Supreme Court Decision: Disability Compensation for Overseas Seafarers.

Supreme Court Decision: Disability Compensation for Overseas Seafarers.


SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 159887

BERNARDO REMIGIO, Petitioner,
-versus-

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, C.F. SHARP CREW MGT., INC. & NEW COMMODORE CRUISE LINE, INC.,
Respondents.

Promulgated: April 12, 2006



DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 67782 which affirmed the March 22, 2001 Resolution4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), awarding sickness allowance of US$3,400.00 to petitioner but denying his claim for disability benefits.

The facts are undisputed.

On November 27, 1997, petitioner Bernardo Remigio entered into a Contract of Employment with respondent C.F. Sharp Crew Manage-ment, Inc. (respondent agency), for and in behalf of its foreign principal, co-respondent New Commodore Cruise Line, Ltd. (respondent principal).

The contract provided that the terms and conditions of the standard employment contract governing the employment of all seafarers, approved per Department of Labor and Employment’s Department Order No. 33 and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration’s Memorandum Circular No. 55, both Series of 1996 (1996 POEA SEC), were to be strictly and faithfully observed.

Under the contract, petitioner was to work as Musician II on board SS “Enchanted Isle,” a vessel owned and operated by respondent principal, for ten (10) months, at a basic monthly salary of US$857.00, overtime rate of US$257.00 per month and vacation leave with pay of three (3) days per month.
After petitioner passed the pre-employment medical examination, he joined the vessel and started performing his job as a drummer in December 1997.

On March 16, 1998, while the vessel was docked at the port of Cancun, Mexico, petitioner went ashore to attend to some personal matters.

While walking, petitioner suddenly felt severe chest pain and shortness of breath. He returned to the vessel and experienced another such episode on the same evening. When his chest pain recurred the following day, he went to the vessel’s infirmary where he again suffered from chest pain.

Petitioner was brought and confined for seven (7) days at the Grand Cayman Island Hospital. His pain worsened upon physical exertion but improved with rest. Thus, he was instructed to refrain from performing any kind of physical activity and to have a complete bed rest.

He rejoined the vessel on March 24, 1998.
Upon the vessel’s arrival at the port of New Orleans, Louisiana, U.S.A., petitioner was brought to the West Jefferson Medical Center for a more thorough check-up and evaluation. Dr. S. Kedia’s “impression” was that petitioner’s chest pains were “probable secondary to severe coronary artery disease.” Dr. Armengol Porta conducted a physical examination on petitioner, including a coronary angiogram, and found that he had several blockages in his coronary arteries.

A triple coronary artery bypass was performed on petitioner on April 2, 1998 by a Dr. Everson. On April 8, 1998, petitioner was transferred to the Marine Medical Unit for observation. After twelve (12) days of confinement, petitioner’s cardiologist found him “not fit for sea duty” and recommended for him to be “[r]epatriated to home port for follow up with a cardiologist.”

He was repatriated to Manila on April 23, 1998. In a letter dated April 27, 1998, Henry P. Desiderio, the manager of the Crewing Administration and Business Development Department of respondent agency, referred petitioner to the American Outpatient Clinic for medical check-up.

On May 13, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, sent a formal communication to respondent agency demanding payment of unpaid wages, sickness allowance and permanent total disability benefits.

The demand, however, was refused.
In a letter dated June 25, 1998 addressed to the manager of respondent agency, Jose Enrique P. Desiderio, the company-designated physician, Dr. Leticia C. Abesamis, of the American Outpatient Clinic wrote, viz:
Mr. B. Remigio who had Coronary Bypass (6x) abroad last April 2, 1998 has completed his cardiac rehabilitation here at the Phil. Heart Center. Stress done on June 23, 1998 shows functional capacity at 8 METS.
Lately he has been complaining of epigastric discomfort probably from Ecotrin. He has been on ulcer regimen. He may go back to sea duty as piano player or guitar player after 8-10 more months.

He was unfit from April 27, 1998 to June 25, 1998.12 (emphases supplied)
On November 12, 1998, petitioner filed the instant complaint for (a) recovery of permanent total disability benefits amounting to US$60,000.00; (b) actual and compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity in the amount of US$154,260.00; and (c) moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Private respondents made an offer to settle the case at US$30,000.00 as evidenced by fax letters, to which petitioner made a counter-proposal of US$40,000.00.

No agreement was reached as the parties proceeded to submit their respective position papers and supporting evidence.

In support of his claims, petitioner submitted copies of:

a) his Contract of Employment with private respondents; b) communication of respondent principal to respondent agency informing the latter about petitioner’s “heart attack,” repatriation and replacement;
c) History and Physical Report of petitioner and Procedure Report of his cardiac catheterization;
d) receipts from a drugstore and the Philippine Heart Center; e) 2D Echocardiogram-Color Doppler Report; f) filled up form of the Exercise Testing and Cardiac Rehabilitation Laboratory of the Philippine Heart Center showing the results of the tests done on petitioner; and
g) the Discharge Summary of the Marine Medical Unit.

On the other hand, private respondents submitted copies of:
a) the Contract of Employment;
b) referral letter dated April 27, 1998 of respondent agency to the American Outpatient Clinic;
c) demand letter dated May 13, 1998 of petitioner’s counsel; and d) medical report of Dr. Leticia C. Abesamis of the American Outpatient Clinic addressed to the manager of respondent agency.

On September 15, 1999, Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday rendered his decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents jointly and severally to pay complainant, his sickness allowance in the amount of US$3,400.00.

All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

In ruling that petitioner is not entitled to disability benefits, Labor Arbiter Caday noted that the Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or Illness Contracted under Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC does not provide for the payment of compensation benefits in cases of cardiac catheterization or heart bypass.

Even assuming that it was included, he held that no medical report was presented to show that petitioner’s disability was total and permanent as to be classified under Grade 1 of the said schedule of disability. Nonetheless, petitioner’s claim for sickness allowance was granted as there was no showing that private respondents paid petitioner’s basic wages after his repatriation, as provided under Section 20, B(3) of the 1996 POEA SEC.

Petitioner was awarded US$3,400.00 as sickness allowance, computed on the basis of his monthly wage of US$850.00 multiplied by four (4) months.

On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC’s resolution, to no avail.

Accordingly, he filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the CA.

On March 31, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition.

The CA likewise did not find substantial evidence to prove that the heart ailment incurred by petitioner during the term of his employment resulted to his disability, i.e., rendered him incapable of further seeking employment as a musician or to follow a substantially gainful occupation.

It noted that petitioner’s medical records abroad never mentioned that his heart ailment resulted to a disability. Petitioner’s reliance on Dr. Abesamis’s letter dated June 25, 1998 that he (petitioner) was “unfit from April 27, 1998 to June 25, 1998” was found as insufficient to prove that petitioner’s earning capacity was either lost or diminished.

The statement that petitioner “may go back to sea duty as piano player or guitar player after 8-10 more months” was likewise found as insufficient to prove that petitioner was actually “sidelined” or that it was impossible for him to work and earn as a musician during the 8-10 months that he was not on board the vessel.

Finally, it considered that heart ailment is not included among the compensable sicknesses and injuries under the 1996 POEA SEC.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration with the CA was denied. Hence, this petition in which petitioner prays that he be awarded US$60,000.00 as permanent total disability benefits, US$3,428.00 as sickness allowance, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

He assigns as lone error, the following:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT AND DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

The main issue is whether petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
At the outset, private respondents’ contention that the instant petition must be dismissed outright for being grounded on a question of fact must be rejected.

The issue of whether petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits is a question of law as it calls for the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on disability benefits to the established facts on record.

It raises the following sub-issues, to wit:

1. Whether heart ailment suffered during the term of the contract is compensable under the 1996 POEA SEC even if there is no proof of work-connection; and

2. Whether the concept of permanent total disability under the Labor Code applies to the case of a seafarer’s claim for disability benefits under the 1996 POEA SEC.
First. In ruling that petitioner is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits, the Labor Arbiter and the CA considered that “cardiac catheterization,” “heart bypass,” or “heart ailment” is not found in the Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or Illness Contracted under Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC. Petitioner contends that the schedule of disability under Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC is not exclusive.

Heart ailment, though not listed in the schedule, is compensable. Private respondents, on the other hand, concede that while petitioner’s illness is not listed under the 1996 POEA SEC, “this does not mean that the same is not compensable.”26 However, since “heart ailment” is not listed under Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC, it is not an “occupational disease.”

It was therefore incumbent upon petitioner to prove by substantial evidence that his illness was work-related. Having failed to do so, he is not entitled to disability benefits.
We find merit in petitioner’s argument.

Petitioner bases his claim for disability benefits under Section 20 in relation to Sections 30 and 30-A of the 1996 POEA SEC, viz:

Sec. 20. Compensation and Benefits
x x x

B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
x x x

5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer during the term of employment caused by either injury or illness[,] the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 30 of [t]his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.

Sec. 30. SCHEDULE OF DISABILITY OR IMPEDIMENT FOR INJURIES SUFFERED AND DISEASES OR ILLNESS CONTRACTED
x x x

CHEST-TRUNK-SPINE
1. Fracture of four (4) or more ribs resulting to severe limitation of chest expansion - Gr. 6

2. Fracture of four (4) or more ribs with intercostal neuralgia resulting in moderate limitation of chest expansion - Gr. 9

3. Slight limitation of chest expansion due to simple rib functional without myositis or intercostal neuralgia - Gr. 12

4. Fracture of the dorsal or lumber spines resulting to severe or total rigidity of the trunk or total loss of lifting power of heavy objects - Gr. 6

5. Moderate rigidity or two thirds (2/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk - Gr. 8

6. Slight rigidity or one third (1/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk - Gr. 11

7. Injury to the spinal cord as to make walking impossible without the aid of a pair of crutches - Gr. 4

8. Injury to the spinal cord as to make walking impossible even with the aid of a pair of crutches - Gr. 1

9. Injury to the spinal cord resulting to incontinence of urine and feces - Gr. 1

x x x

NOTE: Any item in the schedule classified under Grade 1 shall be considered or shall constitute total and permanent disability.
Sec. 30-A.

SCHEDULE OF DISABILITY ALLOWANCES

Impediment Grade Impediment
1 Maximum Rate x 120.00%
2 Maximum Rate x 88.81%
3 Maximum Rate x 78.36%
4 Maximum Rate x 68.66% 5 Maximum Rate x 58.96% 6 Maximum Rate x 50.00% 7 Maximum Rate x 41.80% 8 Maximum Rate x 33.59% 9 Maximum Rate x 26.12% 10 Maximum Rate x 20.15% 11 Maximum Rate x 14.93% 12 Maximum Rate x 10.45% 13 Maximum Rate x 6.72% 14 Maximum Rate x 3.74%

Maximum Rate: US$50,000
To be paid in Philippine Currency equivalent at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. (emphases supplied)
“Disability” is generally defined as “loss or impairment of a physical or mental function resulting from injury or sickness.” Clearly, “disability” is not synonymous with “sickness” or “illness,” the former being a potential effect of the latter.

The schedule in Sec. 30 of the POEA SEC is a Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or Illness Contracted. It is not a list of compensable sicknesses. Unlike the 2000 POEA SEC, nowhere in the 1996 POEA SEC is there a list of “Occupational Diseases.”

The unqualified phrase “during the term” in Section 20(B) of the 1996 POEA SEC covers all injury or illness occurring in the lifetime of the contract. The injury or illness need not be shown to be work-related. In Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, we categorically held:

The argument of petitioners that since cancer of the pancreas is not an occupational disease it was incumbent upon Capt. Arante to prove that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the same, is not meritorious.

It must be noted that his claims arose from the stipulations of the standard format contract entered into between him and SEACORP which, per Circular No. 2, Series of 198430 of respondent POEA was required to be adopted and used by all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen (sic) on board any ocean-going vessel.

His claims are not rooted from the provisions of the New Labor Code as amended. Significantly, under the contract, compensability of the death or illness of seam[e]n need not be dependent upon whether it is work connected or not. Therefore, proof that the working conditions increased the risk of contracting a disease or illness, is not required to entitle a seaman who dies during the term thereof by reason of such disease or illness, of the benefits stipulated thereunder which are, under Section C(2) of the same Circular No.

2, separate and distinct from, and in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. (emphasis supplied)
This principle was reiterated in the recent case of Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC.

While indeed, the Labor Code’s provisions on disability benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) require the element of work-relation for an illness to be compensable, the 1996 POEA SEC giving a more liberal provision in favor of the seafarer must apply.

As a rule, stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the force of law between the contracting parties.

In controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the former’s favor.

The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection of labor.

Second. Is the Labor Code’s concept of permanent total disability applicable to the case at bar? Petitioner claims to have suffered from permanent total disability as defined under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, viz:

Art. 192 (c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules; x x x

Petitioner likewise cites Vicente v. ECC35 and Abaya, Jr. v. ECC, both of which were decided applying the Labor Code provisions on disability benefits. Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that petitioner erred in applying the definition of “permanent total disability” under the Labor Code and cases decided under the ECC as the instant case involves a contractual claim under the 1996 POEA SEC.
Again, we rule for petitioner.

The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to “secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith” and to “promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas.”

Section 29 of the 1996 POEA SEC itself provides that “[a]ll rights and obligations of the parties to [the] Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory.”

Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to “the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.”

Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. In Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. NLRC, seaman Carlos Nietes was found to be suffering from congestive heart failure and cardiomyopathy and was declared as unfit to work by the company-accredited physician.

