice of shooting pets, was untrue.
5 Moreover, it is immediately apparent from a comparison between the above letter and the news item in question that while the letter is a mere request for verification of Thoenen’s status, Lee wrote that residents of BF Homes had "asked the Bureau of Immigration to deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots neighbors’ pets." No complaints had in fact been lodged against him by any of the BF Home-owners,
6 nor had any pending deportation proceedings been initiated against him in the Bureau of Immigration.
**************************************
215 Phil. 430 [1984].
41Id. at 436.
42149 Phil. 688, 709 [1971].
43Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 67, 69 [2001].
44Supra at 63 & 66.
45Jose v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85157, December 26, 1990, 192 SCRA 735, 741.
Exh. C-1-A; Records, p. 58.
2 Records, p. 18.
3 Dated 01 September 1990; Records, p. 84.
4 Ibid.
5 TSN, 14 November 1991, pp. 16-19.
6 Id., p. 8.
7 Id., pp. 14-15.
Defamation and Freedom of the Press (Phil. Journalists, Inc. et al. vs. Francis Thoenen, December 13, 2005).
Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the remand of the reconstitution case (LRC No. Q-5405) to the Court of origin with instructions that Ortigas’ and the Solicitor General’s appeals from the judgment rendered therein, which were wrongly disallowed, be given due course and the records forthwith transmitted to the appellate tribunal.
This, in fact, is a relief alternatively prayed for by petitioner Ortigas. Considering however the fatal infirmities afflicting Molina’s theory or cause of action, evident from the records before this Court, such a remand and subsequent appeal proceedings would be pointless and unduly circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not possible for Molina’s cause to prosper. To defer adjudication thereon would be unwarranted and unjust.
The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As already discussed, the validity of respondents’ and petitioners’ title have been squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which factual findings are no longer reviewable by this Court.
A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA, et al.,
40 where this Court, as claimed by petitioners, have affirmed their title over the disputed property, would reveal that the sole issue resolved therein is whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties.
41 There was no adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot even be discerned if the property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the property subject of the instant controversy.
There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of "their property" without due process of law when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the RTC.
As already discussed, there is no need to remand the case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of respondents and petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority to pass judgment on their title.
All the evidence presented was duly considered by these tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners’ claim that they were deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due process. As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:
42 Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution of certificates of title, the parties acquiesced in submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the said petition, and they were given the full opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of ownership was valid and binding.
The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners’ title which was irregularly and illegally issued in the first place.
43 As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite:
44 The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.
In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property is indefeasible because of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report … that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis …….
Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system does not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.
Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly reconstituted certificates of title secured through fraud and misrepresentation cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.
45 WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481, and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Quisumbing,JJ., concur.
Carpio, J. The Dissenting Opinion
Azcuna,J. I concur in separate opinion.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143372
PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. (PEOPLE’S JOURNAL), ZACARIAS NUGUID, JR. and CRISTINA LEE,
Petitioners,
- versus -
FRANCIS THOENEN,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
December 13, 2005
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For almost a century, this Court has sought that elusive equilibrium between the law on defamation on one hand, and the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press on the other. This case revisits that search.
On 30 September 1990, the following news item appeared in the People’s Journal, a tabloid of general circulation:
Swiss Shoots Neighbors’ Pets
RESIDENTS of a subdivision in Parañaque have asked the Bureau of Immigration to deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots wayward neighbors’ pets that he finds in his domain.
The BF Homes residents through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara complained that the deportation of Francis Thoenen, of 10 Calcutta BF Homes Phase III, could help "prevent the recurrence of such incident in the future."
Angara explained that house owners could not control their dogs and cats when they slip out of their dwellings unnoticed.
An alleged confrontation between Thoenen and the owner of a pet he shot recently threatens to exacerbate the problem, Angara said.
Cristina Lee
1 The subject of this article, Francis Thoenen, is a retired engineer permanently residing in this country with his Filipina wife and their children.
Claiming that the report was false and defamatory, and that the petitioners acted irresponsibly in failing to verify the truth of the same prior to publication, he filed a civil case for damages against herein petitioners Philippine Journalists, Inc., Zacarias Nuguid, Jr., its publisher, and reporter Cristina Lee.
Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect and admiration he enjoyed in the community, and that since it had been published, he and his wife received several queries and angry calls from friends, neighbors and relatives.
For the impairment of his reputation and standing in the community, and his mental anguish, Thoenen sought P200,000.00 in moral damages, P100,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees.
The petitioners admitted publication of the news item, ostensibly out of a "social and moral duty to inform the public on matters of general interest, promote the public good and protect the moral public (sic) of the people," and that the story was published in good faith and without malice.
