Supreme Court Decision:
Land Titles: irregularly issued title can be cancelled administratively by LRA (Severino M. Manotok IV, et al. vs. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, represented by Teresita Barque Hernandez
PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR. and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE HER-NANDEZ,
Respondents.
Promulgated: December 12, 2005
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review assail, in G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision1 of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision2 of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481, and the LRA to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals4 are as follows:
Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in 1988. In support of the petition, petitioners submitted the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real estate tax receipts, tax decla-rations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property.
Upon being notified of the petition for administrative recon-stitution, private respondents (petitioners herein) filed their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their reconsti-tuted title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners’ predeces-sors-in-interest is spurious.
On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer, denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 2101775 on grounds that:
1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;
2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious docu-ment as categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated February 19, 1997.6
Respondents’ motion for recon-sideration was denied in an order7 dated February 10, 1998 hence they appealed to the LRA.
The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of documents other than the owner’s duplicate certificate of title as bases in denying the petition and should have confined himself with the owner’s duplicate certificate of title.8 The LRA further declared:
Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and convincing evidence that TCT NO. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the original of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 .... The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost .... The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed and not salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 ....
It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands ....
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is mandatory.9
….
It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy
through levy on real property; and (2) by judicial action.22 Under Section 25723 and 25824 of the LGC, the basic real property tax constitutes as a lien on the property subject to the tax which may be levied upon through the issuance of a warrant. The local government unit concerned may also enforce the collection of the basic real property tax by civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction.25
Respondents levied on a portion of the MAGRA to satisfy the tax delinquency of PNOC-EDC. However, the land being levied is classified as inalienable. It is owned by the government and thus, cannot be sold at public auction. Likewise, the machineries, equipment and other infrastructures in the MAGRA cannot be levied and sold at public auction because it is not the property that is subject to the tax.
The personal liability for the tax delinquency, is generally on whoever is the owner of the real property at the time the tax accrues; where, however, the tax liability is imposed on the beneficial use of the real property such as those owned but leased to private persons or entities by the government, or when the assessment is made on the basis of the actual use thereof, the personal liability is on any person who has such beneficial or actual use at the time of the accrual of the tax.26
In the case at bar, PNOC-EDC is the beneficial user, however, since respondents cannot avail of the administrative remedy through levy, they can only enforce the collection of real property tax through civil action.
PNOC-EDC also claims that the real property tax assessment is not yet final and executory. It avers that prior resort to administrative remedies before seeking judicial remedies is not necessary considering that the issue raised is purely a question of law. Consequently, it need not appeal the assessment to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals or to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals as provided under Sections 22627 and 22928 of the LGC.
We disagree. It is well-settled in Systems Plus Computer College of Caloocan City v. Local Government of Caloocan City29 that all adminis-trative remedies must be exhausted before availing of the judicial remedies. Thus:
The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-trative remedies. Hence, when the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein. Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes.
If PNOC-EDC was not satisfied with the assessment of its property, it should have appealed to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals within 60 days from receipt of the written notice of assessment. Instead, it waited until the issuance of a warrant of levy before it filed a petition for injunction in the regional trial court, which was not in accordance with the remedies provided in the LGC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The September 8, 2004 Decision and the January 10, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan City, Branch 17, in Civil Case No. 2003-14, are AFFIRMED insofar as it declared PNOC-EDC liable to pay the real property tax accruing from its use of the MAGRA. Respondents however are DIRECTED to refrain from levying on the buildings, infrastructures and machineries of PNOC-EDC to satisfy the payment of the real property tax delinquency.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents’ TCT No. T-210177.
SO ORDERED.24
From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, petitioners filed separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335, respectively.
In G.R. No. 162605, petitioners argue that:
I
THE MAJORITY JUSTICES ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE CANCEL-LATION OF PETITIONERS’ EXISTING TITLE, CONSIDERING THAT:
a. THEY ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME IS NOT PART OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN A RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS.
b. THEY ALLOWED A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; and
c. THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN RESOLVING AN APPEAL OF THE DECISION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE, SINCE ONLY A PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CAN ORDER THE ANNULMENT/CANCEL-LATION OF A TORRENS TITLE. BY ALLOWING A “SHORT CUT”, THE MAJORITY JUSTICES DEPRIVED THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR PROPERTY AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
II
THE MAJORITY JUSTICES GRAVELY MISAPPLIED THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN ORTIGAS V. VELASCO, CONSIDERING THAT:
a. IN THE ORTIGAS CASE, THERE WERE TWO TITLES EXISTING OVER THE SAME PARCEL OF LAND, AS A RESULT OF THE RECONSTITUTED TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF MOLINA. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ONLY PETITIONERS HOLD TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, AS RESPONDENTS ARE MERELY TRYING TO HAVE TITLE RECONSTITUTED IN THEIR NAMES.
b. IN ORTIGAS, THERE WERE SEVERAL DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF ORTIGAS’ PROPERTY. HENCE, THERE WAS SUF-FICIENT GROUND TO ANNUL MOLINA’S TITLE OUTRIGHT. IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE ARE NO SUCH DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE CANCELLATION OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY HEARING.25
In G.R. No. 162335, petitioners raise the following issues:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN ORDERING THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY TO CANCEL TCT NO. RT-22481 OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID COURT WAS FULLY COGNIZANT THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO EXERCISE SUCH AUTHORITY AND POWER AND THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS EQUALLY DEVOID OF JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER BECAUSE UNDER THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980 SPECIFI-CALLY SECTION 19 (2) THEREOF, ONLY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN INVOKING EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION TO JUSTIFY ITS CHALLENGED AMENDED DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2004 DIRECTING LRA TO CANCEL PETITIONERS MANOTOK’S TITLE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT, AS STATED, THE LAW EXPLICITLY VESTS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 24, 1998 OF RESPONDENT LAND REGISTRATION AUTHO-RITY IN LRC ADMIN. CASE NO. Q-547 [97] VIEWED FROM THE FACT THAT SAID RESOLUTION OF LRA IS PATENTLY AT WAR WITH LAW AND CONTROLLING JURISPRU-DENCE THAT PROHIBITS RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE BY THIRD PARTY ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED IF
of Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the office of Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful repository of survey plans for lots situated within the National Capital Region including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by the custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-96 .... Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to Atty. Bustos … confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty. Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. …
.…
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by the certified copy of the computer print-out duly issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered into the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said computer print-out is duly supported by an Offical Receipt ….
The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the legal repository and duly signed by the custodian thereof. The documentary evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. …10
Nevertheless, notwithstanding its conclusion that petitioners’ title was fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted that it is only the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which can declare that the same was indeed fraudulently reconstituted. It thus opined that respondents’ title may only be reconstituted after a judicial declaration that petitioners’ title was void and should therefore be cancelled.11
The dispositive portion of the LRA’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Manotoks upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioners’ filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by respondents with a prayer that reconstitution be ordered immediately.
On June 14, 2001, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and respondents’ prayer for immediate reconstitution were denied.13
From the foregoing, respondents filed a petition for review14 with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and praying that the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute TCT No. 210177 without being subjected to the condition that petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] should first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction.15 Petitioners likewise filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision16 on September 13, 2002, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered the assailed Resolution of the LRA dated June 24, 1998 is AFFIRMED in toto and the petition for review is ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.17
Respondents moved for reconsideration.18 On November 7, 2003, the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division rendered an Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners’ valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 was denied,20 hence, this petition docketed as G.R. No. 162605.
Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision21 on October 29, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of the LRA dated 24 June 1998 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.22
In so ruling, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals declared that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to the petition for reconstitution since there is yet no final judgment upholding or annulling respondents’ title.23
Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was granted by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals on February 24, 2004, thus:
face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact. Questions like these are not reviewable by this court which, as a rule, confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.31 A petition for review should only cover questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable.32
In Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite,33 this Court categorically declared:
Second. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a factual finding that petitioner’s title to the land is of doubtful authenticity.
Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is bound by the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals....
In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of which title, petitioners’ or respondents’, is valid or spurious. This has been ruled upon by the LRA and duly affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals.
The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution. It has the authority to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer. The function is adjudicatory in nature – it can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution. Logically, it can declare a title as sham or spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such declaration, then there would be no basis for its decision to grant or deny the reconstitution. The findings of fact of the LRA, when supported by substantial evidence, as in this case, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.34
In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from the evidence submitted which between or among the titles is genuine and existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the petition. Without such authority, the LRA would be a mere robotic agency clothed only with mechanical powers.
The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the LRA. Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court has jurisdiction on appeals from judgments or final orders of the LRA, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to determine anew which of the two titles is sham or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial court’s ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the LRA and the two divisions of the appellate court have already declared that petitioners’ title is forged. In Mendoza v. Court of Appeals,35 we ruled that:
Now, technically, the revocation and cancellation of the deed of sale and the title issued in virtue thereof in de los Santos’ favor should be had in appropriate proceedings to be initiated at the instance of the Government. However, since all the facts are now before this Court, and it is not within de los Santos’ power in any case to alter those facts at any other proceeding, or the verdict made inevitable by said facts, for this Court to direct at this time that cancellation proceedings be yet filed to nullify the sale to de los Santos and his title, would be needlessly circuitous and would unnecessarily delay the termination of the controversy at bar, .... This Court will therefore make the adjudication entailed by the facts here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other cases in similar premises.
No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an issue in a case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. The remand of the case or of an issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it and particularly where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand thereof.36
The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to act on the petition for administrative reconstitution. The doctrine laid down in Alabang Dev. Corp., et al. v. Hon. Valenzuela, etc., et al.37 does not apply in the instant case. In Alabang, the Court stressed that:
… [L]ands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles … cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. … The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. …38
The Alabang ruling was premised on the fact that the existing Torrens title was duly issued and that there is only one title subsisting at the time the petition for reconstitution was filed. In the instant case, it cannot be said that petitioners’ title was duly issued much less could it be presumed valid considering the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals that the same is sham and spurious.
The Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine laid down in Ortigas in refusing to remand the case to the trial court. As expressly declared in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco:39
ANOTHER VALID TITLE IS EXISTING COVERING THE LAND SUBJECT THEREOF.
IV. THE LRA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE TITLE OF HOMER BARQUE, SR. SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CONDITION THAT THE TITLE OF PETI-TIONERS MANOTOK SHOULD FIRST BE ORDERED CANCELLED BY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN THE FACE OF THE GLARING FACTS THAT SAID TITLE IS HIGHLY SUSPECT AND BEARS BADGES OF FABRICATION AND FALSIFICATION AND THEREFORE NO OTHER LOGICAL AND CREDIBLE CONCLUSION CAN BE DRAWN EXCEPT THAT IT IS A FAKE AND SPURIOUS TITLE.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS CLEARLY FILED OUT OF TIME.26
On August 2, 2004, the petition in G.R. No. 162605 was consolidated with the petition in G.R. No. 162335.27
In sum, petitioners contend that (a) the LRA has no authority to annul their title; (b) the reconstitution of respondents’ Torrens title would be a collateral attack on petitioners’ existing title; (c) they were not given the opportunity to be heard, specifically the chance to defend the validity of their Torrens title; (d) the Court of Appeals, in resolving the appeal from the LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners’ title; and (e) the ruling in Ortigas was misapplied.
The petitions must be denied.
The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title prior to the reconstitution. Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 2628 clearly provides:
Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enume-rated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
....
When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they submitted in support thereof the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, real estate tax receipts and tax declaration. Plainly, the same should have more than sufficed as sources for the reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 26 which explicitly mandates that the reconstitution shall be made following the hierarchy of sources as enumerated by law. In addition, Section 12 of the same law requires that the petition shall be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property only if the source of the reconstitution is Section 3(f) of RA No. 26. Thus:
Section 12. … Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall further be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.29
Since respondents’ source of reconstitution is the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, there is no need for the reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much less deny the petition on the ground that the submitted plan appears to be spurious. By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is the intent of the law to give more weight and preference to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title over the other enumerated sources.
The factual finding of the LRA that respondents’ title is authentic, genuine, valid, and existing, while petitioners’ title is sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It should remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Findings of fact of administrative bodies are accorded respect, even finality by this Court and, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are no longer reviewable except only for very compelling reasons. Basic is the rule that factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions … are accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the consideration that this Court is essentially not a trier of facts.30
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the
Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the remand of the reconstitution case (LRC No. Q-5405) to the Court of origin with instructions that Ortigas’ and the Solicitor General’s appeals from the judgment rendered therein, which were wrongly disallowed, be given due course and the records forthwith transmitted to the appellate tribunal. This, in fact, is a relief alternatively prayed for by petitioner Ortigas. Considering however the fatal infirmities afflicting Molina’s theory or cause of action, evident from the records before this Court, such a remand and subsequent appeal proceedings would be pointless and unduly circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not possible for Molina’s cause to prosper. To defer adjudication thereon would be unwarranted and unjust.