The Court affirmed the award of disability benefits to the seaman, citing ECC v. Sanico, GSIS v. CA, and Bejerano v. ECC42 that “disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity.

Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that [he] was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness.”

It likewise cited Bejerano v. ECC, that in a disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.

The same principles were cited in the more recent case of Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad.

In addition, the Court cited GSIS v. Cadiz45 and Ijares v. CA46 that “permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.”
Finally.

Applying the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the facts on record, is petitioner entitled to permanent total disability benefit?

Petitioner contends that the certification of the company-designated physician that he may go back to sea duty as a piano or guitar player after 8-10 months even if his job was a drummer proves that he suffered from permanent total disability and thus entitled to permanent total disability benefits of US$60,000.00 under the 1996 POEA SEC.

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that:

1) petitioner did not present any proof that he suffered from permanent total disability, i.e., that his earning power is now reduced and that he is incapable of performing remunerative employment;

2) petitioner did not present any medical certificate showing that he suffered any disability;

3) on the contrary, the company-designated physician attested that petitioner could return to further sea duty;

4) even if he could not go back to sea duty, this does not mean that his earning capacity is impaired since as a musician, he may still perform on land; and

5) having admitted that he was a heavy smoker, petitioner is disqualified under Section 20(d) of the 1996 POEA SEC from recovering compensation for any incapacity or disability he suffered.

There are three kinds of disability benefits under the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 626: (1) temporary total disability, (2) permanent total disability, and (3) permanent partial disability. Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code differentiates the disabilities as follows:

Sec. 2. Disability.

(a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.

(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X47 of these Rules.

(c) A disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body. (emphasis supplied)

In Vicente v. ECC:
x x x the test of whether or not an employee suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwith-standing the disability he incurred.

Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. (emphases supplied)
A total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue her usual work and earn therefrom.

On the other hand, a total disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days.

Thus, in the very recent case of Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, we held:
Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.

Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.

It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.

Applying the foregoing standards, we find that petitioner suffered from permanent total disability.

It is undisputed that petitioner started to suffer chest pains on March 16, 1998 and was repatriated on April 23, 1998 after having been found as “not fit for duty.”

The medical report dated June 25, 1998 of the company-designated physician, Dr. Abesamis, establishes the following facts, viz:

a) petitioner underwent a coronary bypass on April 2, 1998; b) petitioner was “unfit” from April 27, 1998 (date of referral) to June 25, 1998 (date of medical report);

c) petitioner may not return to sea duty within 8-10 months after June 25, 1998; and d) petitioner may return to sea duty as a piano or guitar player after 8-10 months from June 25, 1998.

These facts clearly prove that petitioner was unfit to work as drummer for at least 11-13 months from the onset of his ailment on March 16, 1998 to 8-10 months after June 25, 1998.

This, by itself, already constitutes permanent total disability. What is more, private respondents were well aware that petitioner was working for them as a drummer, as proven by the communication of respondent principal to respondent agency referring to petitioner as “drummer with our enchanted isle quartet.”

Thus, the certification that petitioner may go back specifically as a piano or guitar player means that the likelihood of petitioner returning to his usual work as a drummer was practically nil. From this, it is pristine clear that petitioner’s disability is total and permanent.

Private respondents’ contention that it was not shown that it was impossible for petitioner to play the drums during the 8-10 months that he was on land is specious.

To our minds, petitioner’s unfitness to work attached to the nature of his job rather than to its place of performance.

Indeed, playing drums per se requires physical exertion, speed and endurance. It demands the performance of hitting strokes and repetitive movements that petitioner, having undergone a triple coronary bypass, has become incapacitated to do.

The possibility that petitioner could work as a drummer at sea again does not negate the claim for permanent total disability benefits.

In the same case of Crystal Shipping, Inc., we held:

Petitioners tried to contest the above findings [of permanent total disability] by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001. (citation omitted) Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years.

The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability.56 (emphasis supplied)

That the company-designated physician did not specify that petitioner suffered from any disability should not prejudice petitioner’s claim for disability benefits.

In the first place, it is well to note that it was respondent agency which referred petitioner to the American Outpatient Clinic giving only the specific instruction that the designated physician indicate in the medical report “the estimated treatment period and the exam conducted.”

Moreover, what is important is that the facts stated in the medical report clearly constitute permanent total disability as defined by law. It is well-settled that strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits.

Disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. As in the case of Crystal Shipping, Inc., an award of permanent total disability benefits in the petition at bar would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.
We do not agree that petitioner’s admission that he was a heavy smoker is enough ground to disqualify him from entitlement to disability compensation under Section 20(D) of the 1996 POEA SEC, viz:

Section 20.D. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.

We have held that a worker brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability.

In the case at bar, it is noteworthy that petitioner’s habit of smoking was not a consideration when private respondents hired petitioner. It was likewise not shown that petitioner suffered from any form of ailment prior to the heart ailment he suffered during the course of his employment with private respondents.

While smoking may contribute to the development of a heart ailment, heart ailment may be caused by other factors such as working and living under stressful conditions. Thus, private respondents’ peremptory presumption, that petitioner’s habit of smoking heavily was the willful act which caused his illness and resulting disability, without more, cannot suffice to bar petitioner’s claim for disability benefits. Ruling otherwise would run contrary to the constitutional mandate to extend full protection to labor.

Having suffered from permanent total disability, petitioner is entitled to US$60,000.00 which is the amount due for permanent total disability under Section 30-A of the 1996 POEA SEC.

As to the claim for sickness allowance, petitioner prays that private respondents be held jointly and severally liable to pay him US$3,428.00, as opposed to the award of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC and the CA, of only US$3,400.00.

We find this claim warranted by the undisputed fact on record that petitioner’s basic salary is US$857.00 per month. Multiplying the 120-day sickness allowance due petitioner on the basis of the correct monthly rate of US$857.00, he should be awarded US$3,428.00 as sickness allowance.

Under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, attorney’s fees can be recovered in actions for the recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under employer’s liability laws. Attorney’s fees is also recoverable when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest.

Such conditions being present in the case at bar, we find that an award of attorney’s fees is warranted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67782 dated March 31, 2003 and August 14, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Private respondents are held jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner:

a) permanent total disability benefits of US$60,000.00 at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment;

b) sickness allowance of US$3,428.00 at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment; and c) attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ., concur.








1 Also referred to as New Commodore Cruise Line, Ltd. in some parts of the record.
2 Dated March 31, 2003; rollo, pp. 28-35.
3 Dated August 14, 2003; Id. at 64.
4 CA rollo, pp. 33-41.
5 Id. at 293.
6 Note that said POEA SEC has been revised by DOLE Department Order No. 4, Series of 2000 (2000 POEA SEC).
7 CA rollo, p. 206.
8 Id. at 202-204.
9 Id. at 48.
10 Id. at 88.
11 Id. at 89-90.
12 Id. at 241.
13 Id. at 186-187.
14 Id. at 190.
15 Id. at 36.
16 Id. at 190-215.
17 Id. at 87-91.
18 Id. at 44-56.
19 Id. at 56.
20 Supra note 4.
21 Id. at 2-28.
22 Rollo, p. 88.
23 Id. at 116.
24 Id. at 17.
25 See Chiang Kai Shek College v. CA, G.R. No. 152988, August 24, 2004, 437 SCRA 17 1, citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 102508, January 30, 2002, 375 SCRA 145.
26 Memorandum (For the Private Respondents); rollo, p. 172.
27 Labor Code, Art. 167(n).
1 Also referred to as New Commodore Cruise Line, Ltd. in some parts of the record.
2 Dated March 31, 2003; rollo, pp. 28-35.
3 Dated August 14, 2003; Id. at 64.
4 CA rollo, pp. 33-41.
5 Id. at 293.
6 Note that said POEA SEC has been revised by DOLE Department Order No. 4, Series of 2000 (2000 POEA SEC).
7 CA rollo, p. 206.
8 Id. at 202-204.
9 Id. at 48.
10 Id. at 88.
11 Id. at 89-90.
12 Id. at 241.
13 Id. at 186-187.
14 Id. at 190.
15 Id. at 36.
16 Id. at 190-215.
17 Id. at 87-91.
18 Id. at 44-56.
19 Id. at 56.
20 Supra note 4.
21 Id. at 2-28.
22 Rollo, p. 88.
23 Id. at 116.
24 Id. at 17.
25 See Chiang Kai Shek College v. CA, G.R. No. 152988, August 24, 2004, 437 SCRA 17 1, citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 102508, January 30, 2002, 375 SCRA 145.
26 Memorandum (For the Private Respondents); rollo, p. 172.
27 Labor Code, Art. 167(n).
28 See Sec. 32-A of the 2000 POEA SEC titled “Occupational Diseases.”
29 G.R. No. 84812, October 5, 1990, 190 SCRA 337, 346-347.
30 The 1984 POEA SEC and 1996 POEA SEC are similarly worded.
31 G.R. No. 123619, June 8, 2000, 333 SCRA 236, 242.
32 See Arts. 1306 and 1308 of the New Civil Code; Delos Santos v. Jebsen Maritime, Inc., G.R. No. 154185, November 22, 2005, citing Lagunsad vs. Soto, No. L-32066, August 6, 1979, 92 SCRA 476.
33 Mayon Hotel and Restaurant v. Adana, G.R. No. 157634, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 609, citing Nicario v. NLRC, G.R. No. 125340, September 17, 1998, 295 SCRA 619. (citation omitted)
34 Id., citing Sarmiento v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, No. L-68648, September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 421.
35 G.R. No. 85024, January 23, 1991, 193 SCRA 190, 195.
36 G.R. No. 64255, August 16, 1989, 176 SCRA 507, 511.
37 E.O. No. 247, Sec. 3(i) and (j).
38 Art. 1700, New Civil Code. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
39 G.R. No. 123891, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 47.
40 G.R. No. 134028, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 268, 270-271.
41 G.R. No. 117572, January 29, 1998, 285 SCRA 430, 436 and G.R. No. 116015, July 31, 1996, 260 SCRA 133, 138.
42 G.R. No. 84777, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 598, 602.
43 Ibid., citing Ulibas v. Republic, No. L-43320, June 30, 1978, 83 SCRA 819 and Roma v. WCC, No. L-43675, October 28, 1977, 80 SCRA 170.
44 G.R. No. 154798, October 20, 2005.
45 G.R. No. 145093, July 8, 2003, 405 SCRA 450, 454.
46 G.R. No. 105854, August 26, 1999, 313 SCRA 141, 149-150.
47 Rule X. Temporary Total Disability
SECTION 2. Period of entitlement [to Temporary Total Disability Benefit]
(a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary
total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System; x x x
48 Supra note 35.
49 Austria v. CA, G.R. No. 146636, August 12, 2002, 387 SCRA 216, 221, citing Gonzaga v. ECC, No. L-62287, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 443.
50 Rule XI, Section 1(b) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.
51 Supra note 44.
52 Ibid., citing GSIS v. Cadiz, supra note 45; Ijares v. CA, supra note 46.
53 Ibid., citing Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, supra Note 39.
54 Ibid., citing Bejerano v. ECC, supra note 43.
55 CA rollo, p. 64.
56 Citing GSIS v. Cadiz, supra note 45.
57 CA Rollo, p. 88.
58 Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, supra note 39, citing NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 107131, March 13, 1997, 269 SCRA 486, 494.
59 Supra note 39.
60 Supra note 44.
61 Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC, supra, citing More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124927, May 18, 1999, 307 SCRA 189.
62 Contract of Employment and the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA; CA rollo, pp. 34, 36, 45 and 63, rollo, p. 29.

SEC Memorandum: Circular 1, 2 & 3

SEC memorandum
circular no. 1
Series of 2006

Guidelines on the Filing of Functional Currency Financial Statements

The Commission is its meeting of January 10, 2006, resolved to issue this Circular to guide companies whose functional currency (i.e., the currency of the primary economic environment in which the company operates) is other than the Philippine peso and which company file financial statements expressed in that functional currency.

1. The company’s determination of its functional currency shall be made in accordance with PAS
21, The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates.

2. A company that files for the first time financial statements denominated in a currency other than Philippine pesos (“functional currency FS”) for statutory reporting purposes shall notify the Commission that it shall file such financial statements, with an assessment that supports the determination of its functional currency. Please see attached Annex “A” for an illustrative notification.

3. The notification shall be signed by the company’s chief executive officer and chief financial officer. It shall be accompanied by a report from the company’s external auditor indicating his/her assessment that the company’s determination of its functional currency was made in accordance with PAS 21. Please see attached Annex “B” for an illustrative report of the external auditor.

4. A company whose functional currency is other than the Philippine peso that chooses to present financial statements expressed in Philippine peso shall submit financial statements expressed in both its functional currency and in Philippine peso. The company shall (a) translate its functional currency financial state-ments into Philippine pesos in accordance with PAS 21 and (b) submit a notification to the Commission in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) above.

5. The notification shall be filed within forty-five (45)days after the end of the year in which the company intends to initially present a functional currency FS.

6. In the case of a change in functional currency, the company shall file a notice indicating the proposed change including the reasons thereof within thirty (30) days after the end of year in which the change occurred.

The notice shall be signed and accompanied by a report of the company’s external auditor in the manner described in paragraph (3) above.

The submission of the said notice is without prejudice to any objection that the Commission may raise on the proposed change taking into account the previous representations by the company and the principles set forth under PAS 21.