2 The principal source of the article was a letter3 by a certain Atty. Efren Angara addressed to Commissioner Andrea Domingo of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID, now Bureau of Immigration), which states:
Dear Madame:
We would like to request your office to verify the true status/authenticity of the residency in the Philippines of a foreign national (a Swiss) by the name of Francis Thoenen who is presently residing at No. 10 Calcuta cor. Beirut Street, BF Homes (PH. III), Parañaque, Metro Manila. I received (sic) complaint from my clients residing around his vicinity that this foreigner had (sic) been causing troubles ever since he showed up.
He is too meticulous and had (sic) been shooting dogs and cats passing his house wall everytime.
Such act which (sic) is unacceptable to the owners especially if inspite (sic) of control their pets slips (sic) out unnoticed.
A confrontation between him and the owner of the dog he shoot, (sic) already occurred last time. In some instances this guy had been always driving his car barbarously inside the subdivision with children playing around (sic) the street.
Before my clients petitioned themselves with the endorsement of the Homeowners Association and filed to your office for deportation we’re respectfully seeking your assistance to investigate this alien to prevent further incident occurrence (sic) in the future. He should not be allowed to dominate the citizens of this country.
Very truly yours,
Atty. Efren B. Angara
The petitioners claim that Lee, as the reporter assigned to cover news events in the CID, acquired a copy of the above letter from a trusted source in the CID’s Intelligence Division. They claimed to "have reasonable grounds to believe in the truth and veracity of the information derived (from their) sources."
4 It was proven at trial that the news article contained several inaccuracies. The headline, which categorically stated that the subject of the article engaged in the practice of shooting pets, was untrue.
5 Moreover, it is immediately apparent from a comparison between the above letter and the news item in question that while the letter is a mere request for verification of Thoenen’s status, Lee wrote that residents of BF Homes had "asked the Bureau of Immigration to deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots neighbors’ pets." No complaints had in fact been lodged against him by any of the BF Home-owners,
6 nor had any pending deportation proceedings been initiated against him in the Bureau of Immigration.
**************************************
215 Phil. 430 [1984].
41Id. at 436.
42149 Phil. 688, 709 [1971].
43Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 67, 69 [2001].
44Supra at 63 & 66.
45Jose v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85157, December 26, 1990, 192 SCRA 735, 741.
Exh. C-1-A; Records, p. 58.
2 Records, p. 18.
3 Dated 01 September 1990; Records, p. 84.
4 Ibid.
5 TSN, 14 November 1991, pp. 16-19.
6 Id., p. 8.
7 Id., pp. 14-15.
Friday, October 10, 2008
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: Sales; Builders in Good Faith/Bad Faith (Fernando Carrascoso, Jr., vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals and Companion Case
Supreme Court Decisions:
Builders in Good Faith/Bad Faith (Fernando Carrascoso, Jr., vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals and Companion Case, December 14, 2005)
vis-a-vis the laws on libel and slander in the groundbreaking case of US v. Bustos,
23 where we applied the prevailing English and American jurisprudence to the effect that:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.
The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom.
Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.
A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good? Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary - to any or all the agencies of Government - public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. (citations omitted)
The demand to protect public opinion for the welfare of society and the orderly administration of government inevitably lead to the adoption of the doctrine of privileged communication.
"A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith.
An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive.
To this genre belong ‘private communications’ and ‘fair and true report without any comments or remarks.’"
24 The appellate court correctly ruled that the petitioners’ story is not privileged in character, for it is neither "private communication" nor a fair and true report without any comments or remarks.
US v. Bustos defined the concept of private communication thus: "A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter."
25 This defense is unavailing to petitioners. In Daez v. Court of Appeals
26 we held that:
As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconduct on the part of public officials, which comes to his notice, to those charged with supervision over them. Such a communication is qualifiedly privileged and the author is not guilty of libel.
The rule on privilege, however, imposes an additional requirement. Such complaints should be addressed solely to some official having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or power to redress the grievance or has some duty to perform or interest in connection therewith. (emphasis supplied).
In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter written by the spurious Atty. Angara is privileged communication, it lost its character as such when the matter was published in the newspaper and circulated among the general population.
A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated in public,
27 which was what the petitioners did in this case.
Neither is the news item a fair and true report without any comments or remarks of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings; there is in fact no proceeding to speak of. Nor is the article related to any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions, for it concerns only false imputations against Thoenen, a private individual seeking a quiet life.
The petitioners also claim to have made the report out of a "social and moral duty to inform the public on matters of general interest."
In Borjal v. Court of Appeals, we stated that "the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged.
We stated that the doctrine of fair commentaries means "that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.
In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition."