The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As already discussed, the validity of respondents’ and petitioners’ title have been squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which factual findings are no longer reviewable by this Court.
A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA, et al.,40 where this Court, as claimed by petitioners, have affirmed their title over the disputed property, would reveal that the sole issue resolved therein is whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties.41 There was no adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot even be discerned if the property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the property subject of the instant controversy.
There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of “their property” without due process of law when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the RTC. As already discussed, there is no need to remand the case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of respondents and petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority to pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners’ claim that they were deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due process.
As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:42
Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution of certificates of title, the parties acquiesced in submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the said petition, and they were given the full opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of ownership was valid and binding.
The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners’ title which was irregularly and illegally issued in the first place.43 As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite:44
The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.
In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property is indefeasible because of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report … that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis …
….
Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system does not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.
Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly reconstituted certificates of title secured through fraud and misrepresentation cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.45
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481, and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Quisumbing,JJ., concur.
Carpio, J. The Dissenting Opinion
Azcuna,J. I concur in separate opinion.
Friday, November 14, 2008
Monday, November 10, 2008
Supreme Court Decision: Buyers not in Good Faith
Supereme Court Decision:
Buyers not in Good Faith (Sps. Danilo and Alberta Domingo et al. vs. Guillermo Reed, December 9, 2005)
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157701
Spouses DANILO and ALBERTA DOMINGO, and EDUARDO QUITEVES,
petitioners,
- versus -
GUILLERMO REED,
Respondent.
Promulgated: December 9, 2005
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When dealing with registered land, prospective buyers are normally not required by law to inquire further than what appears on the face of the Torrens certificate of title on file with the Register of Deeds. Equally settled is the principle, however, that purchasers cannot close their eyes to known facts that should put a reasonable person on guard; they cannot subsequently claim to have acted in good faith, in the belief that there was no defect in the vendor’s certificate of title.
Their mere refusal to face up to that possibility will not make them innocent purchasers for value, if it later becomes apparent that the title was indeed defective, and that they would have discovered the fact, had they acted with the measure of precaution required of a prudent person in a like situation.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the August 27, 2002 Decision2 and the March 20, 2003 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59544.
The dispositive part of the Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
“The deeds of sale executed by Lolita Reed in favor of [herein Petitioner-]spouses Danilo Domingo and Alberta Domingo and Eduardo Quiteves over portions of the subject property covered by TCT No. 58195 registered in the name of Lolita R. Reed, married to Guillermo Reed, are declared NULL and VOID.
“The Register of Deeds of Pasig City is ordered to cancel TCT Nos. 84565 and 84567 issued in the names of [Petitioners] Eduardo Quiteves and spouses Danilo Domingo and Alberta Domingo, respectively, covering the portions of the subject property sold to them by Lolita Reed, and to reinstate TCT No. 58195 in the name of Lolita Reed, married to Guillermo Reed, insofar as the same covers the portions of the subject property sold to said [petitioners].”
4 The assailed Resolution denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
“[Respondent] Guillermo Reed was an overseas contract worker from 1978 to 1986 and came home only for short vacations.
He purchased from the Government Service Insurance System [GSIS] on installment basis a 166 square meter property located at MRR Road, Mangahan, Pasig.
Because he was working abroad, it was his wife, Lolita Reed, who paid the consideration to the GSIS.
On July 9, 1986, TCT No. 58195 covering said property was issued by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, Metro Manila – District II in the name of Lolita Reed, married to Guillermo Reed.
Guillermo Reed had allowed his brother, Dominador, and the latter’s wife, Luz, to stay in the house constructed on his property.
“In December, 1991, Dominador and Luz Reed were summoned to the barangay in connection with the complaint for ejectment filed against them by Eduardo Quiteves, who claimed to be the owner of the lot where their house stands.
Dominador and Luz informed Guillermo of the complaint filed against them.
Guillermo accompanied Dominador and Luz to the barangay, where they met Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta Domingo, who both claimed ownership of the subject property. Guillermo denied having sold his property.
“In view of the claims of Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta Domingo that they bought the subject property, Guillermo Reed made a verification with the Register of Deeds of Pasig.
Guillermo discovered that his title over the subject property had been cancelled and he was able to secure copies of the following documents, to wit:
“1. Special Power of Attorney, dated July 8, 1986, allegedly executed by him authorizing his wife, Lolita Reed, to sell the subject property or a portion thereof;
“2. Deed of Sale of a Portion of Residential Land, dated July 14, 1986, executed by Lolita Reed in favor of Danilo Domingo, married to Alberta Q. Domingo covering 41.50 square meter portion of subject property;
“3. Absolute Deed of Sale of a Portion of Residential Land, dated July 22, 1987, executed by Lolita Reed, as vendor and attorney-in-fact of Guillermo Reed, in favor of Natividad R. Villanera, married to Ardaniel Villanera, covering 41.50 square meter portion of subject property;
“4. Deed of Sale of a Portion of a Residential Land, dated January 10, 1989, executed by Lolita Reed, for herself and as attorney-in-fact, in favor of Eduardo Quiteves covering 86 square meter portion of subject property;
“5. TCT No. 84565 in the name of Eduardo Quiteves;
“6. TCT No. 84566 in the name of spouses Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera; and
“7. TCT No. 84567 in the name of spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo.
“On March 8, 1994, Guillermo Reed filed a complaint for reconveyance of property against Lolita Reed, spouses Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera, spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo, Eduardo Quiteves and the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila alleging that his wife, Lolita Reed, from whom he had been estranged, conspiring with the other [petitioners], except the Register of Deeds of Pasig, caused the preparation of a special power of attorney, dated July 8, 1986, wherein it was made to appear that he authorized his wife to sell the subject property; that he did not sign the special power of attorney nor appear before the notary public because he was working abroad; that the special power of attorney was not submitted to the Regional Trial Court [(RTC)] in Pasig City by Notary Public Macario C. Cruz, as stated in the letter dated April 1, 1993 of Clerk of Court Grace S. Belvis; and that spouses Villanera and Domingo and Eduardo Quiteves are purchasers in bad faith because they knew, at the time they transacted with Lolita Reed, that he was working abroad and estranged from the latter.
“An [A]nswer to the complaint was filed by [Petitioners] Eduardo Quiteves and spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo alleging that the sale of the subject property to them by Lolita Reed was valid inasmuch as Guillermo Reed gave his written consent thereto, as shown in a letter dated July 26, 1986; that in a proceeding before the [b]arangay [c]hairman, Guillermo Reed admitted that he personally signed the special power of attorney; that they have the right to rely on the presumption of regularity of the notarized special power of attorney; and that they are buyers in good faith and for value.
“Per Sheriff’s Return, Lolita Reed was not served with summons as she is no longer residing at the given address while spouses Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera were served with summons through Mrs. Alberta Domingo.
“After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
‘WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of x x x Sps. Ardaniel & Natividad Villanera, Sps. Alberto (sic) & Dominga (sic) Domingo, Eduardo Quiteves and the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, and against [respondent] Guillermo Reed and orders the DISMISSAL of the present case for lack of merit.
‘No pronouncement as to cost.’”
5 Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
First, it should be clear that the CA ruling concerned two transactions entered into by Petitioner-Intervenor Lolita Reed. The first transaction involved the sale she executed in favor of Spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo.
To them she sold a portion of the subject property covered by TCT No. 58195; it measured 41.5 square meters and was located at the southwest section.
The second sale was effected by the same vendor, this time in favor of Eduardo Quiteves; it covered 86 square meters at the northern portion of the same property.
Because of these transactions, the vendees were able to have certificates of titles issued in their respective names.
A third sale was made in favor of Spouses Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera. The CA ruled, however, that they had not been validly served any summons.
Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; hence, its Decision would not affect their rights.
Second, the CA held that the vendees were not purchasers for value in good faith. It found that Spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo had entered into the Contract of Sale involving conjugal property without actually seeing any Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing Lolita Reed to convey the property for and on behalf of the conjugal partnership.
Also, the fact that the Deed of Sale executed by them did not even mention any SPA showing that Respondent Guillermo Reed had consented to the sale of the conjugal property rendered the transaction questionable.
As for Eduardo Quiteves, he was faulted by the CA for not having inquired into and investigated the authenticity and validity of the SPA shown to him by Lolita, evidencing her husband’s alleged consent to the sale of their conjugal property.
The appellate court opined that Quiteves should have been put on guard, since the acknowledgment portion of the document stated that only Lolita had appeared before the lawyer who had notarized it.
Also, considering that it had been issued two years before the property was offered to Quiteves, he should have taken steps to verify the validity of the document and to find out the whereabouts of Guillermo, who had allegedly executed it.
Finally, the CA found that the SPA, from which Lolita had derived her authority to sell the property, was a forgery.
The appellate court gave credence to the consistent denial of Guillermo that he had signed the document.
It did not accept the Minutes 6 of the barangay meeting, containing his alleged admission that he had signed the SPA.
Furthermore, the CA gave weight to the Certification 7 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig that the alleged SPA notarized by Atty. Macario Cruz was not the same document submitted to that office.
Consequently, the CA declared the Deeds of Sale executed by Lolita in favor of Spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo and Eduardo Quiteves null and void. It also ordered the cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) issued in their favor; and the reinstatement of TCT No. 58195 in the name of Lolita Reed, married to Guillermo Reed, insofar as it covered the portions of the property sold to petitioners.
Hence, this Petition. 8
The Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for this Court’s resolution:
“I. Whether the case for reconveyance filed by respondent against petitioners sans the trial court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of Lolita Reed, an indispensable party, can prosper.
“II. Whether entrenched jurisprudence assigns the onus probandi, or burden of proof, showing forgery to the respondent after having asserted the same in his complaint.
“III. Whether the case of Voluntad vs. Dizon, 313 SCRA 210-211 (26 August 1999), utilized as basis to find petitioners not purchasers in good faith can apply to the case at bench.
“IV. Whether the case of Veloso vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 594-595 (21 August 1996) is apt to the case at bench.
“V. Whether the established doctrine, i.e., trial courts are in a better position to determine questions involving credibility having heard the witnesses and having observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, was applied by the Court of Appeals to the case.
“VI. Whether the finding, assuming without admitting, that respondent’s signature was falsified the right of petitioners, without any evidence as co-conspirators of Lolita Reed in the forgery and as purchasers in good faith over the subject properties, can be adversely affected.”9
For her part, petitioner-intervenor submits the following:
“I. Whether the conveyance of subject property in favor of Petitioners Danilo and Alberta Domingo and Eduardo Quiteves is valid considering that the same was executed by Petitioner-intervenor Lolita Reed and the proceeds arising therefrom were utilized to purchase things necessary for the support of family including education of petitioner-intervenor’s and Guillermo Reed’s common children pursuant to Article 161 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 115 of the same Code.
“II. Whether Guillermo Reed can recover the one-half (1/2) share of the conjugal partnership despite that he had already donated the same to his and Lolita Reed’s common children pursuant to Article 162 of the Civil Code.”10
The long-winded issues presented by petitioners and petitioner-intervenor can be reduced to one procedural and three main questions. The three main issues to be resolved are as follows: 1) whether the Special Power of Attorney is authentic; 2) whether Lolita Reed’s justification for selling the subject property is tenable; and 3) whether petitioners are buyers in good faith. As to the procedural matter, this Court will resolve whether jurisdiction over the person of Lolita has been acquired.
First Main Issue:
Authenticity of the Special Power of Attorney
Prior to determining whether petitioners are buyers in good faith, the essential question to be answered is whether the Special Power of Attorney relied upon by the parties was indeed authentic. Petitioners maintained before the courts below that it had not been proven to be a forgery, so it was presumably authentic. The CA, however, held otherwise. We agree.
Most telling is the admission of Lolita that she merely sent an already typewritten SPA to her husband, who was then working in the Middle East.
13 She further admits that when it was brought back by her brother-in-law, it had already been signed by Guillermo.
14 Thus, it is clear that she never saw him sign it.
Furthermore, she does not have any actual knowledge of whether he even saw the typewritten document, much less signed it.
It then becomes dubious whether the witnesses affixed their signatures to the SPA to attest that it had been signed in their presence by the principal and the attorney-in-fact.
How could they have attested to the signing, when the principal denied it, while the attorney-in-fact admitted having merely sent it to the Middle East for the principal’s signature?
This fact further explains why Notary Public Macario Cruz, in the acknowledgment portion of the document, stated that only Lolita Reed had appeared before him. But Atty. Cruz should have known better.
Obviously, since an SPA was being notarized, there should have been two parties to that document — the principal and the agent who was being constituted as attorney-in-fact.
A document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public.
The affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the contents of the document15 and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness of their signature.16 Notaries public are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document.
In fact, it is their duty to demand that the document presented to them for notarization be signed in their presence.
17 Their function is, among others, to guard against illegal deeds.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act.