This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines and shall take effect fifteen (15) days after the date of the last publication.
Failure to comply with the foregoing Guidelines shall render the financial statements of the company non-compliant with the applicable rules and shall subject the company concerned to the appropriate sanctions provided for in the existing laws.

Signed on behalf of the Commission on January 11, 2006, Mandaluyong City, Philippines.

(Sgd.) FE B. BARIN
Chairperson


Annex “A”


Illustrative Notification
to the SEC on Filing of Functional Currency Financial Statements

To: Securities and Exchange Commission

Pursuant to the requirement of paragraph (6)(c) of SRC Rule 68, (name of Company) notifies the Commission that it will file its financial statements expressed in (indicate functional currency) starting in (year).

I. Determination of Functional Currency Please present the following financial data to reflect the primary economic environment of the company:

a. Revenues (at least for the immediately preceding 2 years)

Year 1 Year 2
In Currency % In Currency %

Total Revenue per xxx xx xxx xx
audited financial
statements

Revenues in original
currencies

a. U.S. Dollars xxx xx xxx xx

b. Japanese Yen xxx xx xxx xx

c. Euro Dollars xxx xx xxx xx

d. Others (specify by currency)

b. Cost and Expenses (at least for the immediately preceding 2 years)

Year 1 Year 2
In Currency % In Currency %

Total Cost and xxx xx xxx xx
expenses per
audited financial
statements

Cost and expenses
in original
currencies

a. U.S. Dollars xxx xx xxx xx

b. Japanese Yen xxx xx xxx xx

c. Euro Dollars xxx xx xxx xx

d. Others (specify by currency)

c. If the factor/s relied upon is other than those falling under paragraphs (a) & (b), discuss such other factors considered as allowed under PAS 211. Attach relevant support as deemed necessary.

2. Conclusion

Based on the consideration of the above factors, which are set forth in PAS 21, The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates, the Company has determined that its functional currency is the (indicate functional currency).

Signed under oath by:

_______________________ ____________________
Chief Executive Officer Chief Finance Officer


NOTARY PUBLIC

1 The following factors may also provide evidence of an entity’s functional currency;

a. The currency in which funds from financing activities (i.e., leasing debt and equity instruments ) are generated.

b. The currency in which receipts from operating activities are usually obtained.
The following additional factors are considered in determining the functional currency of a foreign operation and whether its functional currency is the same as that if the reporting entity (the reporting entity, in this context, being the entity that has the foreign operation as its subsidiary, branch, associate or joins venture):

a. whether the activities of the foreign operation are carried out as an extension of the reporting entity, another than being carried out with a significant degree of autonomy. An example of the farmer is when the foreign operation only sells goods imported from the reporting entity and remits the proceeds to it. An example of the latter is when the operation accumulate cash and other monetary items, incurs expenses, generates income and arranges borrowings, all substantially in its local currency.

b. whether transactions with the reporting entity are a high or a low proportion of the foreign operations activities.

c. whether cash flows from the activities of the foreign operation directly affect the cash flows of the reporting entity and are readily available for remittance to it.

d. whether cash flows from the activities of the foreign operation are sufficient to service existing and normally expected debt obligations without funds being made available by the reporting entity.


Illustrative Report of External Auditor to
Accompany Company’s
Notification to the SEC on Filing of Functional Currency Financial Statements

To: (name of Company)

This report is issued in connection with (name of company)’s notification to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that it will file its financial statements expressed in (indicate functional currency) starting in (year).

We have reviewed (name of company)’s determination of its functional currency as described in its Notification to the SEC and we have assessed that the Company’s determination of its functional currency was made in accordance with PAS 21, The Effects of Charges in Foreign Exchange Rates.


Name and signature of Independent CPA
BOA Registration Number
SEC Accreditation Number (if any)

Date
Address

SEC memorandum
circular no. 3
Series of 2006


TO : ALL CONCERNED
SUBJECT : PRINCIPAL OFFICE ADDRESS; ADDRESS OF EACH INCORPORATOR, DIRECTOR, TRUSTEE, OR PARTNER

In line with the “full disclosure” requirement of existing laws, all corporations and partnerships applying for registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission should state in their Articles of Incorporation or Articles of Partnership the (i) specific address of their principal office, which shall include, if feasible, the street number, street name, barangay, city or municipality; and (ii) specific residence address of each incorporator, stockholder, director, trustee, or partner.
“Metro Manila” shall no longer be allowed as address of the principal office.
Additionally, all corporations are required to state in their General Information Sheet the specific residence address of each stockholder, officer, director or trustee.

Filings that do not comply with the foregoing requirements shall be considered as non-complaint with existing rules and regulations.

This Circular shall take effect after publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Mandaluyong City, Philippines. 16 February 2006.

(Sgd.) FE B. BARIN
Chairperson

Department of Justice: Articles; Capital Punishment Revisited

Department of Justice

Articles: Capital Punishment, Revisited
By Rodolfo A. Arizala


I. Introduction

The question of Capital Punishment or death penalty has resurfaced recently like a chronic pain in the socio-political life of the nation.

It was probably provoked by the commutation of death sentences to life imprisonment of more than one thousand convicts announced by the President of the Philippines on Easter Sunday or Resurrection, followed by a certification as urgent a piece of legislation (House Bill 4826) on the elimination of Capital Punishment from our statute books.

The issue on the “pro” and “con” of the elimination of capital punishment has been debated and discussed long time ago. As a matter of fact in 1970, this writer published an article in the UST Law Review, (Vol. XX, No. 4, March-April 1970 issue), “Should Capital Punishment Be Abolished?” This was followed by an updated article in April 1990 which appeared in the Manila papers (The Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Journal) under the title: “Capital Punishment Should Not Be Restored.”

In view, however, of the renewed interest on the issue of Capital Punishment and the provision in the 1987 Philippine Constitution that death penalty shall not be imposed “unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crime, the Congress provides for it,” it is relevant to take a second look at the subject of Capital Punishment by retracing its history and develop-ment from the early period up to the present.

But before we take a second look at the subject, let us first define what is capital punishment. Capital punishment may be defined as the “imposition of the death penalty on offenders found guilty of certain major crimes.”

The method of execution is generally done either by hanging, gas chamber, electrocution, firing squad or lethal injection. In the Philippines Republic Act No. 8177 mandates that death sentence shall be carried out through lethal injection.

II. Early History; UN Back-ground Study

The movement to abolish capital punishment in civilized countries is not new. Since the days of Beccaria, a theoretical controversy on the question on capital punishment has been going on. And as early as 1651, George Fox had raised the issue of death penalty. He advocated in his pamphlet “To the Parliament and Commonwealth of England” that death penalty should be applied only in cases of murder. However, the first case of total abolition of death penalty by statute started from the eighteenth century. In 1876, for example, under the direct inspiration of Beccaria, Leopold II of Tuscanny promulgated his famous code abolishing death penalty.

The following year, Joseph II of Austria promulgated his penal code doing away with capital punishment.

In modern times, the question of capital punishment, of the laws and practices relating to it, and of the effects of capital punishment and its abolition thereof on the rate of criminality, was taken up by the United Nations. Thus, on 20 November 1959, during the 14th session of the UN General Assembly, a resolution was adopted

inviting the Economic and Social Council to initiate a study on the question. And the Economic and Social Council on 6 April 1960, adopted resolution No. 747 (XXIX) stating that the council should be provided with a factual review of the various aspects of the question of capital punishment and requested the UN Secretary General to prepare such a review.

The said resolution also provided that the Secretary General may consult, as he deemed appropriate, the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee of Experts on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders set up under General Assembly Resolution 415 (V).

In UN Resolution No. 1918 (XVIII), the General Assembly requested the Economic and Social Council to ask the Committee on Human Rights to study the report on capital punishment and the comments on it of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee of Experts on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (E/3724) and to make such recom-mendations on the matter as it deemed appropriate.

III. Report on Capital Punish-ment

Justice March Ancel of the French Supreme Court and Director of the Criminal Science of the Institute of Comparative Law of Paris, prepared a report on capital punishment based on the replies of two questionnaires sent by the UN Secretary General, in addition to whatever information he (Justice Ancel) has already gathered personally on the subject.

The two questionnaires were:

1) A questionnaire requesting infor-mation on the laws, regulations and practices in force on capital punishment sent to members and certain non-member states;

2) A questionnaire requesting infor-mation on the deterrent effect of the death penalty and on the consequences of its abolition, sent to national correspondents of the Secretariat in the field on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders, and to non-governmental organizations.

In his report, Justice Ancel classified the countries or territories as follows:
1). Countries and territories which have kept the death penalty; and

2) Countries and territories which have abolished the death penalty. The latter group is divided into three categories: 1) Abolitionist de jure; 2) Abolitionist de facto; and 3) Almost completely abolitionist.

Abolitionist de jure are those countries in which the death penalty has been abolished by an expressed constitutional or legislative pro-visions such as Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Germany, etc.
Abolitionist de facto are those countries whose positive law (penal code or special statute) makes provision for death penalty and where sentences of death are passed but never carried out because of established custom, such as in Belgium, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, and the Vatican State.

Almost completely abolitionist are those countries or territories in which the death penalty is provided only for offenses committed in certain exceptional circumstances and in which capital punishment has, in fact, virtually disappeared such as in New South Wales, Nicaragua, and in certain States of the United States like Michigan, North Dakota and Rhode Island.

In this connection, it may be asked: “To what category our country belongs?
Under the Philippine Revised Penal Code, law and jurisprudence, the following offenses are examples which may be punishable by death: parricide (Art. 246); kidnapping or detention to extort ransom (Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 19); robbery with homicide (Art. 294, para 1 ); murder (Art. 248); treason (Art. 114); collaboration with the enemy (Art. 120, para 3); qualified piracy (Art. 123); if a person is injured or killed as a result or on occasion of cattle rustling (Sec. 8, PD 533); use of explosives in fishing and if it causes loss of human life (Sec. 3(a) & (b) PD 534); and if death results from the commission of arson (Sec. 5; PD 1613).

To these were added subversion, unlawful possession of firearms, hijacking, embezzlement, and drug-related offenses.

However, death penalty is not imposed ; 1) when the guilty person is more than70 years old (Art. 14); 2) when eight justices of the Supreme Court failed to confirm the death penalty imposed by the lower court (Sect. 9, Judiciary Act of 1948).

It is also observed that under Philippine laws, if death penalty is imposed by the lower court, the case is automatically appealed to the Supreme Court by virtue of Rule 122, Section 9, Rules of Court of the Phillippines. The execution of death sentence is suspended in the following cases: 1) a woman within three years following the sentence;

2) while the woman is pregnant. In case of a person older than 70 years old, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua (Art. 83 & 40), and in case of insanity which developed after the trial but before serving sentence, it suspend the sentence with respect to personal penalty. If a minor is under 16 years old, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody of a public or private benevolent or charitable institution (Art. 80).

The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines abolished capital punishment. Section 19(1), Article III thereof provides as follows: “Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it.

Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.”
Because of the aforequoted provision of the Philippine Constitution, it may be said that the Philippines in 1987 has joined the “Abolitionist de Jure” group those countries in which death penalty has been abolished by an express constitutional or legislative provision. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., in his book The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, (Vol I, First Edition, 1987, p. 443) commenting on the aforequoted provision said: “By a show of hands the abolition of the death penalty was approved 19-18. On motion of Commissioner Rodrigo nominal voting was called and the outcome was still for abolition, 22-17.”

However, because of an amendment authored by one of the Commissioners, death penalty may be reimposed if “for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it.”

Pursuant to such provision in the 1987 Constitution, in December 1993, to address the rising criminality and incidence of heinous crimes, Republic Act No. 7659 was passed reimposing the death penalty.

Said Death Penalty Law lists a total of 46 crimes punishable by death; 25 of these are death mandadtory while 21 are death eligible. With the amendment of Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) and Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), there are now 52 capital offenses, 30 of which are death mandatory and 22 are death eligible in our statute books.

In a 2004 survey conducted by FLAG (Free Legal Association Group), it was reported that of the 1,121 death row inmates whose death sentences were recently commuted by the President to life imprisonment, 22 percent or 198 of them were convicted of murder and/or parricide; 45 percent (405) were found guilty of rape; 14.5 percent (129) of kidnapping; 11 percent (101) of robbery; 0.4 percent(4) of carnapping; 0.8 percent (7) of bribery; and three percent (26) of violation of dangerous drugs laws.

In view of the reimposition of death penalty in 1993 through Republic Act No. 7659, some observers opined that the Philippines belong to the group of countries which is “almost completely abolitionist” if not a country which has kept the death penalty.
IV. Arguments for and against Capital Punishment

A. In favor of Capital Punishment

1. It has deterrent effect.
2. Atonement – death penalty is the only just punishment for the gravest crimes.
3. Public opinion remains generally favorable to capital punishment and the police and prison officials believe in its effectiveness.
4. A particularly potent weapon is needed in dealing with dangerous criminals to protect society.
5. Confinement for life or imprisonment would be more and cruel punishment than death because perpetual imprisonment leaves no hope to the offender.
6. Execution of the offender represents a saving of public funds because taxpayers are not called upon to pay for the indefinite maintenance of anti-social crimi-nals.