28 Again, this argument is unavailing to the petitioners. As we said, the respondent is a private individual, and not a public official or public figure.
We are persuaded by the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
29 that a newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional privilege against liability, for injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in a discussion of public interest.
30 Having established that the article cannot be considered as privileged communication, malice is therefore presumed, and the fourth requisite for the imputation of libel to attach to the petitioners in this case is met.
The news article is therefore defamatory and is not within the realm of protected speech. There is no longer a need to discuss the other assignment of errors, save for the amount of damages to which respon-dent is entitled.
In Policarpio v. Manila Times Publishing Co., Inc.,
31 we awarded damages where the defendants deliberately presented a private individual in a worse light that what she actually was, and where other factual errors were not prevented although defendants had the means to ascertain the veracity of their report. Such are the facts obtaining here.
We must point out that Lee’s brief news item contained falsehoods on two levels. On its face, her statement that residents of BF Homes had "asked the Bureau of Immigration to deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots neighbors’ pets" is patently untrue since the letter of the spurious Atty. Angara was a mere request for verification of Thoenen’s status as a foreign resident.
Lee’s article, moreover, is also untrue, in that the events she reported never happened. The respondent had never shot any of his neighbors’ pets, no complaints had been lodged against him by his neighbors, and no deportation proceedings had been initiated against him.
Worse, the author of Lee’s main source of information, Atty. Efren Angara, apparently either does not exist, or is not a lawyer.
Petitioner Lee would have been enlightened on substantially all these matters had she but tried to contact either Angara or Thoenen. Although it has been stressed that a newspaper "should not be held to account to a point of suppression for honest mistakes, or imperfection in the choice of words,"
32 even the most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced the publication of falsehoods, especially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination of patent lies.33 "There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate."
34 The use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected.
Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality…
The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection" (citations omitted).
35 The legitimate state interest under-lying the law of libel is the compensation of the individuals for the harm inflicted upon them by defamatory falsehood. After all, the individual’s right to protection of his own good name "reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being – a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."
36 The appellate court awarded Thoenen moral damages of P200,000.00, exemplary damages of P50,000.00 and legal fees of P30,000.00, to be borne jointly and severally by the herein petitioners. In Guevarra v. Almario,
37 we noted that the damages in a libel case must depend upon the facts of the particular case and the sound discretion of the court, although appellate courts were "more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase them."
38 So it is in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 January 2000 reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Makati City, of 31 August 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modifi-cation that petitioners are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00, exemplary damages of P30,000.00, and legal fees of P20,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
TSN, 14 November 1991, p. 10.
23 Supra, note 18.
24 Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, 14 January 1999, 301 SCRA 1.
25 Supra, note 18, pp. 742-743.
26 Supra, note 20, p. 69.
27 Ibid., citing Lacsa v. IAC, G.R. No. 74907, 23 May 1988, 161 SCRA 427.
28 Supra, note 24, p. 23.
29 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
30 Three reasons were advanced by Justice Powell for making a distinction between private individuals on one hand and public officers and public figures in the other.
First, public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.
Second, an individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. Those classed as public figures stand in a similar position. For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment.
Third, this would impose an additional difficulty on trial court judges to decide which publications address issues of “general interest” and which do not.[30] Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every instance, the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public office or assumed an “influential role in ordering society.” (Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S., at 164) He has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.
31 G.R. No. L-16027, 30 May 1962, 5 SCRA 148.
32 Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-26549, 31 July 1970, 34 SCRA 116, 127, citing Quisumbing v. Lopez, et al., G.R. No. L-646
5, 31 January 1955, 96 Phil. 510.
33 In Re: Emil P. Jurado, at p. 347.
34 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, note 29, citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US at 270.
35 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 US 64 (1964).
36 Supra, note 29, citing Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 US 75 (1966).
37 56 Phil. 477 (1932).
38 Lopez v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 32, p. 129, citing Guevarra v. Almario, Ibid.
Builders in Good Faith/Bad Faith (Fernando Carrascoso, Jr., vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals and Companion Case, December 14, 2005)
vis-a-vis the laws on libel and slander in the groundbreaking case of US v. Bustos,
23 where we applied the prevailing English and American jurisprudence to the effect that:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.
The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom.
Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.
A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good? Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary - to any or all the agencies of Government - public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. (citations omitted)
The demand to protect public opinion for the welfare of society and the orderly administration of government inevitably lead to the adoption of the doctrine of privileged communication.
"A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith.
An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive.
To this genre belong ‘private communications’ and ‘fair and true report without any comments or remarks.’"
24 The appellate court correctly ruled that the petitioners’ story is not privileged in character, for it is neither "private communication" nor a fair and true report without any comments or remarks.