18 It converts a private document into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.19
In not giving credence to the SPA, the Court agrees with the CA, which held thus:
“[T]he same [special power of attorney] was not reported by Atty. Macario Cruz as having been notarized by him.
Thus, in a letter dated April 1, 1993 addressed to Luz Reed, Grace S. Belvis, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Pasig stated that it was not the special power of attorney dated July 8, 1986 and recorded as Doc. 326, Page No. 66, Book No. XV, Series of 1986 in the notarial report of Atty. Macario Cruz which was submitted by the latter to the court. x x x.”
20 Guillermo Reed has consistently denied having signed the document. Moreover, together with his witness,
21 he has denied other documents allegedly showing that he admitted having signed it. Thus, we do not find any cogent reason to disturb the CA’s findings, as follows:
“The alleged admission of Guillermo Reed before the Barangay Chairman that he signed the special power of attorney, as shown in the minutes of the meeting prepared by Barangay Secretary, does not appear to be credible.
Guillermo Reed has consistently denied having signed the special power of attorney. In fact, he was not confronted during his cross-examination, of said minutes of the meeting in the barangay, where he met Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta Domingo for the first time, despite his insistence that the subject property still belongs to him.
Moreover, on rebuttal, Dominador Reed, whose signature appears in the minutes of the meeting, testified that he affixed his signature on a small piece of paper to show that he attended the meeting and there were no entries therein regarding the alleged admission of Guillermo Reed that he signed the special power of attorney; and that Guillermo Reed stated in said meeting that his property is not for sale. x x x.”
22 Petitioners insist that an expert witness, such as one from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), should have been presented to show that respondent’s signature was forged. But even without expert testimony, the questionable circumstances surrounding the execution of the SPA already casts serious doubt on its genuineness. As shown earlier, there is a plethora of factual details that point to its falsity.
Additionally, the CA noted the date “July 8, 1986,” on the SPA authorizing Lolita to sell the property covered by TCT No. 58195, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, District II, Metro Manila. As of that date, however, TCT No. 58195 was not yet in existence, because it was issued only on the following day, July 9, 1986.
23 All the foregoing circumstances successfully challenge the integrity, genuineness, and veracity of the questioned document. Petitioners, therefore, cannot take refuge in the presumption of regularity of public documents, a presumption that has been clearly rebutted in this case.
Second Main Issue:
Justification for the Sale of the Conjugal Property
Lolita Reed argues that, even on the assumption that the SPA was indeed a forgery, she was still justified in effecting a sale without her husband’s consent.
We are not persuaded. In addition to the fact that her rights over the property were merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
24 there was absolutely no proof to her allegations that she used the proceeds of the sale to purchase necessities for the maintenance and support of the family.
25 Having failed to establish any of these circumstances, she may not unilaterally bind the conjugal assets.
Additionally, the Civil Code provisions she cited pertain to what the conjugal partnership is liable for.
They do not specifically refer to whether the actual transactions entered into by either spouse can validly bind the conjugal partnership. The issues addressed by this Court in this case involve the essential formalities determining the validity of contracts entered into by either the husband or the wife for and on behalf of the partnership.
As to the assertions of Lolita regarding an alleged donation by respondent in favor of their children, this matter is irrelevant to the disputed sales.
We need not belabor the point. Besides, it would mean that she should have sold the subject property not only in her name, but for and on behalf of her children as co-owners of the property. To accept her contention is to open a whole gamut of issues that are not the subject of this appeal.
Third Main Issue:
Buyers in Good Faith
The final question to be resolved is whether petitioners were buyers in good faith. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in that same property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim.
26 The honesty of intention that constitutes good faith implies freedom from knowledge of circumstances that ought to put a prudent person on inquiry. Good faith consists in the belief of the possessors that the persons from whom they received the thing are its rightful owners who could convey their title.
27 Good faith, while always presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, requires this well-founded belief.
When dealing with land that is registered and titled, as in this case, buyers are not required by the law to inquire further than what the Torrens certificate of title indicates on its face.
28 It is also settled, however, that purchasers cannot close their eyes to known facts that should put a reasonable person on guard. They cannot subsequently claim to have acted in good faith in the belief that there was no defect in the vendor’s certificate of title.
29 Their mere refusal to face up to that possibility will not make them innocent purchasers for value, if it later becomes clear that the title was indeed defective, and that they would have discovered the fact, had they acted with the measure of precaution required of a prudent person in a like situation.
30 Thus, the presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the vendor’s certificate and investigate the title appearing on the face of that certificate.
31 A vendee who does not do so cannot be denominated either as an innocent purchaser for value or as a purchaser in good faith and, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.
The circumstances surrounding this case debunk the presumption of good faith on the part of petitioners.
To begin with, it was clear to them that, at the time of the sales, Lolita was married to Respondent Guillermo Reed; and that the property in question was part of their conjugal partnership. As to Spouses Domingo, the CA found thus:
“Alberta Domingo admitted that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership of spouses Guillermo and Lolita Reed; that the Reed spouses were no longer living together as husband and wife when the property was sold to her and her husband by Lolita Reed; and that Guillermo Reed was in Saudi Arabia. x x x.”
32 The Deed of Sale 33 executed between the Domingo spouses and Lolita Reed clearly stated that what was being sold was her share in the conjugal property. Despite their knowledge of this fact, the couple did not inquire about her authority to sell any portion of the property.
According to Alberta Domingo, Lolita told her that the latter had been authorized by Guillermo to sell the property. When they executed the Deed of Sale, however, Lolita allegedly showed no special power of attorney.
Alberta merely relied on the former’s verbal claim of having been authorized to sell the property, and that the sale would bind the conjugal partnership.
Neither was there any mention in the Deed of Sale that Lolita had the authority to sell the property, and that respondent had consented to the sale. In short, there was no mention of the SPA that she allegedly possessed.
Second Main Issue:
Justification for the Sale
of the Conjugal Property
Lolita Reed argues that, even on the assumption that the SPA was indeed a forgery, she was still justified in effecting a sale without her husband’s consent. We are not persuaded. In addition to the fact that her rights over the property were merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,24 there was absolutely no proof to her allegations that she used the proceeds of the sale to purchase necessities for the maintenance and support of the family.25 Having failed to establish any of these circumstances, she may not unilaterally bind the conjugal assets.
Additionally, the Civil Code provisions she cited pertain to what the conjugal partnership is liable for. They do not specifically refer to whether the actual transactions entered into by either spouse can validly bind the conjugal partnership.
The issues addressed by this Court in this case involve the essential formalities determining the validity of contracts entered into by either the husband or the wife for and on behalf of the partnership.
As to the assertions of Lolita regarding an alleged donation by respondent in favor of their children, this matter is irrelevant to the disputed sales. We need not belabor the point.
Besides, it would mean that she should have sold the subject property not only in her name, but for and on behalf of her children as co-owners of the property. To accept her contention is to open a whole gamut of issues that are not the subject of this appeal.
Third Main Issue:
Buyers in Good Faith
The final question to be resolved is whether petitioners were buyers in good faith. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in that same property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim.
26 The honesty of intention that constitutes good faith implies freedom from knowledge of circumstances that ought to put a prudent person on inquiry.
Good faith consists in the belief of the possessors that the persons from whom they received the thing are its rightful owners who could convey their title.
27 Good faith, while always presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, requires this well-founded belief.
When dealing with land that is registered and titled, as in this case, buyers are not required by the law to inquire further than what the Torrens certificate of title indicates on its face.
28 it is also settled, however, that purchasers cannot close their eyes to known facts that should put a reasonable person on guard. They cannot subsequently claim to have acted in good faith in the belief that there was no defect in the vendor’s certificate of title.
29 Their mere refusal to face up to that possibility will not make them innocent purchasers for value, if it later becomes clear that the title was indeed defective, and that they would have discovered the fact, had they acted with the measure of precaution required of a prudent person in a like situation.
30 Thus, the presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the vendor’s certificate and investigate the title appearing on the face of that certificate.
31 A vendee who does not do so cannot be denominated either as an innocent purchaser for value or as a purchaser in good faith and, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.
The circumstances surrounding this case debunk the presumption of good faith on the part of petitioners. To begin with, it was clear to them that, at the time of the sales, Lolita was married to Respondent Guillermo Reed; and that the property in question was part of their conjugal partnership.
As to Spouses Domingo, the CA found thus:
“Alberta Domingo admitted that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership of spouses Guillermo and Lolita Reed; that the Reed spouses were no longer living together as husband and wife when the property was sold to her and her husband by Lolita Reed; and that Guillermo Reed was in Saudi Arabia. x x x.”
32 The Deed of Sale
33 executed between the Domingo spouses and Lolita Reed clearly stated that what was being sold was her share in the conjugal property. Despite their knowledge of this fact, the couple did not inquire about her authority to sell any portion of the property.
According to Alberta Domingo, Lolita told her that the latter had been authorized by Guillermo to sell the property. When they executed the Deed of Sale, however, Lolita allegedly showed no special power of attorney.
Alberta merely relied on the former’s verbal claim of having been authorized to sell the property, and that the sale would bind the conjugal partnership.
Neither was there any mention in the Deed of Sale that Lolita had the authority to sell the property, and that respondent had consented to the sale. In short, there was no mention of the SPA that she allegedly possessed.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition and the Petition-in-Intervention have no merit.
Procedural Issue:
Jurisdiction over the Person
On the procedural question, petitioners contend that, for this case to stand, the RTC should have first acquired jurisdiction over the person of Lolita Reed — an allegedly indispensable party. Petitioners argue that, since she had not been served any summons, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her; consequently, there can be no final determination of this controversy.
Thus, they contend, the case should have never proceeded in the first place.
This Court need not engage itself in a discussion of whether Lolita is an indispensable party. Although the RTC may not have acquired jurisdiction over her because she had not been served any summons, she has already voluntarily appeared before this Court when she filed a Petition-in-Intervention.11 Thus, jurisdiction over her has been acquired, and she is bound by any decision emanating from this Court.
The Rules of Court provide that “the defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.”
12 In fact, Lolita never questioned the Supreme Court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over her. That she recognizes and accepts it is shown by her voluntary appearance before this Court and her decision to participate in this appeal.
Her actions render the alleged lack of jurisdiction moot and binds her to the outcome of this case. There should be no more obstacle to the progress of this case.
We do not see any need to remand this case to the trial court to allow it to receive evidence on the factual allegations of Lolita. As it stands now, this Court is in a position to rule on the merits of this case. Primarily, Lolita vouches for the authenticity of the Special Power of Attorney that she showed to petitioners when the Deeds of Sale were executed.
Significantly, she relies on the same documents already presented by the other parties during the trial. Based on the arguments proffered and the evidence on record, this Court can now render a determination of the SPA’s authenticity, which is one of the main issues to be resolved here, as earlier adverted to.
“SEC. 6. Power of the Commissioner to Make Assessments and Prescribe Additional Require-ments for Tax Administration and Enforcement. –
(A) Examination of Returns and Determination of Tax Due. After a return has been filed as required under the provisions of this Code, the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative may authorize the examination of any taxpayer and the assessment of the correct amount of tax; Provided, however, That failure to file a return shall not prevent the Commissioner from autho-rizing the examination of any taxpayer.
The tax or any deficiency tax so assessed shall be paid upon notice and demand from the Commissioner or from his duly authorized representative. . . .” (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the authority to make tax assessments may be delegated to subordinate officers.
Said assessment has the same force and effect as that issued by the Commissioner himself, if not reviewed or revised by the latter such as in this case.
16 A request for reconsideration must be made within thirty (30) days from the taxpayer’s receipt of the tax deficiency assessment, otherwise, the decision becomes final, unappealable and therefore, demandable.
A tax assessment that has become final, executory and enforceable for failure of the taxpayer to assail the same as provided in Section 228 can no longer be contested, thus:
“SEC. 228. Protesting of Assessment. When the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative finds that proper taxes should be assessed, he shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings…Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the assessment in such form and manner as may be prescribed by implementing rules and regu-lations. Within sixty (60) days from filing of the protest, all relevant supporting documents shall have been submitted; otherwise, the assessment shall become final.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted upon within one hundred (180) days from submission of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the decision or inaction may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said decision, or from the lapse of the one hundred eighty (180) - day period; otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and demandable.”
Here, petitioner failed to avail of its right to bring the matter before the Court of Tax Appeals within the reglementary period upon the receipt of the demand letter reiterating the assessed delinquent taxes and denying its request for reconsideration which constituted the final determination by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on petitioner’s protest.
Being a final disposition by said agency, the same would have been a proper subject for appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals.
The rule is that for the Court of Tax Appeals to acquire jurisdiction, an assessment must first be disputed by the taxpayer and ruled upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to warrant a decision from which a petition for review may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals.
Where an adverse ruling has been rendered by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with reference to a disputed assessment or a claim for refund or credit, the taxpayer may appeal the same within thirty (30) days after receipt thereof.