B. Against Capital Punishment

1. Sanctity of human life. Since it is wrong to kill, the state should be the first one to respect human life.
2. The modern tendency is to regard penalties as having no object other than prevention and punish-ment and this could be achieved other than taking human life.
3. Death penalty has no deterrent effects as shown by statistics. Abolition of death penalty, on the other hand, does not lead to increase the crimes.
4. Death penalty is a sort of judicial or legal murder, and it debases justices.
5. Death penalty is a form of cruelty and inhumanity. Doctors report that even the most efficient methods do not result in instantaneous painless death. It affects not only the criminal but also his families and relatives with mark of infamy.
6. Society can protect itself by other means.

V. General Observations.

A. In countries /territories where death penalty exists.
The modern tendency is more and more to drop the mandatory character of the death penalty. And in many legal systems, the death sentence is mandatory only for certain specific crimes or in certain special courts. As a general rule, only in cases of capital murder or crimes against the external security or integrity of the state death penalty is mandatory. A death sentence may not be imposed if the offender is granted pardon. The pardoning power is generally vested in the head of the state such as king, president, and sometimes even in the governor of a state or province.

B. In countries / territories in which death penalty is not applied.
It has been observed that the number of countries in which offenses other than murder are punishable by death is declining, and that the abolition of death penalty does not have the immediate effect of appreciably increasing the incidence of crime.
In some countries such as those in Scandinavia and Latin America, the deterrent effect of death penalty is not demonstrated. However, the trend towards an authoritarian system of criminal law has checked the slow movement towards gradual abolition of death penalty. Consequently, death penalty, especially for political crimes, has reappeared in countries where it had once been abolished.

VI. Conclusion

During the 23rd session of the UN General Assembly, it adopted resolution 2393 (XXIII) inviting all governments of member states of the United Nations to inform the Secretary General of the steps taken concerning the possible abolition of the death penalty. Said UN Resolution is an indication of the collective interest of the international community towards this problem.

According to reports 123 countries, including members of the European Union, have already abolished death penalty. The issue, therefore, of Capital Punishment is not new but it has been studied, discussed and debated long time ago. It is up for member states of the United Nations which have not yet made a firm or final decision on the subject to do it now in pursuance of UN Resolutions on the subject.

As stated earlier, by virtue of the 1987 Constitution, the Philippines has adopted the policy of “abolitionist de jure” with respect to capital punishment. However, Congress may reimpose death penalty if there are compelling reasons involving “heinous crimes”. Consequently in 1993, through Republic Act No. 7659, death penalty was reimposed in the Philippines.

Personally, the author believes that capital punishment should be completely abolished for reasons already stated in this article – sanctity of human life; death penalty has no deterrent effects; and society can protect itself by other means. This could be done by amending the present Constitution and / or passing the necessary legislation. And that is left to the wisdom of Congress and those who may undertake Constitutional amendments or revisions.

Opinions from the Bar: Should the SC Nominees Have Been Interviewed by the JBC?

Opinions from the Bar:

Should the Three SC Nominees
for Chief Justice Have Been Interviewed by the JBC?

By Leon L. Asa

It is consoling that the Judicial and Bar Council had narrowed down its choices for the position of Chief Justice to the three most Senior Justices, namely, Justices Reynato S. Puno, Artemio V. Panganiban, and Leonardo A. Quisumbing.

After having reached the compulsory retirement age of 70, Honorable Hilario G. Davide Jr. retired as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on 20 December 2005.

The three (3) most Senior Justices – Justices Reynato S. Puno, Artemio V. Panganiban, and Leonardo A. Quisumbing – were automatically nominated for the position of Chief Justice.

The Young Lawyers Asso-ciation of the Philippines recom-mended Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago to the same position. Senator Santiago accepted her recommendation but a little too late.

Under Section 8 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, Rule No. JBC-10 provides
In case of recommen-dations, the acceptance by the recommendee must be made before the deadline. Applications or recom-mendations filed beyond the deadline will not be honored.

Senator Santiago’s acceptance of said recommendation was sub-mitted after the deadline, so it was consequently rejected.

JBC Member Sen. Francis N. Pangilinan moved for the extension of the deadline so that the name of Senator Santiago would be included. The JBC, however, reiterated its previous stand and denied said appeal.

Section 9 of the 1987 Consti-tution provides that members of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President from “a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.”

Instead of immediately sub-mitting to Malacanang the names of the three Senior Justices pursuant to Section 9, the JBC, however, planned to interview the three nominees in a public hearing on 01 December 2005.

In a letter dated 28 November 2005 addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., the twelve (12) Supreme Court Associate Justices vigorously objected to the public interview seriously contemplated by the JBC, enumerating cogent reasons for their opposition. Said letter is hereunder reproduced in its entirety:

28 November 2005

Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
Supreme Court
Manila

Dear Chief:

We write to express our alarm at the departure from established practice, one that has become part of our judicial tradition, in the selection of nominees for Chief Justice. We refer to the plan of the Judicial and Bar Council to interview, for the first time, sitting Justices of the Supreme Court nominated for Chief Justice

We do not agree with this new procedure for the following reasons:
1. Since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC never interviewed nominees who were already incumbent Jus-tices of the Supreme Court.

Thus, the JBC did not interview Chief Justices Fernan, Narvasa and you. There is no sound reason to depart from this established practice.

2. The ostensible reason for interviewing the nominees is to find out how they intend to manage or administer the Judiciary, the assumption being the Chief Justice is the Chief Executive of the Judiciary. This assumption is a gross misconception. The Chief Justice is not the Chief Executive of the Judiciary or even of the Supreme Court.

Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is clear: “The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.” Section 6 of the same Article states: “The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: x x x (6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with Civil Service Law.”

Section 11 of the same Article further provides: “x x x The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.”

Thus, the Supreme Court en banc, not the Chief Justice, manages and administers the Judiciary. The Supreme Court en banc, not the Chief Justice, appoints and disciplines all personnel, other than judges and justices, of the Judiciary.

If the JBC intends to interview the nominees to find out how they intend to manage or administer the Judiciary, then such interview is pointless. Besides, there are only three nominees. The JBC will have to recommend all of them in any event since the President must choose from at least three nominees.

3. The JBC should instead exa-mine the judicial philosophy of the nominees. Sitting Justices of the Court express their judicial philosophy in their written decisions, including dis-sents. The JBC should find out whether the nominee’s judicial philosophy is what is best for the nation. The Chief Justice “leads” the Court and the Judiciary not as an executive manager for he is not one, but as an intellectual leader as expressed in his judicial philosophy.

Sitting Justices nominated for Chief Justice are unlike appellate court justices nominated for the Supreme Court. A sitting Justice of the Supreme Court expresses his judicial philosophy in his written decisions.

The JBC does not need to interview a sitting Justice of the Supreme Court to find out his judicial philo-sophy. All that the JBC needs to do is to scrutinize the decisions of the nominees. The JBC either agrees with the nominee’s judicial philosophy or not. A one-hour interview with the nominee will not change the nominees judicial philosophy.

In contrast, an appellate court justice does not necessarily express his own judicial philo-sophy in writing his decisions because whether he likes it or not he is bound, under stare decisis, to follow decisions of the Supreme Court.

Thus, the JBC needs to interview appel-late court justices to find out their own judicial philosophy, and whether such judicial philo-sophy is for the best interest of the nation.

4. Lastly, the JBC is under the supervision of the Supreme Court. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution states: “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.”

There is something inherently wrong when members of a subordinate body can accept or reject nominees of a superior body supervising such a subordinate body, on a matter involving the choice of presiding officer of the superior body, when the nominees all come from the superior body.

Such a situation is inconsistent with the order of hierarchy found in the 1987 Constitution. Such a situation could not have been the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they placed the JBC under the supervision of the Supreme Court. The established practice of automatically nominating the three most senior members of the Court for Chief Justice is more in accord with the consti-tutional provision placing the JBC under the supervision of the Supreme Court.

Consequently, we respectfully request the Chief Justice to convey to the Judicial and Bar Council our views on this important matter which we believe will have a lasting impact on the indepen-dence of the Supreme Court, a principle the 1987 Constitution zealously protects.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) Leonardo A. Quisumbing
(Sgd.) Consuelo Ynares-Santiago
(Sgd.) Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez
(Sgd.) Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez
(Sgd.) Antonio T. Carpio
(Sgd.) Renato C. Corona
(Sgd.) Conchita Carpio Morales
(Sgd.) Romeo L. Callejo, Jr.
(Sgd.) Adolfo S. Azcuna
(Sgd.) Dante O. Tinga
(Sgd.) Minita V. Chico-Nazario
(Sgd.) Cancio C. Garcia

On 01 December 2005, the date of the scheduled public interview – the JBC decided not to conduct the interview.

Quoted hereunder is the report on the meeting of the JBC on 01 December 2005:
The Council, voting 6 in favor and one against, with the Chief Justice abstaining, granted the request contained in the letter dated 28 November 2005 of the 12 SC Associate Justices NOT TO CONDUCT INTERVIEW but with vigorous and serious objections to the substantive grounds relied upon.

The grant is solely on the ground that only three have been considered for nomination and since the Constitution requires that at least three names should be submitted to Malacanang, it necessarily follows that these three have to be recommended by the JBC. The interview is moot and academic.

One of the letter-writers is the third Member of the Court to be considered for nomination.
This is only pro hac vice, not to be a precedent for future action, where more than three are nominated or where outsiders are nominated, the Council shall proceed with the public interview.

The JBC shall submit to Mala-canang at the earliest opportunity three names to be considered for the position of Chief Justice in alphabetical order.
In the afternoon of 01 December 2005, the JBC forwarded the list of the nominees to Malacanang.

The position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is without question of great importance. The Judicial Depart-ment is the third branch of government which is co-equal with the Executive and Legislative Departments.

The Chief Justice is the fifth in line of constitutional succession.
Would it not diminish the dignity of the Office of Chief Justice if the Chief Justice who would be appointed would be subjected to a public hearing by the Judicial and Bar Council primarily to determine his competence or his ability to administer the judiciary? As plainly stated in the said letter of the 12 SC Justices, “it is the Supreme Court en banc, not the Chief Justice that manages and administers the Judiciary.” Perforce, it is not necessary to interview the nominees for Chief Justice to find out how they will manage or administer the Judiciary.

The JBC already interviewed the three Justices when they first applied for the position of Associate Justice. Their experience as Associate Justices for years surely has increased their competence.

Their well-written ponencias, concurring opinions, and sometimes scathing dissenting opinions in celebrated cases are an open book and striking evidence of their competence and qualifications. Their judicial philosophy is clearly expounded in several landmark cases. It is, therefore, superfluous and an exercise in futility if said nominees would be subjected to a public interview by the Judicial and Bar Council.

Congratulations to the outgoing Honorable Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. for a job well done. Congratulations also to the new Honorable Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban.

Department of Justice: Opinions

Department of Justice:

OPINION NO. 55, S. 2005


December 13, 2005

Administrator Benedicto B. Ulep
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue corner NIA Road
Quezon City

Administrator Ulep:

This has reference to your request for confirmation of your view that the grant of privileges and other favorable terms to the Philippine Airlines (PAL) shall also ipso facto operate equally in favor of Cebu Pacific only upon showing by the latter of a clear proof that PAL’s enjoyment of the privileges and favorable terms accorded to it will place Cebu Pacific at a disadvantage.

The instant request stemmed from the letter of Atty. Perry L. Pe, Corporate Secretary of Cebu Air, Inc. (“Cebu Pacific”), requesting confirmation that the chattel mortgage to be constituted over four (4) Airbus A319-100 aircraft to be acquired by Cebu Air, Inc. (Cebu Pacific) is exempt from registration fees imposed under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, and the Revised Administrative Code.

It appears that Cebu Pacific, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a holder of a legislative franchise granted under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7151 (An Act Granting Cebu Air, Inc., a Franchise to Establish, Operate and Maintain Transport Services for the Carriage of Passengers, Mail, Goods and Property by Air, Both Domestic and International, With Cebu as Its Base), executed an Aircraft Purchase Agreement with Airbus S.A.S. over twelve (12) A319-100 aircrafts for use in domestic and international operations as part of its long-term refleeting and modernization programs; that various French, German and British financial institutions will provide the financing for the transaction with corresponding guaranty or insurance by COFACE, Euler Hermes and Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECDG); that in compliance with one of the lenders’ conditions for the extension of the loan package, Cebu Pacific assigned the Aircraft Purchase Agreement to a Special Purpose Corporation (SPC) domiciled outside of the Philippines; that the SPC shall hold title to the aircraft and shall act as the borrower under relevant loan agreements and that Cebu Pacific shall then enter into a financial lease agreement with the SPC.

It likewise appears that Cebu Pacific, being the ultimate borrower, shall actually bear all the costs relating to the registration and payment of any applicable taxes of the chattel mortgage and other security documents to be constituted over the subject aircrafts. Cebu Pacific is, therefore, requesting confirmation of its exemption from payment of chattel mortgage registration fees over the four (4) Airbus A319-100.

You state that the exemption from payment of registration fees and other privileges granted to PAL continues to be in full force and effect, and subsists notwith-standing the privatization of the Philippines Airlines, in the absence of a law amending or withdrawing the privileges contained in PAL’s charter, P.D. No. 1590. It is your view, however, that before it can avail of the same privileges enjoyed by PAL, Cebu Pacific has to establish that the exemptions granted to, and enjoyed, by PAL will tend to place Cebu Pacific at any disadvantage.