US v. Bustos defined the concept of private communication thus: "A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter."
25 This defense is unavailing to petitioners. In Daez v. Court of Appeals
26 we held that:
As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconduct on the part of public officials, which comes to his notice, to those charged with supervision over them. Such a communication is qualifiedly privileged and the author is not guilty of libel.
The rule on privilege, however, imposes an additional requirement. Such complaints should be addressed solely to some official having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or power to redress the grievance or has some duty to perform or interest in connection therewith. (emphasis supplied).
In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter written by the spurious Atty. Angara is privileged communication, it lost its character as such when the matter was published in the newspaper and circulated among the general population.
A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated in public,
27 which was what the petitioners did in this case.
Neither is the news item a fair and true report without any comments or remarks of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings; there is in fact no proceeding to speak of. Nor is the article related to any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions, for it concerns only false imputations against Thoenen, a private individual seeking a quiet life.
The petitioners also claim to have made the report out of a "social and moral duty to inform the public on matters of general interest."
In Borjal v. Court of Appeals, we stated that "the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged.
We stated that the doctrine of fair commentaries means "that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.
In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition."
28 Again, this argument is unavailing to the petitioners. As we said, the respondent is a private individual, and not a public official or public figure.
We are persuaded by the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
29 that a newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional privilege against liability, for injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in a discussion of public interest.
30 Having established that the article cannot be considered as privileged communication, malice is therefore presumed, and the fourth requisite for the imputation of libel to attach to the petitioners in this case is met.
The news article is therefore defamatory and is not within the realm of protected speech. There is no longer a need to discuss the other assignment of errors, save for the amount of damages to which respon-dent is entitled.
In Policarpio v. Manila Times Publishing Co., Inc.,
31 we awarded damages where the defendants deliberately presented a private individual in a worse light that what she actually was, and where other factual errors were not prevented although defendants had the means to ascertain the veracity of their report. Such are the facts obtaining here.
We must point out that Lee’s brief news item contained falsehoods on two levels. On its face, her statement that residents of BF Homes had "asked the Bureau of Immigration to deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots neighbors’ pets" is patently untrue since the letter of the spurious Atty. Angara was a mere request for verification of Thoenen’s status as a foreign resident.
Lee’s article, moreover, is also untrue, in that the events she reported never happened. The respondent had never shot any of his neighbors’ pets, no complaints had been lodged against him by his neighbors, and no deportation proceedings had been initiated against him.
Worse, the author of Lee’s main source of information, Atty. Efren Angara, apparently either does not exist, or is not a lawyer.
Petitioner Lee would have been enlightened on substantially all these matters had she but tried to contact either Angara or Thoenen. Although it has been stressed that a newspaper "should not be held to account to a point of suppression for honest mistakes, or imperfection in the choice of words,"
32 even the most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced the publication of falsehoods, especially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination of patent lies.33 "There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate."
34 The use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected.
Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality…
The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection" (citations omitted).
35 The legitimate state interest under-lying the law of libel is the compensation of the individuals for the harm inflicted upon them by defamatory falsehood. After all, the individual’s right to protection of his own good name "reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being – a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."
36 The appellate court awarded Thoenen moral damages of P200,000.00, exemplary damages of P50,000.00 and legal fees of P30,000.00, to be borne jointly and severally by the herein petitioners. In Guevarra v. Almario,
37 we noted that the damages in a libel case must depend upon the facts of the particular case and the sound discretion of the court, although appellate courts were "more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase them."
38 So it is in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 January 2000 reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Makati City, of 31 August 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modifi-cation that petitioners are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00, exemplary damages of P30,000.00, and legal fees of P20,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
TSN, 14 November 1991, p. 10.
23 Supra, note 18.
24 Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, 14 January 1999, 301 SCRA 1.
25 Supra, note 18, pp. 742-743.
26 Supra, note 20, p. 69.
27 Ibid., citing Lacsa v. IAC, G.R. No. 74907, 23 May 1988, 161 SCRA 427.
28 Supra, note 24, p. 23.
29 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
30 Three reasons were advanced by Justice Powell for making a distinction between private individuals on one hand and public officers and public figures in the other.
First, public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.
Second, an individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. Those classed as public figures stand in a similar position. For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment.
Third, this would impose an additional difficulty on trial court judges to decide which publications address issues of “general interest” and which do not.[30] Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every instance, the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public office or assumed an “influential role in ordering society.” (Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S., at 164) He has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.
31 G.R. No. L-16027, 30 May 1962, 5 SCRA 148.
32 Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-26549, 31 July 1970, 34 SCRA 116, 127, citing Quisumbing v. Lopez, et al., G.R. No. L-646
5, 31 January 1955, 96 Phil. 510.