17 We agree with the factual findings of the Court of Tax Appeals that the demand letter may be presumed to have been duly directed, mailed and was received by petitioner in the regular course of the mail in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
This is in accordance with Section 2(v), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, and in this case, since the period to appeal has commenced to run from the time the letter of demand was presumably received by petitioner within a reasonable time after January 24, 1991, the period of thirty (30) days to appeal the adverse decision on the request for reconsideration had already lapsed when the petition was filed with the Court of Tax Appeals only on November 8, 1991. Hence, the Court of Tax Appeals properly dismissed the petition as the tax delinquency assessment had long become final and executory.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 31, 2000 and its Resolution dated May 3, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 35581 are hereby AFFIRMED.
The petition is accordingly DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
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1 Rollo, pp. 9-41.
2 Id., pp. 43-57. Penned by Justice Marina L. Buzon, with the concurrence of Justices Cancio C. Garcia (Division chair and now a member of this Court) and Eliezer R. de los Santos (member).
3 Id., pp. 64-66.
4 CA Decision, p. 14; rollo, p. 56.
5 Id., pp. 2-5 & 44-47. Citations omitted. Penned by Judge Santiago G. Estrella.
6 Exhibit “2”; records, p. 256.
7 Exhibit “E”; id., p. 164.
8 The case was deemed submitted for decision on June 10, 2004, upon this Court’s receipt of petitioner-intervenor’s Memorandum, signed by Intervenor Lolita Reed herself. Petitioners’ Memorandum, signed by Atty. Preston F. Villasis, was received by this Court on December 11, 2003. Earlier, respondent’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Alexander L. Bansil, was received on October 24, 2003.
9 Petition, pp. 11-12; rollo, pp. 19-20. Original in uppercase.
10 Petition-in-Intervention, pp. 5-6; id, pp. 235-236. Original in uppercase.
11 Rollo, pp. 231-243.
12 Rule 14, §20, Rules of Court.
13 Petitioner-Intervenor’s Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 307.
14 Ibid.
15 Gonzales v. Ramos, A.C. No. 6649, June 21, 2005.
16 Ibid.
17 Traya Jr. v. Villamor, 422 SCRA 293, February 6, 2004.
18 De la Cruz v. Zabala, 442 SCRA 407, November 17, 2004.
19 S icat v. Ariola, A.C. No. 5864, April 15, 2005; Bon v. Ziga, 429 SCRA 177, May 27, 2004; Tabas v. Mangibin, 421 SCRA 511, February 3, 2004.
20 CA Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 53.
21 TSN dated September 4, 1997, pp. 13 & 22.
22 CA Decision, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 52-53.
23 Exhibit “A”; records, p. 156.
24 Abalos v. Macatangay Jr., 439 SCRA 649, September 30, 2004.
25 Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 200 SCRA 792, August 19, 1991.
26 Vera Cruz v. Calderon, 434 SCRA 534, July 14, 2004; De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, 419 SCRA 648 , January 15, 2004; Tanongon v. Samson, 431 Phil. 729, May 9, 2002.
27 Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 489, September 10, 1985.
28 Voluntad v. Spouses Dizon, 372 Phil. 82, August 26, 1999; State Investment House, Inc. v. CA, 324 Phil. 642, March 5, 1996.
29 Occeña v. Esponilla, 431 SCRA 116, June 4, 2004; Aguirre v. CA, 421 SCRA 310, January 29, 2004; Spouses Uy v. CA, 411 Phil. 788, June 21, 2001.
30 Spouses Uy v. CA, supra.
31 Sandoval v. CA, 329 Phil. 48, August 1, 1996.
32 CA Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 49.
33 Exhibit “6”; records, p. 261.
16 Arches v. Bellosillo, 126 Phil. 426 (1967).
17 section 11, Republic Act No. 1125.
Buyers not in Good Faith (Sps. Danilo and Alberta Domingo et al. vs. Guillermo Reed, December 9, 2005)
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157701
Spouses DANILO and ALBERTA DOMINGO, and EDUARDO QUITEVES,
petitioners,
- versus -
GUILLERMO REED,
Respondent.
Promulgated: December 9, 2005
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When dealing with registered land, prospective buyers are normally not required by law to inquire further than what appears on the face of the Torrens certificate of title on file with the Register of Deeds. Equally settled is the principle, however, that purchasers cannot close their eyes to known facts that should put a reasonable person on guard; they cannot subsequently claim to have acted in good faith, in the belief that there was no defect in the vendor’s certificate of title.
Their mere refusal to face up to that possibility will not make them innocent purchasers for value, if it later becomes apparent that the title was indeed defective, and that they would have discovered the fact, had they acted with the measure of precaution required of a prudent person in a like situation.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the August 27, 2002 Decision2 and the March 20, 2003 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59544.
The dispositive part of the Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
“The deeds of sale executed by Lolita Reed in favor of [herein Petitioner-]spouses Danilo Domingo and Alberta Domingo and Eduardo Quiteves over portions of the subject property covered by TCT No. 58195 registered in the name of Lolita R. Reed, married to Guillermo Reed, are declared NULL and VOID.
“The Register of Deeds of Pasig City is ordered to cancel TCT Nos. 84565 and 84567 issued in the names of [Petitioners] Eduardo Quiteves and spouses Danilo Domingo and Alberta Domingo, respectively, covering the portions of the subject property sold to them by Lolita Reed, and to reinstate TCT No. 58195 in the name of Lolita Reed, married to Guillermo Reed, insofar as the same covers the portions of the subject property sold to said [petitioners].”
4 The assailed Resolution denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
“[Respondent] Guillermo Reed was an overseas contract worker from 1978 to 1986 and came home only for short vacations.
He purchased from the Government Service Insurance System [GSIS] on installment basis a 166 square meter property located at MRR Road, Mangahan, Pasig.
Because he was working abroad, it was his wife, Lolita Reed, who paid the consideration to the GSIS.
On July 9, 1986, TCT No. 58195 covering said property was issued by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, Metro Manila – District II in the name of Lolita Reed, married to Guillermo Reed.
Guillermo Reed had allowed his brother, Dominador, and the latter’s wife, Luz, to stay in the house constructed on his property.
“In December, 1991, Dominador and Luz Reed were summoned to the barangay in connection with the complaint for ejectment filed against them by Eduardo Quiteves, who claimed to be the owner of the lot where their house stands.
Dominador and Luz informed Guillermo of the complaint filed against them.
Guillermo accompanied Dominador and Luz to the barangay, where they met Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta Domingo, who both claimed ownership of the subject property. Guillermo denied having sold his property.
“In view of the claims of Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta Domingo that they bought the subject property, Guillermo Reed made a verification with the Register of Deeds of Pasig.
Guillermo discovered that his title over the subject property had been cancelled and he was able to secure copies of the following documents, to wit:
“1. Special Power of Attorney, dated July 8, 1986, allegedly executed by him authorizing his wife, Lolita Reed, to sell the subject property or a portion thereof;
“2. Deed of Sale of a Portion of Residential Land, dated July 14, 1986, executed by Lolita Reed in favor of Danilo Domingo, married to Alberta Q. Domingo covering 41.50 square meter portion of subject property;
“3. Absolute Deed of Sale of a Portion of Residential Land, dated July 22, 1987, executed by Lolita Reed, as vendor and attorney-in-fact of Guillermo Reed, in favor of Natividad R. Villanera, married to Ardaniel Villanera, covering 41.50 square meter portion of subject property;
“4. Deed of Sale of a Portion of a Residential Land, dated January 10, 1989, executed by Lolita Reed, for herself and as attorney-in-fact, in favor of Eduardo Quiteves covering 86 square meter portion of subject property;
“5. TCT No. 84565 in the name of Eduardo Quiteves;
“6. TCT No. 84566 in the name of spouses Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera; and
“7. TCT No. 84567 in the name of spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo.
“On March 8, 1994, Guillermo Reed filed a complaint for reconveyance of property against Lolita Reed, spouses Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera, spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo, Eduardo Quiteves and the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila alleging that his wife, Lolita Reed, from whom he had been estranged, conspiring with the other [petitioners], except the Register of Deeds of Pasig, caused the preparation of a special power of attorney, dated July 8, 1986, wherein it was made to appear that he authorized his wife to sell the subject property; that he did not sign the special power of attorney nor appear before the notary public because he was working abroad; that the special power of attorney was not submitted to the Regional Trial Court [(RTC)] in Pasig City by Notary Public Macario C. Cruz, as stated in the letter dated April 1, 1993 of Clerk of Court Grace S. Belvis; and that spouses Villanera and Domingo and Eduardo Quiteves are purchasers in bad faith because they knew, at the time they transacted with Lolita Reed, that he was working abroad and estranged from the latter.
“An [A]nswer to the complaint was filed by [Petitioners] Eduardo Quiteves and spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo alleging that the sale of the subject property to them by Lolita Reed was valid inasmuch as Guillermo Reed gave his written consent thereto, as shown in a letter dated July 26, 1986; that in a proceeding before the [b]arangay [c]hairman, Guillermo Reed admitted that he personally signed the special power of attorney; that they have the right to rely on the presumption of regularity of the notarized special power of attorney; and that they are buyers in good faith and for value.
“Per Sheriff’s Return, Lolita Reed was not served with summons as she is no longer residing at the given address while spouses Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera were served with summons through Mrs. Alberta Domingo.
“After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
‘WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of x x x Sps. Ardaniel & Natividad Villanera, Sps. Alberto (sic) & Dominga (sic) Domingo, Eduardo Quiteves and the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, and against [respondent] Guillermo Reed and orders the DISMISSAL of the present case for lack of merit.
‘No pronouncement as to cost.’”
5 Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
First, it should be clear that the CA ruling concerned two transactions entered into by Petitioner-Intervenor Lolita Reed. The first transaction involved the sale she executed in favor of Spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo.
To them she sold a portion of the subject property covered by TCT No. 58195; it measured 41.5 square meters and was located at the southwest section.
The second sale was effected by the same vendor, this time in favor of Eduardo Quiteves; it covered 86 square meters at the northern portion of the same property.
Because of these transactions, the vendees were able to have certificates of titles issued in their respective names.
A third sale was made in favor of Spouses Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera. The CA ruled, however, that they had not been validly served any summons.
Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; hence, its Decision would not affect their rights.
Second, the CA held that the vendees were not purchasers for value in good faith. It found that Spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo had entered into the Contract of Sale involving conjugal property without actually seeing any Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing Lolita Reed to convey the property for and on behalf of the conjugal partnership.
Also, the fact that the Deed of Sale executed by them did not even mention any SPA showing that Respondent Guillermo Reed had consented to the sale of the conjugal property rendered the transaction questionable.
As for Eduardo Quiteves, he was faulted by the CA for not having inquired into and investigated the authenticity and validity of the SPA shown to him by Lolita, evidencing her husband’s alleged consent to the sale of their conjugal property.
The appellate court opined that Quiteves should have been put on guard, since the acknowledgment portion of the document stated that only Lolita had appeared before the lawyer who had notarized it.
Also, considering that it had been issued two years before the property was offered to Quiteves, he should have taken steps to verify the validity of the document and to find out the whereabouts of Guillermo, who had allegedly executed it.
Finally, the CA found that the SPA, from which Lolita had derived her authority to sell the property, was a forgery.
The appellate court gave credence to the consistent denial of Guillermo that he had signed the document.
It did not accept the Minutes 6 of the barangay meeting, containing his alleged admission that he had signed the SPA.
Furthermore, the CA gave weight to the Certification 7 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig that the alleged SPA notarized by Atty. Macario Cruz was not the same document submitted to that office.
Consequently, the CA declared the Deeds of Sale executed by Lolita in favor of Spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo and Eduardo Quiteves null and void. It also ordered the cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) issued in their favor; and the reinstatement of TCT No. 58195 in the name of Lolita Reed, married to Guillermo Reed, insofar as it covered the portions of the property sold to petitioners.
Hence, this Petition. 8
The Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for this Court’s resolution:
“I. Whether the case for reconveyance filed by respondent against petitioners sans the trial court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of Lolita Reed, an indispensable party, can prosper.
“II. Whether entrenched jurisprudence assigns the onus probandi, or burden of proof, showing forgery to the respondent after having asserted the same in his complaint.
“III. Whether the case of Voluntad vs. Dizon, 313 SCRA 210-211 (26 August 1999), utilized as basis to find petitioners not purchasers in good faith can apply to the case at bench.
“IV. Whether the case of Veloso vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 594-595 (21 August 1996) is apt to the case at bench.
“V. Whether the established doctrine, i.e., trial courts are in a better position to determine questions involving credibility having heard the witnesses and having observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, was applied by the Court of Appeals to the case.