Presidential Decree No. 1590 (An Act Granting a New Fran-chise to Philippine Airlines, Inc. to Establish, to Operate, and Maintain Air-Transport Services in the Philippines and Other Countries) which continues to extend certain privileges to Pal in the absence of any law amending or withdrawing the privileges in its charter, reads in part:

Sec. 13. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay to the Philippine Govern-ment during the life of this franchise whichever of subsections (a) and (b) hereunder will result in a lower tax:

(a) The basic corporate income tax based on the grantee’s annual net taxable income com-puted in accordance with the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code; or

(b) A franchise tax of two per cent (2%) of the gross revenues derived by the grantee from all sources, without distinc-tion as to transport or non-transport opera-tions; provided, that with respect to international air-transport service, only the gross pas-senger, mail, and freight revenues from its outgoing flights shall be subject to this tax.

(1) The tax paid by the grantee under either of the above alter-natives shall be in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license, and other fees and charges of any kind, nature, or descrip-tion, imposed, levied, established, assessed, or national authority or government agency, now or in the future, including but not limited to the following:
xxx xxx xxx

(4) All taxes on interest, fees, and other charges on foreign loans obtained and other obligations incurred by the grantee where the payment of such taxes is assumed by the grantee;

(5) All taxes, fees, and other charges on the regis-tration, licensing, acquisition, and transfer of aircraft, equipment, motor vehicles, and all other personal and real property of the grantee; and
xxx xxx xxx

(emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the legislative franchise granted in favor of Cebu Air, Inc., specifically Section 11 of R.A. No. 7151 provides: SEC. 11. Tax Provisions.
xxx xxx xxx

In the event that any competing individual, part-nership or corporation re-ceives and enjoys tax privi-leges and other favorable terms which tend to place the herein grantee at any disad-vantage, then such provisions shall be deemed ipso facto part hereof and shall operate equally in favor of the grantee.
xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing premises, this Department confirms that the “most favored treatment” clause found in Section 11 of R.A. No. 7151 expressly provides that tax privileges or favorable term/s received or enjoyed by any competing individual, partnership or corporation - in this case, PAL, shall automatically be deemed incorporated in the franchise of Cebu Pacific.

The basic idea of the aforesaid clause is “fair play”, such that a rival firm will not gain an undue or unfair advantage over the other in the pursuit of their respective competing business. In other words, the purpose of the said clause is to place the holder thereof on an equal footing with its rival enterprise by not giving such competitors undue advantage (Secretary of Justice Opinion No. 51, s. 1987).

Please be guided accordingly.


Very truly yours,


(Sgd.) RAUL M. GONZALEZ
Secretary

Administrative Rule And Regulation: The 2005 Revised Rules NLRC

Administrative Rule And Regulation



The 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National
Labor Relations Commission





Pursuant to the provisions of Article 218 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, the following Revised Rules of Procedure governing arbitration proceedings before Labor Arbiters and the Commission are hereby adopted and



promulgated:

RULE I


TITLE AND CONSTRUCTION

SECTION 1. TITLE OF THE RULES. - These Rules shall be known as the “2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission”.


SECTION 2. CONSTRUCTION. - These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines and other relevant legislations, and to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive resolution and settlement of labor disputes.


SECTION 3. SUPPLETORY APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF COURT. - In the absence of any applicable provision in these Rules, and in order to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines may, in the interest of expeditious dispensation of labor justice and whenever practicable and convenient, be applied by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.

RULE II


DEFINITION OF TERMS

SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS. - The terms and phrases defined in Article 212 of the Labor Code, as amended, shall be given the same meanings when used herein.


As used herein, “Regional Arbitration Branch” shall mean any of the regional arbitration branches or sub-regional branches of the Commission.


RULE III


PLEADINGS, NOTICES AND APPEARANCES

SECTION 1. COMPLAINT. - a) A complaint or petition is a pleading alleging the cause or causes of action of the complainant or petitioner.



The names and addresses of all complainants or petitioners and respondents must be stated in the complaint or petition. It shall be signed under oath by the complainant or petitioner, with a declaration of non-forum shopping.


b) A party having more than one cause of action against the other party, arising out of the same relationship, shall include all of them in one complaint or petition.


c) No amendment of the complaint or petition shall be allowed after the filing of position papers, unless with leave of the Labor Arbiter or the Commission.


SECTION 2. CAPTION AND TITLE. - In all cases filed with the Commission or with any of its

Regional Arbitration Branches, the party initiating the action shall be called the “Complainant” or “Petitioner”, and the opposing party the “Respondent”.


The full names of all the real parties in interest, whether natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law, shall be stated in the caption of the complaint or petition, as well as in the decisions, resolutions or orders of the Labor Arbiter or the Commission.


SECTION 3. ISSUANCE OF SUMMONS. - Within two (2) days from receipt of a complaint or amended complaint, the Labor Arbiter shall issue the required summons, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint or amended complaint. The summons shall specify the date, time and place of the mandatory conciliation and mediation confe-rence in two (2) settings.


SECTION 4. PROHIBITED PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS. - The following pleadings and motions shall not be allowed and acted upon nor elevated to the Commission in all cases covered by these Rules:


a) Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, improper venue, res adju-dicata, prescription and forum shopping;


b) Motion for a bill of particulars;


c) Motion for new trial;


d) Petition for relief from judgment when filed with the Labor Arbiter;


e) Petition for certiorari, man-damus or prohibition;


f) Motion to declare respondent in default;


g) Motion for reconsideration or appeal from any interlocutory order of the Labor Arbiter.


SECTION 5. FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS. - All pleadings in connection with the case shall be filed with the appropriate docketing unit of the Regional Arbitration Branch or the Commission, as the case maybe.


The party filing the pleadings shall serve the opposing parties with a copy thereof and its supporting documents in the manner provided for in these Rules with proof of service thereof.


SECTION 6. SERVICE OF NOTICES AND RESOLUTIONS.



a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the Bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by registered mail; Provided that in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court; Provided further, that in cases of decisions and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel or representative by registered mail; Provided further that in cases where a party to a case or his counsel on record personally seeks service of the decision upon inquiry thereon, service to said party shall be deemed effected upon actual receipt thereof; Provided finally, that where parties are so numerous, service shall be made on counsel and upon such number of complainants, as may be practicable, which shall be considered substantial compliance with Article 224 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.


For purposes of appeal, the period shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel or representative of record.


b) The Bailiff or officer serving the notice, order, resolution or decision shall submit his return within two (2) days from date of service thereof, stating legibly in his return his name, the names of the persons served and the date of receipt, which return shall be immediately attached and shall form part of the records of the case.



In case of service by registered mail, the bailliff or officer shall write in the return, the names of persons served and the date of mailing of the resolution or decision.



If no service was effected, the service officer shall state the reason therefor in the return.
SECTION 7. PROOF AND COMPLETE-NESS OF SERVICE.



The return is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent; but if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect after such time.


SECTION 8. APPEARANCES.



a) A lawyer appearing for a party is presumed to be properly authorized for that purpose.

In every case, he shall indicate in his pleadings and motions his Attorney’s Roll Number, as well as his PTR and IBP numbers for the current year.


b) A non-lawyer may appear as counsel in any of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter or Commission only under the following conditions:


(1) he represents himself as party to the case;


(2) he represents a legitimate labor organization, as defined under Article 212 and 242 of the Labor Code, as amended, which is a party to the case: Provided, that he presents: (i) a certification from the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) or Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment attesting that the organization he represents is duly registered and listed in the roster of legitimate labor organi-zations; (ii) a verified certification issued by the secretary and attested to by the president of the said organization stating that he is authorized to represent the said organization in the said case; and (iii) a copy of the resolution of the board of directors of the said organization granting him such authority;


(3) he represents a member or members of a legitimate labor organization that is existing within the employer’s establishment, who are parties to the case: Provided, that the presents: (i) a verified certification attesting that he is authorized by such member or members to represent them in the case; and (ii) a verified certification issued by the secretary and attested to by the president of the said organization stating that the person or persons he is representing are members of their organization which is existing in the employer’s establishment;


(4) he is duly-accredited member of any legal aid office recognized by the Department of Justice or Integrated Bar of the Philippines: Provided, that he (i) presents proof of his accreditation; and (ii) represents a party to the case;


(5) he is the owner or president of a corporation or establishment which is a party to the case: Provided, that he presents: (i) a verified certifi-cation attesting that he is authorized to represent said corporation or establishment; and (ii) a copy of the resolution of the board of directors of said corporation, or other similar resolution or instrument issued by said establishment, granting him such authority.


c) A non-lawyer who appears in contravention of this section shall not be recognized in any proceedings before the Labor Arbiter or the Commission.


d) Appearances may be made orally or in writing. In both cases, the complete name and office address of both parties shall be made on record and the adverse party or his counsel or representative properly notified.


e) Any change in the address of counsel or representative should be filed with the records of the

case and furnished the adverse party or counsel.


f) Any change or withdrawal of counsel or representative shall be made in accordance with the



Rules of Court.


SECTION 9.



AUTHORITY TO BIND PARTY. - Attorneys and other repre-sentatives of parties shall have authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a special power of attorney or express consent, enter into a compromise agreement with the opposing party in full or partial discharge of a client’s claim.

RULE IV


VENUE, ASSIGNMENT AND DISPOSITION OF CASES

SECTION 1. VENUE. - a) All cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant or petitioner.


For purposes of venue, the workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned at the time the cause of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment, or travel. In case of field employees, as well as ambulant or itinerant workers, their workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or where they are supposed to regularly receive their salaries and wages or work instructions from, and report the results of their assignment to, their employers.


b) Where two (2) or more Regional Arbitration Branches have jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant or petitioner, the Branch that first acquired jurisdiction over the case shall exclude the others.


c) When venue is not objected to before the filing of position papers such issue shall be deemed waived.


d) The venue of an action may be changed or transferred to a different Regional Arbitration Branch other than where the complaint was filed by written agreement of the parties or when the Commission or Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending so orders, upon motion by the proper party in meritorious cases.


e) Cases involving overseas Filipino workers may be filed before the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the place where the complainant resides or where the principal office of any of the respondents is situated, at the option of the complainant.


SECTION 2. RAFFLE AND ASSIGN-MENT OF CASES. -



a) All complaints and petitions filed with the docket unit of the Regional Arbitration Branch shall be immediately raffled and assigned to a Labor Arbiter from receipt thereof.


(b) The Executive Labor Arbiter shall be responsible for the immediate raffle and assignment of all complaints and petitions filed with his Regional Arbitration Branch, and the immediate forwarding of all subsequent pleadings and motions.


c) All pleadings and motions subsequent to the filing of the complaint shall be forwarded to the Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt thereof.


SECTION 3. CONSOLIDATION OF CASES AND COMPLAINTS. - Where there are two or more cases or complaints pending before different Labor Arbiters in the same Regional Arbitration Branch involving the same employer and common principal causes of action, or the same parties with different causes of action, the subsequent cases or complaints shall be consolidated with the first to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. Such consolidated cases or complaints shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter to whom the first case was assigned.
In case of objection to the consolidation, the same shall be resolved by the Executive Labor Arbiter. An order resolving a motion or objection to consolidation shall be inappealable.


SECTION 4. DISPOSITION OF CASES. - Subject to the provisions of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, when a case is assigned to a Labor Arbiter, the entire case and any or all incidents thereto shall be considered assigned to him; and the same shall be disposed of in the same proceedings to avoid multiplicity of suits or proceedings.


When the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over a strike or lockout or certified the same to the Commission, the parties to such dispute shall immediately inform the Secretary or the Commission, as the case may be, of all cases directly related to the dispute between them pending before any Regional Arbitration Branch, and the Labor Arbiters handling the same of such assumption or certification.



The Labor Arbiter concerned shall forward within two (2) days from notice the entire records of the case to the Commission or to the Secretary of Labor, as the case may be, for proper disposition.

RULE V


PROCEEDINGS BEFORE LABOR
ARBITERS

SECTION 1. JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS. - Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:


a) Unfair labor practice cases;


b) Termination disputes;


c) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;


d) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations;


e) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of the Labor Code, as amended, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;


f) Except claims for employees compen-sation not included in the next succeeding paragraph, social security, medicare, and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, inclu-ding those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement;


g) Money claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract, involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment, including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages;




h) Wage distortion disputes in unorganized establishments not voluntarily settled by the parties pursuant to Republic Act No. 6727;


i) Enforcement of compromise agree-ments when there is non-compliance by any of the parties pursuant to Article 227 of the Labor Code, as amended; and


j) Other cases as may be provided by law.
Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration, as may be provided in said agreements.


SECTION 2. NATURE OF PROCEE-DINGS. - The proceedings before the Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law shall not strictly apply thereto. The Labor Arbiter may avail himself of all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy speedily, including ocular inspection and examination of well-informed persons.


SECTION 3. MANDATORY CONCILIA-TION AND MEDIATION CONFERENCE. - a) The mandatory conciliation and mediation conference shall be called for the purpose of (1) amicably settling the case upon a fair compromise; (2) determining the real parties in interest; (3) determining the necessity of amending the complaint and including all causes of action; (4) defining and simplifying the issues in the case; (5) entering into admissions or stipulations of facts; and (6) threshing out all other preliminary matters. The Labor Arbiter shall preside and take full control of the proceedings.


b) Conciliation and mediation efforts shall be exerted by the Labor Arbiters all throughout the proceedings. Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to the whole or any part of the dispute, the same shall be reduced to writing and signed by the parties and their respective counsel or authorized representative, if any, before the Labor Arbiter.


c) In any case, the compromise agreement shall be approved by the Labor Arbiter, if after explaining to the parties, particularly to the complainants, the terms, conditions and consequences thereof, he is satisfied that they understand the agreement, that the same was entered into freely and voluntarily by them, and that it is not contrary to law, morals, and public policy.


d) A compromise agreement duly entered into in accordance with this Section shall be final and binding upon the parties and shall have the force and effect of a judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter.


e) The mandatory conciliation and mediation conference shall, except for justifiable grounds, be terminated within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the first conference.
f) No motion for postponement shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds.