33 In Re: Emil P. Jurado, at p. 347.
34 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, note 29, citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US at 270.
35 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 US 64 (1964).
36 Supra, note 29, citing Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 US 75 (1966).
37 56 Phil. 477 (1932).
38 Lopez v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 32, p. 129, citing Guevarra v. Almario, Ibid.
Thursday, October 2, 2008
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE AND REGULATION: The 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
The 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National
Labor Relations Commission
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 218 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, the following Revised Rules of Procedure governing arbitration proceedings before the Labor Arbiters and the Commission are hereby adopted and promulgated:
RULE I
TITLE AND CONSTRUCTION
SECTION 1.
TITLE OF THE RULES. - These Rules shall be known as the "2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission".
SECTION 2.
CONSTRUCTION. - These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines and other relevant legislations, and to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive resolution and settlement of labor disputes.
SECTION 3.
SUPPLETORY APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF COURT. - In the absence of any applicable provision in these Rules, and in order to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines may, in the interest of expeditious dispensation of labor justice and whenever practicable and convenient, be applied by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
RULE II
DEFINITION OF TERMS
SECTION 1.
DEFINITIONS. - The terms and phrases defined in Article 212 of the Labor Code, as amended, shall be given the same meanings when used herein.
As used herein, "Regional Arbitration Branch" shall mean any of the regional arbitration branches or sub-regional branches of the Commission.
RULE III
PLEADINGS, NOTICES AND APPEARANCES
SECTION 1.
COMPLAINT. - a) A complaint or petition is a pleading alleging the cause or causes of action of the complainant or petitioner. The names and addresses of all complainants or petitioners and respondents must be stated in the complaint or petition.
It shall be signed under oath by the complainant or petitioner, with a declaration of non-forum shopping.
b) A party having more than one cause of action against the other party, arising out of the same relationship, shall include all of them in one complaint or petition.
c) No amendment of the complaint or petition shall be allowed after the filing of position papers, unless with leave of the Labor Arbiter or the Commission.
SECTION 2.
CAPTION AND TITLE. - In all cases filed with the Commission or with any of its Regional Arbitration Branches, the party initiating the action shall be called the "Complainant" or "Petitioner", and the opposing party the "Respondent".
The full names of all the real parties in interest, whether natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law, shall be stated in the caption of the complaint or petition, as well as in the decisions, resolutions or orders of the Labor Arbiter or the Commission.
SECTION 3.
ISSUANCE OF SUMMONS. - Within two (2) days from receipt of a complaint or amended complaint, the Labor Arbiter shall issue the required summons, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint or amended complaint.
The summons shall specify the date, time and place of the mandatory conciliation and mediation confe-rence in two (2) settings.
SECTION 4.
PROHIBITED PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS. - The following pleadings and motions shall not be allowed and acted upon nor elevated to the Commission in all cases covered by these Rules:
a) Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, improper venue, res adju-dicata, prescription and forum shopping;
b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
c) Motion for new trial;
d) Petition for relief from judgment when filed with the Labor Arbiter;
e) Petition for certiorari, man-damus or prohibition;
f) Motion to declare respondent in default;
g) Motion for reconsideration or appeal from any interlocutory order of the Labor Arbiter.
SECTION 5.
FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS. - All pleadings in connection with the case shall be filed with the appropriate docketing unit of the Regional Arbitration Branch or the Commission, as the case maybe.
The party filing the pleadings shall serve the opposing parties with a copy thereof and its supporting documents in the manner provided for in these Rules with proof of service thereof.
SECTION 6.
SERVICE OF NOTICES AND RESOLUTIONS. - a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the Bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by registered mail; Provided that in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court; Provided further, that in cases of decisions and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel or representative by registered mail; Provided further that in cases where a party to a case or his counsel on record personally seeks service of the decision upon inquiry thereon, service to said party shall be deemed effected upon actual receipt thereof; Provided finally, that where parties are so numerous, service shall be made on counsel and upon such number of complainants, as may be practicable, which shall be considered substantial compliance with Article 224 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
For purposes of appeal, the period shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel or representative of record.
b) The Bailiff or officer serving the notice, order, resolution or decision shall submit his return within two (2) days from date of service thereof, stating legibly in his return his name, the names of the persons served and the date of receipt, which return shall be immediately attached and shall form part of the records of the case.
In case of service by registered mail, the Bailiff or officer shall write in the return, the names of persons served and the date of mailing of the resolution or decision.
If no service was effected, the service officer shall state the reason therefor in the return.
SECTION 7.
PROOF AND COMPLETENESS OF SERVICE. - The return is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent; but if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect after such time.
SECTION 8.