“VI. Whether the finding, assuming without admitting, that respondent’s signature was falsified the right of petitioners, without any evidence as co-conspirators of Lolita Reed in the forgery and as purchasers in good faith over the subject properties, can be adversely affected.”9
For her part, petitioner-intervenor submits the following:
“I. Whether the conveyance of subject property in favor of Petitioners Danilo and Alberta Domingo and Eduardo Quiteves is valid considering that the same was executed by Petitioner-intervenor Lolita Reed and the proceeds arising therefrom were utilized to purchase things necessary for the support of family including education of petitioner-intervenor’s and Guillermo Reed’s common children pursuant to Article 161 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 115 of the same Code.
“II. Whether Guillermo Reed can recover the one-half (1/2) share of the conjugal partnership despite that he had already donated the same to his and Lolita Reed’s common children pursuant to Article 162 of the Civil Code.”10
The long-winded issues presented by petitioners and petitioner-intervenor can be reduced to one procedural and three main questions. The three main issues to be resolved are as follows: 1) whether the Special Power of Attorney is authentic; 2) whether Lolita Reed’s justification for selling the subject property is tenable; and 3) whether petitioners are buyers in good faith. As to the procedural matter, this Court will resolve whether jurisdiction over the person of Lolita has been acquired.
First Main Issue:
Authenticity of the Special Power of Attorney
Prior to determining whether petitioners are buyers in good faith, the essential question to be answered is whether the Special Power of Attorney relied upon by the parties was indeed authentic. Petitioners maintained before the courts below that it had not been proven to be a forgery, so it was presumably authentic. The CA, however, held otherwise. We agree.
Most telling is the admission of Lolita that she merely sent an already typewritten SPA to her husband, who was then working in the Middle East.
13 She further admits that when it was brought back by her brother-in-law, it had already been signed by Guillermo.
14 Thus, it is clear that she never saw him sign it.
Furthermore, she does not have any actual knowledge of whether he even saw the typewritten document, much less signed it.
It then becomes dubious whether the witnesses affixed their signatures to the SPA to attest that it had been signed in their presence by the principal and the attorney-in-fact.
How could they have attested to the signing, when the principal denied it, while the attorney-in-fact admitted having merely sent it to the Middle East for the principal’s signature?
This fact further explains why Notary Public Macario Cruz, in the acknowledgment portion of the document, stated that only Lolita Reed had appeared before him. But Atty. Cruz should have known better.
Obviously, since an SPA was being notarized, there should have been two parties to that document — the principal and the agent who was being constituted as attorney-in-fact.
A document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public.
The affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the contents of the document15 and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness of their signature.16 Notaries public are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document.
In fact, it is their duty to demand that the document presented to them for notarization be signed in their presence.
17 Their function is, among others, to guard against illegal deeds.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act.
18 It converts a private document into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.19
In not giving credence to the SPA, the Court agrees with the CA, which held thus:
“[T]he same [special power of attorney] was not reported by Atty. Macario Cruz as having been notarized by him.
Thus, in a letter dated April 1, 1993 addressed to Luz Reed, Grace S. Belvis, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Pasig stated that it was not the special power of attorney dated July 8, 1986 and recorded as Doc. 326, Page No. 66, Book No. XV, Series of 1986 in the notarial report of Atty. Macario Cruz which was submitted by the latter to the court. x x x.”
20 Guillermo Reed has consistently denied having signed the document. Moreover, together with his witness,
21 he has denied other documents allegedly showing that he admitted having signed it. Thus, we do not find any cogent reason to disturb the CA’s findings, as follows:
“The alleged admission of Guillermo Reed before the Barangay Chairman that he signed the special power of attorney, as shown in the minutes of the meeting prepared by Barangay Secretary, does not appear to be credible.
Guillermo Reed has consistently denied having signed the special power of attorney. In fact, he was not confronted during his cross-examination, of said minutes of the meeting in the barangay, where he met Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta Domingo for the first time, despite his insistence that the subject property still belongs to him.
Moreover, on rebuttal, Dominador Reed, whose signature appears in the minutes of the meeting, testified that he affixed his signature on a small piece of paper to show that he attended the meeting and there were no entries therein regarding the alleged admission of Guillermo Reed that he signed the special power of attorney; and that Guillermo Reed stated in said meeting that his property is not for sale. x x x.”
22 Petitioners insist that an expert witness, such as one from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), should have been presented to show that respondent’s signature was forged. But even without expert testimony, the questionable circumstances surrounding the execution of the SPA already casts serious doubt on its genuineness. As shown earlier, there is a plethora of factual details that point to its falsity.
Additionally, the CA noted the date “July 8, 1986,” on the SPA authorizing Lolita to sell the property covered by TCT No. 58195, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, District II, Metro Manila. As of that date, however, TCT No. 58195 was not yet in existence, because it was issued only on the following day, July 9, 1986.
23 All the foregoing circumstances successfully challenge the integrity, genuineness, and veracity of the questioned document. Petitioners, therefore, cannot take refuge in the presumption of regularity of public documents, a presumption that has been clearly rebutted in this case.
Second Main Issue:
Justification for the Sale of the Conjugal Property
Lolita Reed argues that, even on the assumption that the SPA was indeed a forgery, she was still justified in effecting a sale without her husband’s consent.
We are not persuaded. In addition to the fact that her rights over the property were merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
24 there was absolutely no proof to her allegations that she used the proceeds of the sale to purchase necessities for the maintenance and support of the family.
25 Having failed to establish any of these circumstances, she may not unilaterally bind the conjugal assets.
Additionally, the Civil Code provisions she cited pertain to what the conjugal partnership is liable for.
They do not specifically refer to whether the actual transactions entered into by either spouse can validly bind the conjugal partnership. The issues addressed by this Court in this case involve the essential formalities determining the validity of contracts entered into by either the husband or the wife for and on behalf of the partnership.
As to the assertions of Lolita regarding an alleged donation by respondent in favor of their children, this matter is irrelevant to the disputed sales.
We need not belabor the point. Besides, it would mean that she should have sold the subject property not only in her name, but for and on behalf of her children as co-owners of the property. To accept her contention is to open a whole gamut of issues that are not the subject of this appeal.
Third Main Issue:
Buyers in Good Faith
The final question to be resolved is whether petitioners were buyers in good faith. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in that same property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim.
26 The honesty of intention that constitutes good faith implies freedom from knowledge of circumstances that ought to put a prudent person on inquiry. Good faith consists in the belief of the possessors that the persons from whom they received the thing are its rightful owners who could convey their title.
27 Good faith, while always presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, requires this well-founded belief.
When dealing with land that is registered and titled, as in this case, buyers are not required by the law to inquire further than what the Torrens certificate of title indicates on its face.
28 It is also settled, however, that purchasers cannot close their eyes to known facts that should put a reasonable person on guard. They cannot subsequently claim to have acted in good faith in the belief that there was no defect in the vendor’s certificate of title.
29 Their mere refusal to face up to that possibility will not make them innocent purchasers for value, if it later becomes clear that the title was indeed defective, and that they would have discovered the fact, had they acted with the measure of precaution required of a prudent person in a like situation.
30 Thus, the presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the vendor’s certificate and investigate the title appearing on the face of that certificate.
31 A vendee who does not do so cannot be denominated either as an innocent purchaser for value or as a purchaser in good faith and, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.
The circumstances surrounding this case debunk the presumption of good faith on the part of petitioners.
To begin with, it was clear to them that, at the time of the sales, Lolita was married to Respondent Guillermo Reed; and that the property in question was part of their conjugal partnership. As to Spouses Domingo, the CA found thus:
“Alberta Domingo admitted that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership of spouses Guillermo and Lolita Reed; that the Reed spouses were no longer living together as husband and wife when the property was sold to her and her husband by Lolita Reed; and that Guillermo Reed was in Saudi Arabia. x x x.”
32 The Deed of Sale 33 executed between the Domingo spouses and Lolita Reed clearly stated that what was being sold was her share in the conjugal property. Despite their knowledge of this fact, the couple did not inquire about her authority to sell any portion of the property.
According to Alberta Domingo, Lolita told her that the latter had been authorized by Guillermo to sell the property. When they executed the Deed of Sale, however, Lolita allegedly showed no special power of attorney.
Alberta merely relied on the former’s verbal claim of having been authorized to sell the property, and that the sale would bind the conjugal partnership.
Neither was there any mention in the Deed of Sale that Lolita had the authority to sell the property, and that respondent had consented to the sale. In short, there was no mention of the SPA that she allegedly possessed.
Second Main Issue:
Justification for the Sale
of the Conjugal Property
Lolita Reed argues that, even on the assumption that the SPA was indeed a forgery, she was still justified in effecting a sale without her husband’s consent. We are not persuaded. In addition to the fact that her rights over the property were merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,24 there was absolutely no proof to her allegations that she used the proceeds of the sale to purchase necessities for the maintenance and support of the family.25 Having failed to establish any of these circumstances, she may not unilaterally bind the conjugal assets.
Additionally, the Civil Code provisions she cited pertain to what the conjugal partnership is liable for. They do not specifically refer to whether the actual transactions entered into by either spouse can validly bind the conjugal partnership.
The issues addressed by this Court in this case involve the essential formalities determining the validity of contracts entered into by either the husband or the wife for and on behalf of the partnership.
As to the assertions of Lolita regarding an alleged donation by respondent in favor of their children, this matter is irrelevant to the disputed sales. We need not belabor the point.
Besides, it would mean that she should have sold the subject property not only in her name, but for and on behalf of her children as co-owners of the property. To accept her contention is to open a whole gamut of issues that are not the subject of this appeal.
Third Main Issue:
Buyers in Good Faith
The final question to be resolved is whether petitioners were buyers in good faith. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in that same property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim.
26 The honesty of intention that constitutes good faith implies freedom from knowledge of circumstances that ought to put a prudent person on inquiry.
Good faith consists in the belief of the possessors that the persons from whom they received the thing are its rightful owners who could convey their title.
27 Good faith, while always presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, requires this well-founded belief.
When dealing with land that is registered and titled, as in this case, buyers are not required by the law to inquire further than what the Torrens certificate of title indicates on its face.
28 it is also settled, however, that purchasers cannot close their eyes to known facts that should put a reasonable person on guard. They cannot subsequently claim to have acted in good faith in the belief that there was no defect in the vendor’s certificate of title.
29 Their mere refusal to face up to that possibility will not make them innocent purchasers for value, if it later becomes clear that the title was indeed defective, and that they would have discovered the fact, had they acted with the measure of precaution required of a prudent person in a like situation.
30 Thus, the presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the vendor’s certificate and investigate the title appearing on the face of that certificate.
31 A vendee who does not do so cannot be denominated either as an innocent purchaser for value or as a purchaser in good faith and, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.
The circumstances surrounding this case debunk the presumption of good faith on the part of petitioners. To begin with, it was clear to them that, at the time of the sales, Lolita was married to Respondent Guillermo Reed; and that the property in question was part of their conjugal partnership.
As to Spouses Domingo, the CA found thus:
“Alberta Domingo admitted that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership of spouses Guillermo and Lolita Reed; that the Reed spouses were no longer living together as husband and wife when the property was sold to her and her husband by Lolita Reed; and that Guillermo Reed was in Saudi Arabia. x x x.”
32 The Deed of Sale
33 executed between the Domingo spouses and Lolita Reed clearly stated that what was being sold was her share in the conjugal property. Despite their knowledge of this fact, the couple did not inquire about her authority to sell any portion of the property.
According to Alberta Domingo, Lolita told her that the latter had been authorized by Guillermo to sell the property. When they executed the Deed of Sale, however, Lolita allegedly showed no special power of attorney.
Alberta merely relied on the former’s verbal claim of having been authorized to sell the property, and that the sale would bind the conjugal partnership.
Neither was there any mention in the Deed of Sale that Lolita had the authority to sell the property, and that respondent had consented to the sale. In short, there was no mention of the SPA that she allegedly possessed.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition and the Petition-in-Intervention have no merit.
Procedural Issue:
Jurisdiction over the Person
On the procedural question, petitioners contend that, for this case to stand, the RTC should have first acquired jurisdiction over the person of Lolita Reed — an allegedly indispensable party. Petitioners argue that, since she had not been served any summons, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her; consequently, there can be no final determination of this controversy.
Thus, they contend, the case should have never proceeded in the first place.
This Court need not engage itself in a discussion of whether Lolita is an indispensable party. Although the RTC may not have acquired jurisdiction over her because she had not been served any summons, she has already voluntarily appeared before this Court when she filed a Petition-in-Intervention.11 Thus, jurisdiction over her has been acquired, and she is bound by any decision emanating from this Court.
The Rules of Court provide that “the defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.”
12 In fact, Lolita never questioned the Supreme Court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over her. That she recognizes and accepts it is shown by her voluntary appearance before this Court and her decision to participate in this appeal.
Her actions render the alleged lack of jurisdiction moot and binds her to the outcome of this case. There should be no more obstacle to the progress of this case.
We do not see any need to remand this case to the trial court to allow it to receive evidence on the factual allegations of Lolita. As it stands now, this Court is in a position to rule on the merits of this case. Primarily, Lolita vouches for the authenticity of the Special Power of Attorney that she showed to petitioners when the Deeds of Sale were executed.