SECTION 4. EFFECT OF FAILURE OF CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION. - Should the parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, either in whole or in part, during the mandatory conciliation and mediation conference, the Labor Arbiter shall terminate the conciliation and mediation stage and proceed to pursue the

other purposes of the said conference as enumerated in the immediately preceding section. Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter shall direct the parties to simultaneously file their respective position papers on the issues agreed upon by the parties and as reflected in the minutes of the proceedings.


SECTION 5. NON-APPEARANCE OF PARTIES. - The non-appearance of the complainant or petitioner during the two (2) settings for mandatory conciliation and mediation conference scheduled in the summons, despite due notice thereof, shall be a ground for the dismissal of the case without prejudice.


In case of non-appearance by the respondent during the first scheduled conference, the second conference shall proceed as scheduled in the summons. If the respondent still fails to appear at the second conference despite being duly served with summons, the Labor Arbiter shall immediately terminate the mandatory conciliation and mediation conference. The Labor Arbiter shall thereafter allow the complainant petitioner to file his verified position paper and submit evidence in support of his causes of action, and thereupon render his decision on the basis of the evidence on record.


SECTION 6. MOTION TO DISMISS. - On or before the date set for the mandatory conciliation and mediation conference, the respondent may file a motion to dismiss. Any motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment, prescription, or forum shopping, shall be immediately resolved by the Labor Arbiter through a written order. An order denying the motion to dismiss, or suspending its resolution until the final determination of the case, is not appealable.


SECTION 7. SUBMISSION OF POSI-TION PAPER AND REPLY.



a) Subject to Sections 4 and 5 of this Rule, the Labor Arbiter shall direct the parties to submit simultaneously their verified position papers with supporting documents and affidavits, if any, within an inextendible period of ten (10) calendar days from the date of termination of the mandatory conciliation and mediation conference.


b) The position papers of the parties shall cover only those claims and causes of action raised in the complaint or amended complaint, excluding those that may have been amicably settled, and accompanied by all supporting documents, including the affidavits of witnesses, which shall take the place of their direct testimony.


c) A reply may be filed by any party within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the position paper of the adverse party.


d) In their position papers and replies, the parties shall not be allowed to allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts and any cause or causes of action not referred to or included in the original or amended complaint or petition.


SECTION 8. DETERMINATION OF NECESSITY OF HEARING OR CLARIFI-CATORY CONFERENCE. - Immediately after the submission by the parties of their position paper or

reply, as the case may be, the Labor Arbiter shall, motu proprio, determine whether there is a need for a hearing or clarificatory conference. At this stage, he may, at his discretion and for the purpose of making such determination, ask clarificatory questions to further elicit facts or information, including but not limited to the subpoena of relevant documentary evidence, if any, from any party or witness.


SECTION 9. ROLE OF THE LABOR ARBITER IN HEARING AND CLARIFI-CATORY CONFERENCE.



a) The Labor Arbiter shall take full control and personally conduct the hearing or clarificatory conference. Unless otherwise provided by law, the Labor Arbiter shall determine the order of presentation of evidence by the parties, subject to the requirements of due process. He shall examine the parties and their witnesses with respect to the matters at issue; and ask questions only for the purpose of clarifying points of law or fact involved in the case. He shall limit the presentation of evidence to matters relevant to the issue before him and necessary for a just and speedy disposition of the case.


b) In the cross-examination of witnesses, only relevant, pertinent and material questions necessary to enlighten the Labor Arbiter shall be allowed.


c) The Labor Arbiter shall make a written summary of the proceedings, including the substance of the evidence presented, in consultation with the parties. The written summary shall be signed by the parties and shall form part of the records.


SECTION 10. NON-APPEARANCE OF PARTIES, AND POSTPONEMENT OF HEARINGS CLARIFICATORY CONFE-RENCES.



a) Non-appearance at a hearing or clarificatory

conference by the complainant or petitioner, who was duly notified thereof, may be sufficient cause to dismiss the case without prejudice. Subject to Section 16 of this Rule, where proper justification is shown by proper motion to warrant the re-opening of the case, the Labor Arbiter shall call another hearing or clarificatory conference and continue the proceedings until the case is finally decided. The dismissal of the case for the second time due to the unjustified non-appearance of the complainant or petitioner, who was duly notified of the clarificatory hearing, shall be with prejudice.


b) In case the respondent fails to appear during the hearing or clarificatory conference despite due notice thereof, the complainant shall be allowed to present evidence ex-parte, without prejudice to cross-examination at the next hearing or conference. Two (2) successive non-appearances by the respondent during his scheduled presentation of evidence or opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, despite due notice thereof, shall be construed as a waiver on his part to present evidence or conduct cross-examination.


c) The parties and their counsels appearing before the Labor Arbiter shall be prepared for continues hearing or clarificatory conference. No postponement or continuance shall be allowed by the Labor Arbiter, except upon meritorious grounds and subject always to the requirement of expeditious disposition of cases. In any case, the hearing or clarificatory conference shall be terminated within ninety (90) calendar days from the date of the initial hearing or conference.


d) Paragraph (c) of this Section notwithstanding, in cases involving overseas Filipino workers, the aggregate period for conducting the mandatory conciliation and mediation conference, including hearing on the merits or clarificatory conference, shall not exceed sixty (60) days, which shall be reckoned from the date of acquisition of jurisdiction by the Labor Arbiter over the person of the respondents.


SECTION 11. SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR DECISION. - Upon the submission by the parties of their position papers of replies, or the lapse of the period to submit the same, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the Labor Arbiter calls for a hearing or clarificatory conference in accordance with Section 8 of this Rule, in which case, notice of hearing or clarificatory conference shall be immediately sent to the parties. Upon termination of the said hearing or conference, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision.

SECTION 12. INHIBITION. - A Labor Arbiter may voluntarily inhibit himself from the resolution of a case and shall so state in writing the legal justifications therefor.



Upon motion of a party, either on the ground of relationship within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity with the adverse party or counsel, or on question of impartiality, the Labor Arbiter may inhibit himself from further hearing and deciding the case. Such motion shall be resolved within five (5) days from the filing thereof.



An order denying or granting a motion for inhibition is inappealable.


SECTION 13. PERIOD TO DECIDE CASE. - The Labor Arbiter shall render his decision within thirty (30) calendar days, without extension, after the submission of the case by the parties for decision, even in the absence of stenographic notes; Provided however, that cases involving overseas Filipino workers shall be decided within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint which shall commence to run upon acquisition by the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction over the respondents.


SECTION 14. CONTENTS OF DECISIONS. - The decisions and orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be clear and concise and shall include a brief statement of the: a) facts of the case; b) issues involved; c) applicable laws or rules; d) conclusions and the reasons therefor; and e) specific remedy or relief granted. In cases involving monetary awards, the decisions or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall contain the amount awarded.


In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter includes an order of reinstatement, it shall likewise contain: a) a statement that the reinstatement aspect is immediately executory; and b) a directive for the employer to submit a report of compliance within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the said decision.


SECTION 15. MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION AND PETITIONS FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. - No motions for reconsideration or petitions for relief from judgment of any decision, resolution or order of a Labor Arbiter shall be allowed. However, when one such motion for reconsideration is filed, it shall be treated as an appeal provided that it complies with the requirements for perfecting an appeal. In the case of a petition for relief from judgment, the Labor Arbiter shall elevate the case to the Commission for disposition.


SECTION 16. REVIVAL AND RE-OPENING OR RE-FILING OF DISMISSED CASE. - A party may file a motion to revive or re-open a case dismissed without prejudice, within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice of the order dismissing the same; otherwise, his only remedy shall be to re-file the case in the arbitration branch of origin.

RULE VI
APPEALS

SECTION 1. PERIODS OF APPEAL. - Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof; and in case of decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment pursuant to Article 129 of the Labor Code, within five (5) calendar days from receipt thereof. If the 10th or 5th day, as the case may be, falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the last day to perfect the appeal shall be the first working day following such Saturday, Sunday or holiday.


No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed.


SECTION 2. GROUNDS. - The appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:


a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter or Regional Director;


b) If the decision, resolution or order was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption;


c) If made purely on questions of law; and/or


d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which, if not corrected, would cause grave

or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.


SECTION 3. WHERE FILED. - The appeal shall be filed with the regional Arbitration Branch or Regional Office where the case was heard and decided.


SECTION 4. REQUISITES FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL. - a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified by the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, 3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and

5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the other parties.


b) A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.


c) The appellee may file with the Regional Arbitration Branch or Regional Office where the appeal was filed, his answer or reply to appellant’s memorandum of appeal, not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. Failure on the part of the appellee who was properly furnished with a copy of the appeal to file his answer or reply within the said period may be construed as a waiver on his part to file the same.


d) Subject to the provisions of Article 218 of the Labor Code, one the appeal is perfected in accordance with these Rules, the Commission shall limit itself to reviewing and deciding only the specific issues that were elevated on appeal.


SECTION 5. APPEAL FEE. - The appellant shall pay an appeal fee of One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P150.00) to the Regional Arbitration Branch or Regional Office of origin, and the official receipt of such payment shall form part of the records of the case.


SECTION 6. BOND. - In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees.


In case of surety bond, the same shall be issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court, and shall be accompanied by original or certified true copies of the following:


a) a joint declaration under oath by the employer, his counsel, and the bonding company, attesting that the bond posted is genuine, and shall be in effect until final disposition of the case.

b) an indemnity agreement between the employer-appellant and bonding company;


c) proof of security deposit or collateral securing the bond: provided, that a check shall not be considered as an acceptable security;


d) a certificate of authority from the Insurance Commission;


e) certificate of registration from the Securities and Exchange Commis-sion;


f) certificate of authority to transact surety business from the Office of the President;
g) certificate of accreditation and authority from the Supreme Court; and


h) notarized board resolution or secretary’s certificate from the bonding company showing its authorized signatories and their specimen signatures.


A cash or surety bond shall be valid and effective from the date of deposit or posting, until the case is finally decided, resolved or terminated, or the award satisfied. This condition shall be deemed incorporated in the terms and conditions of the surety bond, and shall be binding on the appellants and the bonding company.


The appellant shall furnish the appellee with a certified true copy of the said surety bond with all the above-mentioned supporting documents. The appellee shall verify the regularity and genuineness thereof and immediately report any irregularity to the Commission.
Upon verification by the Commission that the bond is irregular or not genuine, the Commission shall cause the immediate dismissal of the appeal, and censure or cite in contempt the responsible parties and their counsels, or subject them to reasonable fine or penalty.
No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds, and only upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.


The mere filing of a motion to reduce bond without complying with the requisites in the preceding paragraphs shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.


SECTION 7. RECORDS OF CASE ON APPEAL. - The records of a case shall have a corresponding index of its contents which shall include the following: a) the original copy of the complaint; b) other pleadings and motions; c) minutes of the proceedings, notices, transcripts of stenographic notes, if any; d) decisions, orders, and resolutions as well as proof of service thereof, if available; e) the computation of the award; f) memorandum of appeal and the reply or answer thereto, if any, and proof of service, if available; g) official receipt of the appeal fee; and h) the

appeal bond, if any.


The records shall be chronologically arranged and paged prominently.


SECTION 8. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORDS OF CASE ON APPEAL. - Within forty-eight (48)

hours after the filing of the appeal, the records of the case shall be transmitted by the Regional Arbitration Branch or office of origin to the Commission.


SECTION 9. PERFECTION OF APPEAL; EFFECT. - Without prejudice to immediate reinstatement pending appeal under Section 6 of Rule XI, once an appeal is filed, the Labor Arbiter loses jurisdiction over the case. All pleadings and motions pertaining to the appealed case shall thereafter be addressed to and filed with the Commission.


SECTION 10. FRIVOLOUS OR DILA-TORY APPEALS. - No appeal from an interlocutory order shall be entertained. To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, including those taken from interlocutory orders, the Commission may censure or cite in contempt the erring parties and their counsels, or subject them to reasonable fine or penalty.


SECTION 11. APPEALS FROM DECISION OF OTHER AGENCIES. - The Rules provided

herein governing appeals from the decisions or orders of Labor Arbiters shall apply to appeals to the Commission from decisions or orders of the other offices or agencies appealable to the Commission according to law.

RULE VII


PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE COMMISSION

SECTION 1. JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION.



The Commission shall exercise exclusive, original, and appellate jurisdiction in accordance with law.


SECTION 2. COMPOSITION AND INTERNAL FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION EN BANC AND ITS DIVISIONS.

a) Composition. - Unless otherwise provided by law, the Commission shall be composed of the Chairman and of fourteen (14) Commissioners.

b) Commission En Banc. - The Commission shall sit en banc only for purposes of promulgating rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before its Divisions and Regional Arbitration Branches, and for the formulation of policies affecting its administration and operations.