APPEARANCES. - a) A lawyer appearing for a party is presumed to be properly authorized for that purpose. In every case, he shall indicate in his pleadings and motions his Attorney’s Roll Number, as well as his PTR and IBP numbers for the current year.
b) A non-lawyer may appear as counsel in any of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter or Commission only under the following conditions:
(1) he represents himself as party to the case;
(2) he represents a legitimate labor organization, as defined under Article 212 and 242 of the Labor Code, as amended, which is a party to the case: Provided, that he presents: (i) a certification from the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) or Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment attesting that the organization he represents is duly registered and listed in the roster of legitimate labor organi-zations; (ii) a verified certification issued by the secretary and attested to by the president of the said organization stating that he is authorized to represent the said organization in the said case; and (iii) a copy of the resolution of the board of directors of the said organization granting him such authority;
(3) he represents a member or members of a legitimate labor organization that is existing within the employer’s establishment, who are parties to the case: Provided, that the presents: (i) a verified certification attesting that he is authorized by such member or members to represent them in the case; and (ii) a verified certification issued by the secretary and attested to by the president of the said organization stating that the person or persons he is representing are members of their organization which is existing in the employer’s establishment;
(4) he is duly-accredited member of any legal aid office recognized by the Department of Justice or Integrated Bar of the Philippines: Provided, that he (i) presents proof of his accreditation; and (ii) represents a party to the case;
(5) he is the owner or president of a corporation or establishment which is a party to the case: Provided, that he presents: (i) a verified certifi-cation attesting that he is authorized to represent said corporation or establishment; and (ii) a copy of the resolution of the board of directors of said corporation, or other similar resolution or instrument issued by said establishment, granting him such authority.
c) A non-lawyer who appears in contravention of this section shall not be recognized in any proceedings before the Labor Arbiter or the Commission.
d) Appearances may be made orally or in writing. In both cases, the complete name and office address of both parties shall be made on record and the adverse party or his counsel or representative properly notified.
e) Any change in the address of counsel or representative should be filed with the records of the case and furnished the adverse party or counsel.
f) Any change or withdrawal of counsel or representative shall be made in accordance with the Rules of Court.
SECTION 9.
AUTHORITY TO BIND PARTY. - Attorneys and other repre-sentatives of parties shall have authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a special power of attorney or express consent, enter into a compromise agreement with the opposing party in full or partial discharge of a client’s claim.
RULE IV
VENUE, ASSIGNMENT AND DISPOSITION OF CASES
SECTION 1.
VENUE. - a) All cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant or petitioner.
For purposes of venue, the workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned at the time the cause of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment, or travel. In case of field employees, as well as ambulant or itinerant workers, their workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or where they are supposed to regularly receive their salaries and wages or work instructions from, and report the results of their assignment to, their employers.
b) Where two (2) or more Regional Arbitration Branches have jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant or petitioner, the Branch that first acquired jurisdiction over the case shall exclude the others.
c) When venue is not objected to before the filing of position papers such issue shall be deemed waived.
d) The venue of an action may be changed or transferred to a different Regional Arbitration Branch other than where the complaint was filed by written agreement of the parties or when the Commission or Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending so orders, upon motion by the proper party in meritorious cases.
e) Cases involving overseas Filipino workers may be filed before the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the place where the complainant resides or where the principal office of any of the respondents is situated, at the option of the complainant.
SECTION 2.
RAFFLE AND ASSIGN-MENT OF CASES. - a) All complaints and petitions filed with the docket unit of the Regional Arbitration Branch shall be immediately raffled and assigned to a Labor Arbiter from receipt thereof.
(b) The Executive Labor Arbiter shall be responsible for the immediate raffle
Dept of Justice Opinion: Exemption from payment of chattel mortgage registration
OPINION NO. 55, S. 2005
December 13, 2005
Administrator Benedicto B. Ulep
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue corner NIA Road
Quezon City
Administrator Ulep:
This has reference to your request for confirmation of your view that the grant of privileges and other favorable terms to the Philippine Airlines (PAL) shall also ipso facto operate equally in favor of Cebu Pacific only upon showing by the latter of a clear proof that PAL’s enjoyment of the privileges and favorable terms accorded to it will place Cebu Pacific at a disadvantage.
The instant request stemmed from the letter of Atty. Perry L. Pe, Corporate Secretary of Cebu Air, Inc. ("Cebu Pacific"), requesting confirmation that the chattel mortgage to be constituted over four (4) Airbus A319-100 aircraft to be acquired by Cebu Air, Inc. (Cebu Pacific) is exempt from registration fees imposed under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, and the Revised Administrative Code.