Significantly, she relies on the same documents already presented by the other parties during the trial. Based on the arguments proffered and the evidence on record, this Court can now render a determination of the SPA’s authenticity, which is one of the main issues to be resolved here, as earlier adverted to.
“SEC. 6. Power of the Commissioner to Make Assessments and Prescribe Additional Require-ments for Tax Administration and Enforcement. –
(A) Examination of Returns and Determination of Tax Due. After a return has been filed as required under the provisions of this Code, the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative may authorize the examination of any taxpayer and the assessment of the correct amount of tax; Provided, however, That failure to file a return shall not prevent the Commissioner from autho-rizing the examination of any taxpayer.
The tax or any deficiency tax so assessed shall be paid upon notice and demand from the Commissioner or from his duly authorized representative. . . .” (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the authority to make tax assessments may be delegated to subordinate officers.
Said assessment has the same force and effect as that issued by the Commissioner himself, if not reviewed or revised by the latter such as in this case.
16 A request for reconsideration must be made within thirty (30) days from the taxpayer’s receipt of the tax deficiency assessment, otherwise, the decision becomes final, unappealable and therefore, demandable.
A tax assessment that has become final, executory and enforceable for failure of the taxpayer to assail the same as provided in Section 228 can no longer be contested, thus:
“SEC. 228. Protesting of Assessment. When the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative finds that proper taxes should be assessed, he shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings…Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the assessment in such form and manner as may be prescribed by implementing rules and regu-lations. Within sixty (60) days from filing of the protest, all relevant supporting documents shall have been submitted; otherwise, the assessment shall become final.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted upon within one hundred (180) days from submission of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the decision or inaction may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said decision, or from the lapse of the one hundred eighty (180) - day period; otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and demandable.”
Here, petitioner failed to avail of its right to bring the matter before the Court of Tax Appeals within the reglementary period upon the receipt of the demand letter reiterating the assessed delinquent taxes and denying its request for reconsideration which constituted the final determination by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on petitioner’s protest.
Being a final disposition by said agency, the same would have been a proper subject for appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals.
The rule is that for the Court of Tax Appeals to acquire jurisdiction, an assessment must first be disputed by the taxpayer and ruled upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to warrant a decision from which a petition for review may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals.
Where an adverse ruling has been rendered by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with reference to a disputed assessment or a claim for refund or credit, the taxpayer may appeal the same within thirty (30) days after receipt thereof.
17 We agree with the factual findings of the Court of Tax Appeals that the demand letter may be presumed to have been duly directed, mailed and was received by petitioner in the regular course of the mail in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
This is in accordance with Section 2(v), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, and in this case, since the period to appeal has commenced to run from the time the letter of demand was presumably received by petitioner within a reasonable time after January 24, 1991, the period of thirty (30) days to appeal the adverse decision on the request for reconsideration had already lapsed when the petition was filed with the Court of Tax Appeals only on November 8, 1991. Hence, the Court of Tax Appeals properly dismissed the petition as the tax delinquency assessment had long become final and executory.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 31, 2000 and its Resolution dated May 3, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 35581 are hereby AFFIRMED.
The petition is accordingly DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
*****************************************************************************
1 Rollo, pp. 9-41.
2 Id., pp. 43-57. Penned by Justice Marina L. Buzon, with the concurrence of Justices Cancio C. Garcia (Division chair and now a member of this Court) and Eliezer R. de los Santos (member).
3 Id., pp. 64-66.
4 CA Decision, p. 14; rollo, p. 56.
5 Id., pp. 2-5 & 44-47. Citations omitted. Penned by Judge Santiago G. Estrella.
6 Exhibit “2”; records, p. 256.
7 Exhibit “E”; id., p. 164.
8 The case was deemed submitted for decision on June 10, 2004, upon this Court’s receipt of petitioner-intervenor’s Memorandum, signed by Intervenor Lolita Reed herself. Petitioners’ Memorandum, signed by Atty. Preston F. Villasis, was received by this Court on December 11, 2003. Earlier, respondent’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Alexander L. Bansil, was received on October 24, 2003.
9 Petition, pp. 11-12; rollo, pp. 19-20. Original in uppercase.
10 Petition-in-Intervention, pp. 5-6; id, pp. 235-236. Original in uppercase.
11 Rollo, pp. 231-243.
12 Rule 14, §20, Rules of Court.
13 Petitioner-Intervenor’s Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 307.
14 Ibid.
15 Gonzales v. Ramos, A.C. No. 6649, June 21, 2005.
16 Ibid.
17 Traya Jr. v. Villamor, 422 SCRA 293, February 6, 2004.
18 De la Cruz v. Zabala, 442 SCRA 407, November 17, 2004.
19 S icat v. Ariola, A.C. No. 5864, April 15, 2005; Bon v. Ziga, 429 SCRA 177, May 27, 2004; Tabas v. Mangibin, 421 SCRA 511, February 3, 2004.
20 CA Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 53.
21 TSN dated September 4, 1997, pp. 13 & 22.
22 CA Decision, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 52-53.
23 Exhibit “A”; records, p. 156.
24 Abalos v. Macatangay Jr., 439 SCRA 649, September 30, 2004.
25 Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 200 SCRA 792, August 19, 1991.
26 Vera Cruz v. Calderon, 434 SCRA 534, July 14, 2004; De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, 419 SCRA 648 , January 15, 2004; Tanongon v. Samson, 431 Phil. 729, May 9, 2002.
27 Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 489, September 10, 1985.
28 Voluntad v. Spouses Dizon, 372 Phil. 82, August 26, 1999; State Investment House, Inc. v. CA, 324 Phil. 642, March 5, 1996.
29 Occeña v. Esponilla, 431 SCRA 116, June 4, 2004; Aguirre v. CA, 421 SCRA 310, January 29, 2004; Spouses Uy v. CA, 411 Phil. 788, June 21, 2001.
30 Spouses Uy v. CA, supra.
31 Sandoval v. CA, 329 Phil. 48, August 1, 1996.
32 CA Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 49.
33 Exhibit “6”; records, p. 261.
16 Arches v. Bellosillo, 126 Phil. 426 (1967).
17 section 11, Republic Act No. 1125.
Thursday, November 6, 2008
Supreme Court Decision: Taxation: Demand Letter for tax deficiency assessments signed by authorized subordinate officer, is deemed final
Supreme Court Decision:
Taxation: Demand Letter for tax deficiency assessments signed by authorized subordinate officer, is deemed final (Oceanic Wireless Network, Inc., vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al.,
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 148380
OCEANIC WIRELESS NETWORK, INC.,
Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
Promulgated: December 9, 2005
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 31, 2000, and its Resolution dated May 3, 2001, in “Oceanic Wireless Network, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue” docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 35581, upholding the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals dismissing the Petition for Review in CTA Case No. 4668 for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner Oceanic Wireless Network, Inc. challenges the authority of the Chief of the Accounts Receivable and Billing Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) National Office to decide and/or act with finality on behalf of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) on protests against disputed tax deficiency assessments.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 17, 1988, petitioner received from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) deficiency tax assessments for the taxable year 1984 in the total amount of P8,644,998.71, broken down as follows:
kind of Tax Assessment No. Amount
Deficiency Income Tax FAR-4-1984-88-001130 P8,381,354.00
Penalties for late payment FAR-4-1984-88-001131 3,000.00
of income and failure to
file quarterly returns
Deficiency Contractor’s FAR-4-1984-88-001132 29,849.06
Tax
Deficiency Fixed Tax FAR-4--88-001133 12,083.65
Deficiency Franchise Tax FAR-4--84-88-001134 227,712.00
Total P8,644,998.71
Petitioner filed its protest against the tax assessments and requested a reconsideration or cancellation of the same in a letter to the BIR Commis-sioner dated April 12, 1988.
Acting in behalf of the BIR Commissioner, then Chief of the BIR Accounts Receivable and Billing Division, Mr. Severino B. Buot, reiterated the tax assessments while denying petitioner’s request for reinvestigation in a letter1 dated January 24, 1991, thus:
“Note: Your request for re-investigation has been denied for failure to submit the necessary supporting papers as per endorse-ment letter from the office of the Special Operation Service dated 12-12-90.”
Said letter likewise requested petitioner to pay the total amount of P8,644,998.71 within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, otherwise the case shall be referred to the Collection Enforcement Division of the BIR National Office for the issuance of a warrant of distraint and levy without further notice.
Upon petitioner’s failure to pay the subject tax assessments within the prescribed period, the Assistant Commissioner for Collection, acting for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, issued the corresponding warrants of distraint and/or levy and garnishment. These were served on petitioner on October 10, 1991 and October 17, 1991, respectively.
2 On November 8, 1991, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) to contest the issuance of the warrants to enforce the collection of the tax assessments. This was docketed as CTA Case No. 4668.
The CTA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction in a decision dated September 16, 1994, declaring that said petition was filed beyond the thirty (30)-day period reckoned from the time when the demand letter of January 24, 1991 by the Chief of the BIR Accounts Receivable and Billing Division was presumably received by petitioner, i.e., “within a reasonable time from said date in the regular course of mail pursuant to Section 2(v) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.”
3 The decision cited Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals
4 wherein this Court considered a mere demand letter sent to the taxpayer after his protest of the assessment notice as the final decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the protest. Hence, the filing of the petition on November 8, 1991 was held clearly beyond the reglementary period.
5 The court a quo likewise stated that the finality of the denial of the protest by petitioner against the tax deficiency assessments was bolstered by the subsequent issuance of the warrants of distraint and/or levy and garnishment to enforce the collection of the deficiency taxes.
The issuance was not barred by prescription because the mere filing of the letter of protest by petitioner which was given due course by the Bureau of Internal Revenue suspended the running of the prescription period as expressly provided under the then Section 224 of the Tax Code: SEC. 224. Suspension of Running of the Statute of Limitations.
The running of the Statute of Limitations provided in Section 203 and 223 on the making of assessment and the beginning of distraint or levy or a proceeding in court for collection, in respect of any deficiency, shall be suspended for the period during which the Commissioner is prohibited from making the assessment or beginning distraint or levy or a proceeding in court and for sixty (60) days thereafter; when the taxpayer requests for a reinvestigation which is granted by the Commissioner; when the taxpayer cannot be located in the address given by him in the return files upon which a tax is being assessed or collected: Provided, That if the taxpayer inform the Commissioner of any change of address, the running of the statute of limitations will not be suspended; when the warrant of distraint and levy is duly served upon the taxpayer, his authorized representative, or a member of his household with sufficient discretion, and no property could located; and when the taxpayer is out of the Philippines.
6 (Underscoring supplied.) Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the demand letter of January 24, 1991 cannot be considered as the final decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on its protest because the same was signed by a mere subordinate and not by the Commissioner himself.
7 With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner consequently filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals contending that there was no final decision to speak of because the Commissioner had yet to make a personal determination as regards the merits of petitioner’s case.
8 The Court of Appeals denied the petition in a decision dated October 31, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads: “WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution dated May 3, 2001.
Hence, this petition with the following assignment of errors:
9 I THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEMAND LETTER ISSUED BY THE (THEN) ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE/BILLING DIVISION OF THE BIR NATIONAL OFFICE WAS THE FINAL DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT CIR ON THE DISPUTED ASSESSMENTS, AND HENCE CONSTITUTED THE DECISION APPEALABLE TO THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT CTA; AND,
II THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT CA ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE DENIAL OF THE PROTEST OF THE SUBJECT ALLEGED DEFICIENCY TAX ASSESSMENTS HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY FOR FAILURE OF THE PETITIONER TO INSTITUTE THE APPEAL FROM THE DEMAND LETTER OF THE CHIEF OF THE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE/BILLING DIVISION, BIR NATIONAL OFFICE, TO THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT CTA, WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS FROM RECEIPT THEREOF.
Thus, the main issue is whether or not a demand letter for tax deficiency assessments issued and signed by a subordinate officer who was acting in behalf of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is deemed final and executory and subject to an appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals.
We rule in the affirmative.
A demand letter for payment of delinquent taxes may be considered a decision on a disputed or protested assessment. The determination on whether or not a demand letter is final is conditioned upon the language used or the tenor of the letter being sent to the taxpayer.
We laid down the rule that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language what constitutes his final determination of the disputed assessment, thus:
. . . we deem it appropriate to state that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language whenever his action on an assessment questioned by a taxpayer constitutes his final determination on the disputed assessment, as contemplated by Sections 7 and 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended. On the basis of his statement indubitably showing that the Commissioner’s communicated action is his final decision on the contested assessment, the aggrieved taxpayer would then be able to take recourse to the tax court at the opportune time. Without needless difficulty, the taxpayer would be able to determine when his right to appeal to the tax court accrues.