It may, on temporary or emergency basis, allow cases within the jurisdiction of any Division to be heard by any other Division whose docket allows the additional workload and such transfer will not expose litigants to unnecessary additional expense.

c) Divisions. - Unless otherwise provided by law, the Commission shall exercise its adjudicatory and all other powers, functions and duties through its five (5) Divisions. Each Division shall consist of one member from the public sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the workers and employers sectors, respectively.

Of the five (5) Divisions, the First, Second and Third Divisions shall have exclusive territorial jurisdiction over appealed cases coming from Luzon; Fourth Division, appealed cases from Visayas Region; and the Fifth Division, appealed cases from Mindanao including those from the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao.

d) Headquarters. - As provided by law, the Commission and its First, Second and Third Divisions shall have their main office in the National Capital Region, and the Fourth and Fifth Divisions in the cities of Cebu and Cagayan de Oro, respectively.

SECTION 3. THE CHAIRMAN. - The Chairman shall preside over all sessions of the Commission en banc. He is the Presiding Commissioner of the First Division. In case of the effective absence or incapacity of the Chairman, the Presiding Commissioner of the Second Division shall be the Acting Chairman.

The Chairman, aided by the Executive Clerk of the Commission, shall have administrative supervision over the Commission and its Regional Arbitration Branches and all its personnel including the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters.

SECTION 4. COMMISSION EN BANC SESSION, QUORUM AND VOTE.

a) Commission En Banc. - The Chairman shall call the Commission to an en banc session at least twice a year, preferably on the first week of June and the first week of December, to deliberate and decide on any matter before it. However, a majority of all the members of the Commission may call a special en banc session to discuss and decide on urgent and vital matters which need immediate action.

b) Quorum. - The presence of a majority of all the members of the Commission shall be necessary to constitute a quorum. The vote or concurrence of the majority of the members constituting a quorum shall be the decision or resolution of the Commission en banc.

c) Division. - The presence of at least two (2) Commissioners of a Division shall constitute a quorum. The concurrence of two (2) Commissioners of a Division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment or resolution.

Whenever the required membership in a Division is not complete and the concurrence of two (2) Commissioners to arrive at a judgment or resolution cannot be obtained, the Chairman shall designate such number of additional Commissioners from the other Divisions as may be necessary from the same sector.

d) Role of Chairman in the Division. - The Chairman of the Commission may convene and preside over the session of any Division to consider any case pending before it and participate in its deliberations, if in his judgment, his presence therein will best serve the interests of labor justice. He shall not however, participate in the voting by the Division, except when he is acting as Presiding Commissioner of the Division in the absence of the regular Presiding Commissioner.

SECTION 5. CONSULTATION. - The conclusions of a Division on any case or matter submitted to it for decision shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion. It shall be mandatory for the Division to meet for the purpose of the consultation ordained herein.

A certification to this effect singed by the presiding Commissioner of the Division shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties.

SECTION 6. DISSENTING OPINION. - Should any member of a Division indicate his intention to write a dissenting opinion, he may file the same within the period prescribed for deciding or resolving the appeal; otherwise, such written dissenting opinion shall not be considered part of the records of the case.

SECTION 7. INHIBITION. - No motion to inhibit the entire Division of the Commission shall be
entertained. However, any Commissioner may inhibit himself from the consideration and resolution of any case or matter before the Division and shall so state in writing the legal or justifiable grounds therefor.

In the event that a member inhibits himself, the case shall be raffled by the Executive Clerk or Deputy Executive Clerk to either of the two (2) remaining Commissioners. In case two (2) Commissioners in a Division inhibit themselves in a case or matter before it, the Chairman shall, as far as practicable, appoint two (2) Commissioners from other Divisions representing the sector of the Commis-sioners who inhibited themselves.

SECTION 8. ABSTENTION. - In the event of an abstention, and the concurrence of two (2) Commissioners to arrive at a judgment or resolution cannot be obtained, Section 4 (c), second paragraph, of this Rule shall apply.

SECTION 9. CONSOLIDATION OF CASES. - Appealed and injunction cases involving the same parties, issues, or related questions of fact or law shall be consolidated before the Commissioner to whom the case with the lowest case number is assigned. Notice of the consolidation shall be given by the Executive Clerk or Deputy Executive Clerk to the other members of the concerned
Divisions.

SECTION 10. TECHNICAL RULES NOT BINDING. - The rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.

In any proceeding before the Commis-sion, the parties may be represented by legal counsel but it shall be the duty of the Chairman, any Presiding Commissioner or Commissioner to exercise complete control of the proceedings at all stages.

SECTION 11. CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION. - In the exercise of its exclusive, original and
appellate jurisdiction, the Commission may exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute.

The settlement of cases on appeal, to be valid and binding between the parties, shall be made before the Commissioner or his authorized representative.

SECTION 12. ROLE OF THE LABOR ARBITER ASSIGNED TO THE COMMIS-SION. - In the resolution of cases on appeal, and those mentioned in Rules VIII and X, the Commission shall be assisted by a Labor Arbiter who may be directed to study, review, hear and receive evidence, and submit reports thereon.

SECTION 13. FORM OF DECISION, RESOLUTION AND ORDER. - The decision, resolution and order of the Commission shall state clearly and distinctly the findings of facts, issues, and conclusions of law on which it is based, and the relief granted, if any. If the decision, resolution or order involves monetary awards, the same shall contain the specific amount awarded as of the date the decision is rendered.

SECTION 14. FINALITY OF DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AND ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT.

a) Finality of the Decisions, Resolutions or Orders of the Commission. - Except as provided in Section 9 of Rule X, the decisions, resolutions or orders of the Commission shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.

b) Entry of Judgment. - Upon the expiration of the ten (10) calendar day period provided in paragraph (a) of this Section, the decision, resolution, or order shall be entered in a book of entries of judgement.
The Executive Clerk or Deputy Executive Clerk shall consider the decision, resolution or order as final and execu- tory after sixty (60) calendar days from date of mailing in the absence of return cards, certifications from the post office, or other proof of service to parties.

SECTION 15. MOTIONS FOR RECON-SIDERATION. - Motion for reconsideration of any decision, resolution or order of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable or patent errors; provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of decision, resolution or order, with proof of service that a copy of the same has been furnished, within the reglementary period, the adverse party; and provided further, that only one such motion from the same party shall be entertained.
Should a motion for reconsideration be entertained pursuant to this Section, the resolution shall be executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof.

RULE VIII

CERTIFIED CASES

SECTION 1. POLICY. - It is the declared policy of certification of labor disputes for compulsory arbitration to ensure and maintain industrial peace based on social justice and national interest by having a full, complete and immediate settlement or adjudication of all labor disputes between the parties, as well as issues that are relevant to or incidents of the certified issues.

SECTION 2. CERTIFIED LABOR DISPUTES. - Certified labor disputes are cases certified to the Commission for compulsory arbitration under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code.

SECTION 3. EFFECTS OF CERTIFI-CATION.

a) Upon certification, the intended or impending strike or lockout is automatically enjoined, notwithstanding the filing of any motion for reconsideration of the certification order nor the non-resolution of any such motion which may have been duly submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

If a work stoppage has already taken place at the time of the certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.

b) All cases between the same parties, except where the certification order specifies otherwise the issues submitted for arbitration which are already filed or may be filed, and are relevant to or are proper incidents of the certified case, shall be considered subsumed or absorbed by the certified case, and shall be decided by the appropriate Division of the Commission.
Subject to the second paragraph of Section 4 of Rule IV, the parties to a certified case, under pain of contempt, shall inform their counsels and the Division concerned of all cases pending with the Regional Arbitration Branches and the Voluntary Arbitrators relative or incident to the certified case before it.

c) Whenever a certified labor dispute involves a business entity with several workplaces located in different regions, the Division having territorial jurisdiction over the principal office of the company shall acquire jurisdiction to decide such labor dispute; unless the certification order provides otherwise.

SECTION 4. EFFECTS OF DEFIANCE. - Non-compliance with the certification order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment shall be considered as an illegal act committed in the course of the strike or lockout, and shall authorize the Commission to enforce the same under pain of immediate disciplinary action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out employer of backwages, damages and/or other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against the liable parties.

The Commission may also seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance and enforcement of its orders and resolutions.

SECTION 5. Procedure in certi-fied cases. - a) Unless there is a necessity to conduct a clarificatory hearing, the Commssion shall resolve all certified cases within thirty (30) calendar days from receipt by the assigned Commissioner of the complete records, which shall include the position papers of the parties and the order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment denying the motion for reconsideration of the certification order, if such motion has been filed.

b) Where a clarificatory hearing is needed, the Commission shall, within five (5) calendar days from receipt of the records, issue a notice to be served on the parties through the fastest means available, requiring them to appear and submit additional evidence, if any.

c) Notwithstanding the necessity for a clarificatory hearing, all certified cases shall be resolved by the Commission within sixty (60) calendar days from receipt of the complete records.

d) No motion for postponement or extension shall be entertained.

SECTION 6. EXECUTION OF JUDG-MENT IN CERTIFIED CASE. - Upon issuance of the entry
of judgment, the Commission, motu proprio or upon motion by the proper party, may cause the execution of the judgment in the certified case.

RULE IX

CONTEMPT

SECTION 1. DIRECT CONTEMPT. - The Chairman or any Commissioner or Labor Arbiter may summarily adjudge guilty of direct contempt any person committing any act of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the Chairman or any Commissioner or Labor Arbiter as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward said officials, offensive acts toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness or to subscribe to an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.

If the offense is committed against the Commission or any member thereof, the same shall be punished by a fine not exceeding Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment not exceeding five (5) days, or both; and, if the offense is committed against any Labor Arbiter, the same shall be punished by a fine not exceeding One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both.

Any person adjudged guilty of direct contempt by a Labor Arbiter may, within a period of five (5) calendar days from notice of the judgment, appeal the same to the Commission and the execution of said judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of the appeal upon the filing by said person of a bond on condition that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the appeal be decided against him. A judgment of the Commission on direct contempt shall be immediately executory and inap- pealable.

SECTION 2. INDIRECT CONTEMPT. - The Commission or any Labor Arbiter may, in accordance with Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, cite any person for indirect contempt and impose the appropriate penalty under any of the following grounds:

a) Misbehavior of any officer or employee in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transaction;

b) Disobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ, order or decision;

c) Any abuse of, or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings not constituting direct contempt;

d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the adminis-tration of justice;

e) Assuming to be an attorney or a representative of party without authority;

f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; or

g) Other grounds analogous to the foregoing.
The same procedure provided in the second paragraph of Section 1 of this Rule shall govern any person adjudged guilty of indirect contempt.


RULE X

INJUNCTION

SECTION 1. INJUNCTION IN ORDI-NARY LABOR DISPUTES. - A preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.

A certification of non-forum shopping shall accompany the petition for injunction.
The writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order shall become effective only upon posting of the required cash bond in the amount to be determined by the Commission to answer for any damage that may be suffered by the party enjoined, if it is finally determined
that the petitioner is not entitled thereto.

SECTION 2. INJUNCTION IN STRIKES OR LOCKOUTS. - A preliminary or permanent injunction may be granted by the Commission only after hearing the testimony of witnesses and with opportunity for cross-examination in support of the allegations of the complaint or petition made under oath, and testimony by way of opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding of fact by the Commission:

a) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof.

b) That substantial and irreparable injury to petitioner’s property will follow;

c) That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon the petitioner
by the denial or relief than will be inflicted upon respondents by the granting of relief;

d) That petitioner has no adequate remedy at law; and

e) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect petitioner’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.

SECTION 3. HEARING; NOTICE THEREOF. - Hearings shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in such manner as the Commissioner shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief Executive and other public officials of the province or city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect petitioner’s property.

SECTION 4. RECEPTION OF EVI-DENCE; DELEGATION. - The reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses, and shall thereafter submit his report and recommendation to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from such delegation.

SECTION 5. OCULAR INSPECTION. - The Chairman, any Commissioner, Labor Arbiter or
their duly authorized representatives, may, at any time during working hours, conduct an ocular inspection on any establishment, building, ship or vessel, place or premises, including any work, material, implement, machinery, appliance or any object therein, and ask any employee, laborer, or any person, as the case may be, for any information or data concerning any matter or question relative to the object of the petition.
The ocular inspection reports shall be submitted to the appropriate Division within twenty-four (24) hours from the conduct thereof.

SECTION 6. TEMPORARY RESTRAIN-ING ORDER; REQUISITES. - If the petitioner shall also allege that, unless a temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to petitioner’s property will be unavoidable, such a temporary restraining order may be issued upon testimony under oath, or by affidavits of the petitioner’s witnesses, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the Commission in the issuance thereof.

SECTION 7. CASH BOND. - No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
shall be issued except on the condition that petitioner shall first file an undertaking to answer for the damages and post a cash bond in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), or such higher amount as may be determined by the Commission, to recompense those enjoined for any loss, expense or damage caused by the improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or injunction, including all reasonable costs, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee, and expense of defense against the order or against the granting of any injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and subsequently denied by the Commission.

SECTION 8. EFFECTIVITY OF TEMPO-RARY RESTRAINING ORDER. - A temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than twenty (20) days reckoned from the posting of the cash bond required under the preceding Section. During the said period, the parties shall be required to present evidence to substantiate their respective positions in the main petition.

SECTION 9. EFFECTS OF DEFIANCE. - The order or resolution enjoining the performance of
illegal acts shall be immediately executory in accordance with the terms thereof. In case of non-compliance, the Commission shall impose such sanctions, and shall issue such orders, as may be necessary to implement the said order or resolution, including the enlistment of law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction over the area for the purpose of enforcing the same.