It appears that Cebu Pacific, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a holder of a legislative franchise granted under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7151 (An Act Granting Cebu Air, Inc., a Franchise to Establish, Operate and Maintain Transport Services for the Carriage of Passengers, Mail, Goods and Property by Air, Both Domestic and International, With Cebu as Its Base), executed an Aircraft Purchase Agreement with Airbus S.A.S. over twelve (12) A319-100 aircrafts for use in domestic and international operations as part of its long-term refleeting and modernization programs; that various French, German and British financial institutions will provide the financing for the transaction with corresponding guaranty or insurance by COFACE, Euler Hermes and Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECDG); that in compliance with one of the lenders’ conditions for the extension of the loan package, Cebu Pacific assigned the Aircraft Purchase Agreement to a Special Purpose Corporation (SPC) domiciled outside of the Philippines; that the SPC shall hold title to the aircraft and shall act as the borrower under relevant loan agreements and that Cebu Pacific shall then enter into a financial lease agreement with the SPC.
It likewise appears that Cebu Pacific, being the ultimate borrower, shall actually bear all the costs relating to the registration and payment of any applicable taxes of the chattel mortgage and other security documents to be constituted over the subject aircrafts. Cebu Pacific is, therefore, requesting confirmation of its exemption from payment of chattel mortgage registration fees over the four (4) Airbus A319-100.
You state that the exemption from payment of registration fees and other privileges granted to PAL continues to be in full force and effect, and subsists notwith-standing the privatization of the Philippines Airlines, in the absence of a law amending or withdrawing the privileges contained in PAL’s charter, P.D. No. 1590. It is your view, however, that before it can avail of the same privileges enjoyed by PAL, Cebu Pacific has to establish that the exemptions granted to, and enjoyed, by PAL will tend to place Cebu Pacific at any disadvantage.
Presidential Decree No. 1590 (An Act Granting a New Fran-chise to Philippine Airlines, Inc. to Establish, to Operate, and Maintain Air-Transport Services in the Philippines and Other Countries) which continues to extend certain privileges to Pal in the absence of any law amending or withdrawing the privileges in its charter, reads in part:
Sec. 13. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay to the Philippine Government during the life of this franchise whichever of subsections (a) and (b) hereunder will result in a lower tax:
(a) The basic corporate income tax based on the grantee’s annual net taxable income com-puted in accordance with the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code; or
(b) A franchise tax of two per cent (2%) of the gross revenues derived by the grantee from all sources, without distinc-tion as to transport or non-transport operations; provided, that with respect to international air-transport service, only the gross pas-senger, mail, and freight revenues from its outgoing flights shall be subject to this tax.
(1) The tax paid by the grantee under either of the above alternatives shall be in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license, and other fees and charges of any kind, nature, or descrip-tion, imposed, levied, established, assessed, or national authority or government agency, now or in the future, including but not limited to the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) All taxes on interest, fees, and other charges on foreign loans obtained and other obligations incurred by the grantee where the payment of such taxes is assumed by the grantee;
(5) All taxes, fees, and other charges on the regis-tration, licensing, acquisition, and transfer of aircraft, equipment, motor vehicles, and all other personal and real property of the grantee; and
xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the legislative franchise granted in favor of Cebu Air, Inc., specifically Section 11 of R.A. No. 7151 provides:
SEC. 11. Tax Provisions. -
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In the event that any competing individual, part-nership or corporation re-ceives and enjoys tax privi-leges and other favorable terms which tend to place the herein grantee at any disad-vantage, then such provisions shall be deemed ipso facto part hereof and shall operate equally in favor of the grantee.
xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing premises, this Department confirms that the "most favored treatment" clause found in Section 11 of R.A. No. 7151 expressly provides that tax privileges or favorable term/s received or enjoyed by any competing individual, partnership or corporation - in this case, PAL, shall automatically be deemed incorporated in the franchise of Cebu Pacific. The basic idea of the aforesaid clause is "fair play", such that a rival firm will not gain an undue or unfair advantage over the other in the pursuit of their respective competing business. In other words, the purpose of the said clause is to place the holder thereof on an equal footing with its rival enterprise by not giving such competitors undue advantage (Secretary of Justice Opinion No. 51, s. 1987).
Please be guided accordingly.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) RAUL M. GONZALEZ
Secretary
December 13, 2005
Administrator Benedicto B. Ulep
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue corner NIA Road
Quezon City
Administrator Ulep:
This has reference to your request for confirmation of your view that the grant of privileges and other favorable terms to the Philippine Airlines (PAL) shall also ipso facto operate equally in favor of Cebu Pacific only upon showing by the latter of a clear proof that PAL’s enjoyment of the privileges and favorable terms accorded to it will place Cebu Pacific at a disadvantage.