The rule of conduct would also obviate all desire and opportunity on the part of the taxpayer to continually delay the finality of the assessment – and, consequently, the collection of the amount demanded as taxes – by repeated requests for recomputation and reconsideration. On the part of the Commissioner, this would encourage his office to conduct a careful and thorough study of every questioned assessment and render a correct and definite decision thereon in the first instance.
This would also deter the Commissioner from unfairly making the taxpayer grope in the dark and speculate as to which action constitutes the decision appealable to the tax court. Of greater import, this rule of conduct would meet a pressing need for fair play, regularity, and orderliness in administrative action.
10 In this case, the letter of demand dated January 24, 1991, unquestionably constitutes the final action taken by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on petitioner’s request for reconsideration when it reiterated the tax deficiency assessments due from petitioner, and requested its payment.
Failure to do so would result in the “issuance of a warrant of distraint and levy to enforce its collection without further notice.”
11 In addition, the letter contained a notation indicating that petitioner’s request for reconsideration had been denied for lack of supporting documents.
The above conclusion finds support in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ayala Securities Corporation,12 where we held: The letter of February 18, 1963 (Exh. G), in the view of the Court, is tantamount to a denial of the reconsideration or [respondent corporation’s]…protest o[f] the assessment made by the petitioner, considering that the said letter [was] in itself a reiteration of the demand by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the settlement of the assessment already made, and for the immediate payment of the sum of P758,687.04 in spite of the vehement protest of the respondent corporation on April 21, 1961.
This certainly is a clear indication of the firm stand of petitioner against the reconsideration of the disputed assessment…This being so, the said letter amount[ed] to a decision on a disputed or protested assessment, and, there, the court a quo did not err in taking cognizance of this case.
Similarly, in Surigao Electric Co., Inc v. Court of Tax Appeals,
13 and in CIR v. Union Shipping Corporation,
14 we held: . . . In this letter, the commissioner not only in effect demanded that the petitioner pay the amount of P11,533.53 but also gave warning that in the event it failed to pay, the said commissioner would be constrained to enforce the collection thereof by means of the remedies provided by law.
The tenor of the letter, specifically the statement regarding the resort to legal remedies, unmistakably indicate[d] the final nature of the determination made by the commissioner of the petitioner’s deficiency franchise tax liability.”
The demand letter received by petitioner verily signified a character of finality. Therefore, it was tantamount to a rejection of the request for reconsideration.
As correctly held by the Court of Tax Appeals, “while the denial of the protest was in the form of a demand letter, the notation in the said letter making reference to the protest filed by petitioner clearly shows the intention of the respondent to make it as [his] final decision.”
15 This now brings us to the crux of the matter as to whether said demand letter indeed attained finality despite the fact that it was issued and signed by the Chief of the Accounts Receivable and Billing Division instead of the BIR Commissioner.
The general rule is that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may delegate any power vested upon him by law to Division Chiefs or to officials of higher rank. He cannot, however, delegate the four powers granted to him under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) enumerated in Section 7.
As amended by Republic Act No. 8424, Section 7 of the Code authorizes the BIR Commissioner to delegate the powers vested in him under the pertinent provisions of the Code to any subordinate official with the rank equivalent to a division chief or higher, except the following:
(a) The power to recommend the promulgation of rules and regulations by the Secretary of Finance;
(b) The power to issue rulings of first impression or to reverse, revoke or modify any existing ruling of the Bureau;
(c) The power to compromise or abate under Section 204 (A) and (B) of this Code, any tax deficiency: Provided, however, that assessments issued by the Regional Offices involving basic deficiency taxes of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or less, and minor criminal violations as may be determined by rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner, discovered by regional and district officials, may be compromised by a regional evaluation board which shall be composed of the Regional Director as Chairman, the Assistant Regional Director, heads of the Legal, Assessment and Collection Divisions and the Revenue District Officer having jurisdiction over the taxpayer, as members; and
(d) The power to assign or reassign internal revenue officers to establishments where articles subject to excise tax are produced or kept.
It is clear from the above provision that the act of issuance of the demand letter by the Chief of the Accounts Receivable and Billing Division does not fall under any of the exceptions that have been mentioned as non-delegable.
*******************************************************************
Section 6 of the Code further provides:
1 Annex “C’ of Petition, Rollo, p. 48.
2 Rollo, p. 7.
3 CA Rollo, pp. 38-39.
4 L-25289, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 524.
5 CA Rollo, pp. 40-41.
6 Id; Note: Section 224 is now Section 223.
7 Rollo, p. 9.
8 Id. at 10.
9 Id. at 22.
10 Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-25289, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 523.
11 Annex “C” of Petition, Rollo, p. 48.
12 No. L-24985, March 31, 1976, 70 SCRA 204, 209.
13 L-25289, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 523, 526.
14 G.R. No. 66160, May 21, 1990, 188 SCRA 547.
15 CA Rollo, p. 40.
Taxation: Demand Letter for tax deficiency assessments signed by authorized subordinate officer, is deemed final (Oceanic Wireless Network, Inc., vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al.,
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 148380
OCEANIC WIRELESS NETWORK, INC.,
Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
Promulgated: December 9, 2005
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 31, 2000, and its Resolution dated May 3, 2001, in “Oceanic Wireless Network, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue” docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 35581, upholding the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals dismissing the Petition for Review in CTA Case No. 4668 for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner Oceanic Wireless Network, Inc. challenges the authority of the Chief of the Accounts Receivable and Billing Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) National Office to decide and/or act with finality on behalf of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) on protests against disputed tax deficiency assessments.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 17, 1988, petitioner received from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) deficiency tax assessments for the taxable year 1984 in the total amount of P8,644,998.71, broken down as follows:
kind of Tax Assessment No. Amount
Deficiency Income Tax FAR-4-1984-88-001130 P8,381,354.00
Penalties for late payment FAR-4-1984-88-001131 3,000.00
of income and failure to
file quarterly returns
Deficiency Contractor’s FAR-4-1984-88-001132 29,849.06
Tax
Deficiency Fixed Tax FAR-4--88-001133 12,083.65
Deficiency Franchise Tax FAR-4--84-88-001134 227,712.00
Total P8,644,998.71
Petitioner filed its protest against the tax assessments and requested a reconsideration or cancellation of the same in a letter to the BIR Commis-sioner dated April 12, 1988.
Acting in behalf of the BIR Commissioner, then Chief of the BIR Accounts Receivable and Billing Division, Mr. Severino B. Buot, reiterated the tax assessments while denying petitioner’s request for reinvestigation in a letter1 dated January 24, 1991, thus:
“Note: Your request for re-investigation has been denied for failure to submit the necessary supporting papers as per endorse-ment letter from the office of the Special Operation Service dated 12-12-90.”
Said letter likewise requested petitioner to pay the total amount of P8,644,998.71 within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, otherwise the case shall be referred to the Collection Enforcement Division of the BIR National Office for the issuance of a warrant of distraint and levy without further notice.
Upon petitioner’s failure to pay the subject tax assessments within the prescribed period, the Assistant Commissioner for Collection, acting for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, issued the corresponding warrants of distraint and/or levy and garnishment. These were served on petitioner on October 10, 1991 and October 17, 1991, respectively.
2 On November 8, 1991, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) to contest the issuance of the warrants to enforce the collection of the tax assessments. This was docketed as CTA Case No. 4668.
The CTA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction in a decision dated September 16, 1994, declaring that said petition was filed beyond the thirty (30)-day period reckoned from the time when the demand letter of January 24, 1991 by the Chief of the BIR Accounts Receivable and Billing Division was presumably received by petitioner, i.e., “within a reasonable time from said date in the regular course of mail pursuant to Section 2(v) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.”
3 The decision cited Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals
4 wherein this Court considered a mere demand letter sent to the taxpayer after his protest of the assessment notice as the final decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the protest. Hence, the filing of the petition on November 8, 1991 was held clearly beyond the reglementary period.
5 The court a quo likewise stated that the finality of the denial of the protest by petitioner against the tax deficiency assessments was bolstered by the subsequent issuance of the warrants of distraint and/or levy and garnishment to enforce the collection of the deficiency taxes.
The issuance was not barred by prescription because the mere filing of the letter of protest by petitioner which was given due course by the Bureau of Internal Revenue suspended the running of the prescription period as expressly provided under the then Section 224 of the Tax Code: SEC. 224. Suspension of Running of the Statute of Limitations.
The running of the Statute of Limitations provided in Section 203 and 223 on the making of assessment and the beginning of distraint or levy or a proceeding in court for collection, in respect of any deficiency, shall be suspended for the period during which the Commissioner is prohibited from making the assessment or beginning distraint or levy or a proceeding in court and for sixty (60) days thereafter; when the taxpayer requests for a reinvestigation which is granted by the Commissioner; when the taxpayer cannot be located in the address given by him in the return files upon which a tax is being assessed or collected: Provided, That if the taxpayer inform the Commissioner of any change of address, the running of the statute of limitations will not be suspended; when the warrant of distraint and levy is duly served upon the taxpayer, his authorized representative, or a member of his household with sufficient discretion, and no property could located; and when the taxpayer is out of the Philippines.
6 (Underscoring supplied.) Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the demand letter of January 24, 1991 cannot be considered as the final decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on its protest because the same was signed by a mere subordinate and not by the Commissioner himself.
7 With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner consequently filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals contending that there was no final decision to speak of because the Commissioner had yet to make a personal determination as regards the merits of petitioner’s case.
8 The Court of Appeals denied the petition in a decision dated October 31, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads: “WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution dated May 3, 2001.
Hence, this petition with the following assignment of errors:
9 I THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEMAND LETTER ISSUED BY THE (THEN) ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE/BILLING DIVISION OF THE BIR NATIONAL OFFICE WAS THE FINAL DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT CIR ON THE DISPUTED ASSESSMENTS, AND HENCE CONSTITUTED THE DECISION APPEALABLE TO THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT CTA; AND,
II THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT CA ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE DENIAL OF THE PROTEST OF THE SUBJECT ALLEGED DEFICIENCY TAX ASSESSMENTS HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY FOR FAILURE OF THE PETITIONER TO INSTITUTE THE APPEAL FROM THE DEMAND LETTER OF THE CHIEF OF THE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE/BILLING DIVISION, BIR NATIONAL OFFICE, TO THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT CTA, WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS FROM RECEIPT THEREOF.
Thus, the main issue is whether or not a demand letter for tax deficiency assessments issued and signed by a subordinate officer who was acting in behalf of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is deemed final and executory and subject to an appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals.
We rule in the affirmative.
A demand letter for payment of delinquent taxes may be considered a decision on a disputed or protested assessment. The determination on whether or not a demand letter is final is conditioned upon the language used or the tenor of the letter being sent to the taxpayer.
We laid down the rule that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language what constitutes his final determination of the disputed assessment, thus:
. . . we deem it appropriate to state that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language whenever his action on an assessment questioned by a taxpayer constitutes his final determination on the disputed assessment, as contemplated by Sections 7 and 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended. On the basis of his statement indubitably showing that the Commissioner’s communicated action is his final decision on the contested assessment, the aggrieved taxpayer would then be able to take recourse to the tax court at the opportune time. Without needless difficulty, the taxpayer would be able to determine when his right to appeal to the tax court accrues.
The rule of conduct would also obviate all desire and opportunity on the part of the taxpayer to continually delay the finality of the assessment – and, consequently, the collection of the amount demanded as taxes – by repeated requests for recomputation and reconsideration. On the part of the Commissioner, this would encourage his office to conduct a careful and thorough study of every questioned assessment and render a correct and definite decision thereon in the first instance.
This would also deter the Commissioner from unfairly making the taxpayer grope in the dark and speculate as to which action constitutes the decision appealable to the tax court. Of greater import, this rule of conduct would meet a pressing need for fair play, regularity, and orderliness in administrative action.
10 In this case, the letter of demand dated January 24, 1991, unquestionably constitutes the final action taken by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on petitioner’s request for reconsideration when it reiterated the tax deficiency assessments due from petitioner, and requested its payment.
Failure to do so would result in the “issuance of a warrant of distraint and levy to enforce its collection without further notice.”
11 In addition, the letter contained a notation indicating that petitioner’s request for reconsideration had been denied for lack of supporting documents.
The above conclusion finds support in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ayala Securities Corporation,12 where we held: The letter of February 18, 1963 (Exh. G), in the view of the Court, is tantamount to a denial of the reconsideration or [respondent corporation’s]…protest o[f] the assessment made by the petitioner, considering that the said letter [was] in itself a reiteration of the demand by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the settlement of the assessment already made, and for the immediate payment of the sum of P758,687.04 in spite of the vehement protest of the respondent corporation on April 21, 1961.
This certainly is a clear indication of the firm stand of petitioner against the reconsideration of the disputed assessment…This being so, the said letter amount[ed] to a decision on a disputed or protested assessment, and, there, the court a quo did not err in taking cognizance of this case.