SECTION 10. ORDINARY REMEDY IN LAW OR IN EQUITY. - Nothing in this Rule shall deprive any party having a claim or cause of action under or upon such undertaking from electing to pursue his ordinary remedy by suit at law or in equity.

RULE XI

EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS

SECTION 1. EXECUTION UPON FINALITY OF DECISION OR ORDER.

a) A writ of execution may be issued motu proprio or on motion, upon a decision or order that finally disposes of the action or proceedings after the parties and their counsels or authorized representatives are furnished with copies of the decision or order in accordance with these Rules, but only after the expiration of the period to appeal if no appeal has been filed, as shown by the certificate of finality.

If an appeal has been filed, a writ of execution may be issued when there is an entry of judgment as provided for in Section 14 of Rule VII.

b) No motion for execution shall be entertained nor a writ of execution be issued unless the Labor Arbiter or the Commission is in possession of the records of the case which shall include an entry of judgment if the case was appealed; except that, as provided for in Section 14 of Rule V and Section 6 of this Rule, and in those cases where partial execution is allowed by law, the Labor Arbiter shall retaine duplicate original copies of the decision to be implemented and proof of service thereof for the purpose of immediate enforcement.

SECTION 2. PRE-EXECUTION CONFE-RENCE. - Within two (2) working days from receipt of a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, and subject to Section 1, paragraph (b) of this Rule, the Labor Arbiter shall schedule a pre-execution conference or hearing to thresh out matters relevant to execution, including the computation of the award.

SECTION 3. FORM AND CONTENTS OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION. - The writ of execution must be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines signed by the Commission or Labor Arbiter requiring the Sheriff to execute the decision, order, or award of the Commission or Labor Arbiter, and must contain the dispositive portion thereof, the amount, if any, to be demanded, and all lawful fees to be collected from the losing party or any other person required by law to obey the same.

SECTION 4. COMPUTATION DURING EXECUTION. - Where further computation of the
award in the decision, resolution or order is necessary during the course of the execution proceedings, no writ of execution shall be issued until after the computation has been approved by the Labor Arbiter in an order issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard on the matter.

SECTION 5. EXECUTION OF MONE-TARY JUDGMENT.

a) Immediate payment on demand. - The Sheriff shall enforce a monetary judgment by demanding the immediate payment of the
full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees from the losing party or any other person required by law to obey the same.

b) In the event of failure or refusal of the losing party to pay the judgment award, the Sheriff shall immediately proceed against the cash deposit or surety bond posted by the losing party, if any;

c) If the bonding company refuses to comply with the writ of execution, then its president and officers or authorized representatives shall be cited for contempt, and the bonding company shall be barred from transacting business with the Commission;

d) Should the cash deposit or surety bond be insufficient, or in case the surety bond cannot be
proceeded against for any reason, the Sheriff shall, within five (5) days from demand, execute the monetary judgment by levying on the property, personal and real, of the losing party not exempt from execution, sufficient to cover the judgment award, which may be disposed of for value at a public auction to the highest bidder.

e) Proceeds of execution shall be deposited with the Cashier of the concerned Division or Regional Arbitration Branch, or with an authorized depositary bank. Where payment is made in the form of a check, the same shall be payable to the Commission.

SECTION 6. EXECUTION OF REIN-STATEMENT PENDING APPEAL. - In case the decision includes an order of reinstatement, and the employer disobeys the directive under the second paragraph of Section 14 of Rule V or refuses to reinstate the dismissed employee, the Labor Arbiter shall immediately issue writ of execution, even pending appeal, directing the employer to immediately reinstate the dismissed employee either physically or in the payroll, and to pay the accrued salaries as a consequence of such reinstatement at the rate specified in the decision.
The Sheriff shall serve the writ of execution upon the employer or any other person required by law to obey the same. If he disobeys the writ, such employer or person may be cited for contempt in accordance with Rule IX.

SECTION 7. ENFORCEMENT OF WRIT OF EXECUTION. - In executing a decision, resolution or order, the Sheriff, or other authorized officer acting as Sheriff of the Commission, shall be guided strictly by these Rules, and by the Manual on Execution of Judgement, which shall form part of these Rules. In the absence of applicable rules, the Rules of Court, as amended, shall be applied in a suppletory manner.

SECTION 8. EXECUTORY BY MOTION OR BY INDEPENDENT ACTION. - A decision or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such period, the judgment shall become dormant, and may only be enforced by an independent action within a period of ten (10) years from date of its finality.

SECTION 9. EFFECT OF PERFECTION OF APPEAL ON EXECUTION. - The perfection of an appeal shall stay the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on Appeal, except execution for reinstatement pending appeal.

SECTION 10. EFFECT OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON EXECUTION. - A petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the assailed decision unless a restraining order is issued by said courts.

SECTION 11. RESOLUTION OF MOTION TO QUASH. - The mere filing of a motion to quash shall not stay execution proceedings. A motion to quash shall be resolved by the Labor Arbiter within ten (10) working days from submission of said motion for resolution.

SECTION 12. THIRD PARTY CLAIM. - A third party claim shall be filed within five (5) days from the last day of posting or publication of the notice of execution sale; otherwise the claim shall be forever barred. The third party claimant shall execute an affidavit stating his title to the property or right to possession thereof with supporting evidence, and shall file the same with the Sheriff and the Commission or Labor Arbiter who issued the writ of execution.

Upon receipt of the third party claim, all proceedings, with respect to the execution of the property subject of such claim, shall automatically be suspended. The Labor Arbiter who issued the writ may require the third party claimant to adduce additional evidence in support of his third party claim and to post a cash or surety bond equivalent to the amount of his claim, as provided for in Section 6 of Rule VI, without prejudice to the posting by the prevailing party of a supersedeas bond in an amount equivalent to that posted by the third party claimant. The Labor Arbiter shall resolve the propriety of such third party claim within ten (10) working days from submission of said claim for resolution.

SECTION 13. RETURN OF WRIT OF EXECUTION. - The writ of execution shall be returned to the Commission or Labor Arbiter who issued it at anytime, but not within ten (10) days nor beyond one hundred eighty (180) days, after receipt thereof by the Sheriff, who shall set forth in writing the whole proceedings, and file it with the Commission or Labor Arbiter to form part of the records of the case.

SECTION 14. SHERIFF’S REPORT. - The Sheriff enforcing the writ of execution shall submit not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of such writ, and every thirty (30) days thereafter, a report updating the Commission or Labor Arbiter who issued the writ of execution on the status of the enforcement thereof. A copy of the report shall be furnished the Chairman and the Executive Labor Arbiter.

SECTION 15. DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL SHERIFFS AND IMPOSI- TION OF FINES. - The Chairman of the Commission may designate special Sheriffs and take any measure, under existing laws, to ensure compliance with the decisions, resolutions or orders of the Commission and those of Labor Arbiters, including the imposition of administrative fine which shall not be less than Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
Failure on the part of the Sheriff to submit the return or report required under Section 13 and 14 of this Rule within the stated period shall subject him to the above administrative fine, or suspen- sion for fifteen (15) days without pay, or both.

RULE XII

COMMISSION SEAL AND
RECORDS, AND POWERS

AND DUTIES OF COMMISSION OFFICIALS

SECTION 1. SEAL OF THE COMMIS-SION. - The seal of the National Labor Relations Commission shall be of standard size, circular, with the inscription, running from left to right on the upper outside edge, the words “NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION”, and the lower outside edge, the words “REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”, with a design at the center containing the coat of arms of the Department of Labor and Employ- ment.

SECTION 2. THE EXECUTIVE CLERK. - The Executive Clerk shall assist the Commission when sitting en banc and when acting through the First Division, and shall perform such similar or equivalent functions and duties as are discharged by the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.

SECTION 3. DEPUTY EXECUTIVE CLERKS. - The Deputy Executive Clerks for the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Divisions shall assist the Commission when acting through its Division, and shall perform similar functions and duties as discharged by the Deputy Clerks of Court of the Court of Appeals, and as enume- rated herein as functions of the Executive Clerk relative to their respective Divisions.

SECTION 4. DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE CLERK AND DEPUTY EXECUTIVE CLERKS.

a) Custody of Seal and Books. - He shall keep in his care and custody the Seal of the Commission, together with all the books necessary for the recording of the proceedings of the Commission, including the records, files and exhibits;

b) Filing of Pleadings. - He shall receive and file all cases and pleadings and documents indicating thereon the date and time filed. All pleadings shall be filed in three (3) legibly typewritten copies in legal size;

c) Raffle and Assignment of Cases. - He shall assign appealed cases for study or report strictly by raffle or as directed by the Chairman. In this connection, the raffle of cases for study or report must be attended by the duty designated representative of the Members of the appropriate Division;

d) Service of Processes, Orders and Decisions. - He shall serve parties and counsel processes, notices of hearings, copies of decisions, resolutions or orders issued by the Commission by mail or by personal service and immediately attach the returns thereof to the records;

e) Commission Calendar and Minutes Book. - He shall prepare the Commission or Division calendars of sessions, attend such sessions personally and immediately prepare the minutes thereof. For this purpose, he shall keep a minutes book;

f) General Docket. - The Executive Clerk shall keep a general docket for the Commission, each page of which shall be numbered and prepared for receiving all the entries in a single page, and shall enter therein all original and appealed cases before it, numbered consecutively in the order in which they were received and, under the heading of each case, the date and hour of each pleading filed, of each order, decision or resolution entered, and of each other step or action taken in the case; so that, by reference to any single page, the history of the case may be known;

g) Promulgation and Promulgation Book. - He shall promulgate decisions and final resolutions on the same date the same is filed with his office and indicate the date and time of promulgation and attest the same by his signature on the first page thereof.

He shall immediately furnish the Chairman with a copy of such decision, resolution, or order with a summary of the nature thereof and the issue involved therein. He shall keep a promulgation book which indicates the date and time of promulgation, the case number, title of the case, the ponente, the nature of the decision or final resolution and the action taken by the Commission by quoting the dispositive portion thereof. Notices of said decisions, resolutions or orders shall be sent in sealed envelopes to parties and their counsel within forty-eight (48) hours from promulgation;

h) Entry of Judgment. - He shall keep a book of entries of judgment, decisions, resolutions and orders containing in chronological order the entries of all final decisions, resolutions and orders of the Commission;

i) Disposition and Remand of Records. - Upon entry of judgment, he shall immediately remand the records of the case to the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin, Regional Director or his duly authorized officer, as the case may be. The Records Unit shall immediately post said records without delay within two (2) working days;

j) Monthly Accomplishment Reports. - He shall submit a monthly accomplishment report of the Commission or Division not later than the 7th day of the following month;

k) Other Functions. - He shall perform other functions as directed by the Chairman or the Commission en banc.

SECTION 5. BOARD SECRETARIES. - The Board Secretaries of the Commission shall assist the Executive Clerk or Deputy Executive Clerks in the performance of their duties and functions relative to the Commission or their respective Divisions.

SECTION 6. ISSUANCE OF CERTIFIED COPIES. - Unless otherwise restricted by Section 8 hereof, the Executive Clerk, Deputy Executive Clerks, and the authorized officers of the Regional Arbitration Branches shall prepare, for any person asking for the same, a certified copy, under the Seal of the Commission, of any paper, record, decision, resolution, order or entry by and in his office, proper to be certified, after payment of the standard fees to the Commission duly receipted for; Provided, that a pauper litigant, as defined by law, shall be exempted from paying any fee for certified copies of any document, including transcripts of stenographic notes.

SECTION 7. POWER TO ADMINISTER OATH. - The Chairman, Members of the Commission, the Executive Clerk, the Deputy Executive Clerks, the Executive Labor Arbiters, the Labor Arbiters, and other persons designated or commissioned by the Chairman of the Commission, shall have the power to administer oath on all matters or proceedings related to the performance of their duties.

SECTION 8. ACCESS TO COMMIS-SION RECORDS. - All official records of the Commission shall be open to the public during regular office hours, except those kept by it in the nature of confidential reports, records or communications which cannot be divulged without violating private rights or prejudicing the public interest. Minutes of hearings or sessions may not be divulged until after promulgation of the decision or resolution.

RULE XIII
EFFECTIVITY

SECTION 1. EFFECTIVITY. - These Rules shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
(Sgd.) BENEDICTO ERNESTO R. BITONIO JR.
Chairman

(Sgd.) RAUL T. AQUINO
Presiding Commissioner

(Sgd.) LOURDES C. JAVIER
Presiding Commissioner

(Sgd.) GERARDO C. NOGRALES
Presiding Commissioner

(Sgd.) SALIC B. DUMARPA
Presiding Commissioner
(Sgd.) PERLITA B. VELASCO
Commissioner

(Sgd.) ROMEO L. GO
Commissioner

(Sgd.) VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY
Commissioner

(Sgd.) ANGELITA A. GACUTAN
Commissioner

(Sgd.) ROMEO C. LAGMAN
Commissioner

(Sgd.) TITO F. GENILO
Commissioner

(Sgd.) AURELIO D. MENZON
Commissioner

(Sgd.) OSCAR S. UY
Commissioner

(Sgd.) PROCULO T. SARMEN
Commissioner

(Sgd.) JOVITO C. CAGAANAN
Commissioner

Attested by:

(Sgd.) APOLLO X.C.S. SANGALANG
Executive Clerk of Court IV