The instant request stemmed from the letter of Atty. Perry L. Pe, Corporate Secretary of Cebu Air, Inc. ("Cebu Pacific"), requesting confirmation that the chattel mortgage to be constituted over four (4) Airbus A319-100 aircraft to be acquired by Cebu Air, Inc. (Cebu Pacific) is exempt from registration fees imposed under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, and the Revised Administrative Code.
It appears that Cebu Pacific, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a holder of a legislative franchise granted under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7151 (An Act Granting Cebu Air, Inc., a Franchise to Establish, Operate and Maintain Transport Services for the Carriage of Passengers, Mail, Goods and Property by Air, Both Domestic and International, With Cebu as Its Base), executed an Aircraft Purchase Agreement with Airbus S.A.S. over twelve (12) A319-100 aircrafts for use in domestic and international operations as part of its long-term refleeting and modernization programs; that various French, German and British financial institutions will provide the financing for the transaction with corresponding guaranty or insurance by COFACE, Euler Hermes and Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECDG); that in compliance with one of the lenders’ conditions for the extension of the loan package, Cebu Pacific assigned the Aircraft Purchase Agreement to a Special Purpose Corporation (SPC) domiciled outside of the Philippines; that the SPC shall hold title to the aircraft and shall act as the borrower under relevant loan agreements and that Cebu Pacific shall then enter into a financial lease agreement with the SPC.
It likewise appears that Cebu Pacific, being the ultimate borrower, shall actually bear all the costs relating to the registration and payment of any applicable taxes of the chattel mortgage and other security documents to be constituted over the subject aircrafts. Cebu Pacific is, therefore, requesting confirmation of its exemption from payment of chattel mortgage registration fees over the four (4) Airbus A319-100.
You state that the exemption from payment of registration fees and other privileges granted to PAL continues to be in full force and effect, and subsists notwith-standing the privatization of the Philippines Airlines, in the absence of a law amending or withdrawing the privileges contained in PAL’s charter, P.D. No. 1590. It is your view, however, that before it can avail of the same privileges enjoyed by PAL, Cebu Pacific has to establish that the exemptions granted to, and enjoyed, by PAL will tend to place Cebu Pacific at any disadvantage.
Presidential Decree No. 1590 (An Act Granting a New Fran-chise to Philippine Airlines, Inc. to Establish, to Operate, and Maintain Air-Transport Services in the Philippines and Other Countries) which continues to extend certain privileges to Pal in the absence of any law amending or withdrawing the privileges in its charter, reads in part:
Sec. 13. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay to the Philippine Government during the life of this franchise whichever of subsections (a) and (b) hereunder will result in a lower tax:
(a) The basic corporate income tax based on the grantee’s annual net taxable income com-puted in accordance with the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code; or
(b) A franchise tax of two per cent (2%) of the gross revenues derived by the grantee from all sources, without distinc-tion as to transport or non-transport operations; provided, that with respect to international air-transport service, only the gross pas-senger, mail, and freight revenues from its outgoing flights shall be subject to this tax.
(1) The tax paid by the grantee under either of the above alternatives shall be in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license, and other fees and charges of any kind, nature, or descrip-tion, imposed, levied, established, assessed, or national authority or government agency, now or in the future, including but not limited to the following:
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(4) All taxes on interest, fees, and other charges on foreign loans obtained and other obligations incurred by the grantee where the payment of such taxes is assumed by the grantee;
(5) All taxes, fees, and other charges on the regis-tration, licensing, acquisition, and transfer of aircraft, equipment, motor vehicles, and all other personal and real property of the grantee; and
xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the legislative franchise granted in favor of Cebu Air, Inc., specifically Section 11 of R.A. No. 7151 provides:
SEC. 11. Tax Provisions. -
xxx xxx xxx
In the event that any competing individual, part-nership or corporation re-ceives and enjoys tax privi-leges and other favorable terms which tend to place the herein grantee at any disad-vantage, then such provisions shall be deemed ipso facto part hereof and shall operate equally in favor of the grantee.
xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing premises, this Department confirms that the "most favored treatment" clause found in Section 11 of R.A. No. 7151 expressly provides that tax privileges or favorable term/s received or enjoyed by any competing individual, partnership or corporation - in this case, PAL, shall automatically be deemed incorporated in the franchise of Cebu Pacific. The basic idea of the aforesaid clause is "fair play", such that a rival firm will not gain an undue or unfair advantage over the other in the pursuit of their respective competing business. In other words, the purpose of the said clause is to place the holder thereof on an equal footing with its rival enterprise by not giving such competitors undue advantage (Secretary of Justice Opinion No. 51, s. 1987).
Please be guided accordingly.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) RAUL M. GONZALEZ
Secretary
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