Similarly, in Surigao Electric Co., Inc v. Court of Tax Appeals,
13 and in CIR v. Union Shipping Corporation,
14 we held: . . . In this letter, the commissioner not only in effect demanded that the petitioner pay the amount of P11,533.53 but also gave warning that in the event it failed to pay, the said commissioner would be constrained to enforce the collection thereof by means of the remedies provided by law.
The tenor of the letter, specifically the statement regarding the resort to legal remedies, unmistakably indicate[d] the final nature of the determination made by the commissioner of the petitioner’s deficiency franchise tax liability.”
The demand letter received by petitioner verily signified a character of finality. Therefore, it was tantamount to a rejection of the request for reconsideration.
As correctly held by the Court of Tax Appeals, “while the denial of the protest was in the form of a demand letter, the notation in the said letter making reference to the protest filed by petitioner clearly shows the intention of the respondent to make it as [his] final decision.”
15 This now brings us to the crux of the matter as to whether said demand letter indeed attained finality despite the fact that it was issued and signed by the Chief of the Accounts Receivable and Billing Division instead of the BIR Commissioner.
The general rule is that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may delegate any power vested upon him by law to Division Chiefs or to officials of higher rank. He cannot, however, delegate the four powers granted to him under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) enumerated in Section 7.
As amended by Republic Act No. 8424, Section 7 of the Code authorizes the BIR Commissioner to delegate the powers vested in him under the pertinent provisions of the Code to any subordinate official with the rank equivalent to a division chief or higher, except the following:
(a) The power to recommend the promulgation of rules and regulations by the Secretary of Finance;
(b) The power to issue rulings of first impression or to reverse, revoke or modify any existing ruling of the Bureau;
(c) The power to compromise or abate under Section 204 (A) and (B) of this Code, any tax deficiency: Provided, however, that assessments issued by the Regional Offices involving basic deficiency taxes of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or less, and minor criminal violations as may be determined by rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner, discovered by regional and district officials, may be compromised by a regional evaluation board which shall be composed of the Regional Director as Chairman, the Assistant Regional Director, heads of the Legal, Assessment and Collection Divisions and the Revenue District Officer having jurisdiction over the taxpayer, as members; and
(d) The power to assign or reassign internal revenue officers to establishments where articles subject to excise tax are produced or kept.
It is clear from the above provision that the act of issuance of the demand letter by the Chief of the Accounts Receivable and Billing Division does not fall under any of the exceptions that have been mentioned as non-delegable.
*******************************************************************
Section 6 of the Code further provides:
1 Annex “C’ of Petition, Rollo, p. 48.
2 Rollo, p. 7.
3 CA Rollo, pp. 38-39.
4 L-25289, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 524.
5 CA Rollo, pp. 40-41.
6 Id; Note: Section 224 is now Section 223.
7 Rollo, p. 9.
8 Id. at 10.
9 Id. at 22.
10 Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-25289, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 523.
11 Annex “C” of Petition, Rollo, p. 48.
12 No. L-24985, March 31, 1976, 70 SCRA 204, 209.
13 L-25289, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 523, 526.
14 G.R. No. 66160, May 21, 1990, 188 SCRA 547.
15 CA Rollo, p. 40.
Monday, November 3, 2008
Supreme Court Decision: Compromise Agreement (Sps. Segundo Ramos and Felisa Valdez vs. Hon. Court of Appeals)
Supreme Court Decision:
Compromise Agreement (Sps. Segundo Ramos and Felisa Valdez vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., December 9, 2005)
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 132196
SPOUSES SEGUNDO RAMOS and FELISA VALDEZ,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HON. COURT OF AP-PEALS, LEILA VALDEZ-PASCUAL, ARACELI VALDEZ, GLICERIA VALDEZ, JUANA VALDEZ, SIMEON VALDEZ, CONRADA VALDEZ, SEVERINO VALDEZ, MARIO VALDEZ, ADORACION VALDEZ, JOSE VALDEZ, DIONISIA VALDEZ, DANILO VALDEZ, SERAPIO VALDEZ, HELEN VALDEZ, PERLA VALDEZ, and DELIA VALDEZ,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
December 9, 2005DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This case presents a tangled tale involving the conflicting accounts of petitioners and private respondents over a piece of land sold by Gregorio Valdez (private respondents’ father) to petitioners in 1948 and which ostensibly became the subject of a com-promise agreement in 1977.
Through the instant Petition for Review on certiorari, spouses Segundo Ramos and Felisa Valdez seek the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 1997 which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 48, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
The RTC decision dismissed the case filed by private respondents for Quieting of Title, Ownership, Possession plus Damages with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and adjudged petitioners as the lawful owners of a piece of land, with an area of 3,036 square meters, and which forms part of a bigger tract of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 48824 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Pangasinan in the name of Gregorio Valdez. Under review as well is the Court of Appeals Resolution3 dated 08 December 1997 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
4 Private respondents are the children of Gregorio Valdez. In 1948, Gregorio Valdez sold the subject land to petitioners.
The absolute deed of sale was subsequently annotated at the back of OCT No. 48824 as Entry No. 377847. It is the contention of private respondents that as early as 1977, petitioners no longer owned subject land as they had renounced their rights thereto as evidenced by a compromise agreement dated 02 June 1977.
Sometime in 1991, Gregorio Valdez died. Private respondents allege that immediately after the death of their father, petitioners disturbed their possession of subject land by cultivating the same and by enclosing it with a fence.
As petitioners did not heed their demands to vacate, they were constrained to file a case for Quieting of Title, Ownership, Possession plus Damages with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners, in their Answer with Counterclaim, maintain that they remain owners of the subject land as the compromise agree-ment being relied upon by private respondents refers to another piece of land.
Thus, they argue that the compromise agreement constitutes a cloud on their title. They prayed, among other things, for the quieting of their title and that they be adjudged lawful owners of the subject land.
The trial court believed petitioners. It sided with petitioners by declaring them owners of the subject land by virtue of the absolute deed of sale dated 06 January 1948. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premi-ses considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs and declaring the defendants to be the lawful owners of the land in question.
5 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling. It held that the land renounced by petitioners was the subject land and that it was made in favor of Gregorio Valdez, thus:
WHEREFORE, premi-ses considered the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring plaintiffs as owner of the land in question, and ordering defendants-appellees to vacate the same.
With costs against defendants-appellees. Aggrieved by the aforecited ruling, and their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals, petitioners assert before us that signatories were signing. Thus, typewritten in the agreement are the following entries:
SEGUNDO RAMOS FELISA RAMOS
Applicant Applicant
FELIPE CABERO
Oppositor
ASSISTED BY:
ATTY. ELISEO E. ATTY. NICANOR
VERSOZA CALDITO
Counsel for the Applicants Counsel for Oppositor
Soconi, Bugallon, Pang. Pozorrubio, Pang.
The persons whose names were typewritten on the compromise agreement signed above their names. Gregorio Valdez’s name, on the other hand, as well as the role he played in the execution of the document, was not typewritten on the document.
His signature, however, appears on the same line as the phrase “assisted by” just above the signature of Atty. Caldito. Petitioner Segundo Ramos swears that he did not see Gregorio Valdez sign the document at the time of the execution of the same.
13 Witness for petitioners, Leonardo Quesora, who was present at the time of the execution of the compromise agreement, likewise testified that he did not see Gregorio Valdez sign.
14 Moreover, none of the private respondents or their witnesses testified as to having witnessed Gregorio Valdez sign the compromise agreement.
It is axiomatic that a contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof.
15 A person who is not a party to a compromise agreement cannot be affected by it.
16 This is already well-settled. Thus, in Young v. Court of Appeals
17 we stressed: The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioner can enforce a compromise agreement to which she was not a party.
This issue has already been squarely settled by this Court in the negative in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Cadampog (7 SCRA 808 [1963]) where it was ruled that appellant is not entitled to enforce a compromise agreement to which he was not a party and that as to its effect and scope, it has been determined in the sense that its effectivity if at all, is limited to the parties thereto and those mentioned in the exhibits (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Aguirre, 7 SCRA 112 [1963]).
It was reiterated later that a compromise agreement cannot bind persons who are not parties thereto (Guerrero v. C.A., 29 SCRA 791 [1969]).
Consequently, Gregorio Valdez not being a party to the compromise agreement, his heirs (private respondents) cannot sue for its performance.
Be that as it may, private respondents additionally harp on the reference to their father made in the body of the compromise agreement itself which they claim is proof of renunciation of subject land by petitioners in favor of their father, to wit:
2. That the applicants Segundo Ramos and Felisa Valdez hereby also quitclaim and renounce whatever rights in the document registered under entry No. 377847 annotated at the back of O.C.T. No. 48824 of Gregorio Valdez; Contrary to the position taken by private respondents, the reference to their father, Gregorio Valdez, seems to us to be a mere description of the land being renounced.
Nothing in the compromise agreement would suggest that the renunciation of the subject land was to be made in Gregorio Valdez’s favor. Verily, for this Court to interpret the stipulation as conferring some right to a third person (i.e., stipulation pour autrui), the following requisites must concur:
1. There must be a stipulation in favor of a third person;
2. The stipulation in favor of a third person should be a part, not the whole, of the contract;
3. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person, not a mere incidental benefit or interest;
4. The third person must have communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation; and
5. Neither of the contracting parties bears the legal representation or authorization of the third party.
18 To constitute a valid stipulation pour autrie, it must be the purpose and intent of the stipulating parties to benefit the third person, and it is not sufficient that the third person may be incidentally benefited by the stipulation.
19 In herein case, from the testimony of petitioner Segundo Ramos who is undoubtedly a party to the compromise agreement, and from the rest of the evidence on hand, any benefit which accrued to private respondents’ father was merely incidental.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 1997 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 48, insofar as it dismissed the complaint filed by herein private respondents, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
************************************************************
1 Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Jorge S. Imperial and Ramon U. Mabutas, Jr. concurring (Rollo, pp. 28-45).
2 Decided by Presiding Judge Alicia Gonzalez-Decano.
3 Rollo, p. 47.
4 Except for Conrada Valdez who is Gregorio Valdez’s daughter-in-law and Danilo and Mario Valdez who are his grandchildren (RTC Records, p. 48).
5 Rollo, p. 24.
13 TSN, 17 February 1992, p. 12; TSN, 18 February 1992, p. 6.
14 TSN, 29 January 1992, p. 11.
15 University of the Philippines v. Philab Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 152411, 29 September 2004, 439 SCRA 467, 480.
16 Banzagales v. Galman, G.R. No. 46717, 21 May 1993, 222 SCRA 350, 356.
17 G.R. No. 79518, 13 January 1989, 169 SCRA 213, 218.
18 Id., p. 219.
19 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, p. 433.
Compromise Agreement (Sps. Segundo Ramos and Felisa Valdez vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., December 9, 2005)
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 132196
SPOUSES SEGUNDO RAMOS and FELISA VALDEZ,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HON. COURT OF AP-PEALS, LEILA VALDEZ-PASCUAL, ARACELI VALDEZ, GLICERIA VALDEZ, JUANA VALDEZ, SIMEON VALDEZ, CONRADA VALDEZ, SEVERINO VALDEZ, MARIO VALDEZ, ADORACION VALDEZ, JOSE VALDEZ, DIONISIA VALDEZ, DANILO VALDEZ, SERAPIO VALDEZ, HELEN VALDEZ, PERLA VALDEZ, and DELIA VALDEZ,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
December 9, 2005DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This case presents a tangled tale involving the conflicting accounts of petitioners and private respondents over a piece of land sold by Gregorio Valdez (private respondents’ father) to petitioners in 1948 and which ostensibly became the subject of a com-promise agreement in 1977.
Through the instant Petition for Review on certiorari, spouses Segundo Ramos and Felisa Valdez seek the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 1997 which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 48, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
The RTC decision dismissed the case filed by private respondents for Quieting of Title, Ownership, Possession plus Damages with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and adjudged petitioners as the lawful owners of a piece of land, with an area of 3,036 square meters, and which forms part of a bigger tract of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 48824 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Pangasinan in the name of Gregorio Valdez. Under review as well is the Court of Appeals Resolution3 dated 08 December 1997 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
4 Private respondents are the children of Gregorio Valdez. In 1948, Gregorio Valdez sold the subject land to petitioners.
The absolute deed of sale was subsequently annotated at the back of OCT No. 48824 as Entry No. 377847. It is the contention of private respondents that as early as 1977, petitioners no longer owned subject land as they had renounced their rights thereto as evidenced by a compromise agreement dated 02 June 1977.
Sometime in 1991, Gregorio Valdez died. Private respondents allege that immediately after the death of their father, petitioners disturbed their possession of subject land by cultivating the same and by enclosing it with a fence.
As petitioners did not heed their demands to vacate, they were constrained to file a case for Quieting of Title, Ownership, Possession plus Damages with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners, in their Answer with Counterclaim, maintain that they remain owners of the subject land as the compromise agree-ment being relied upon by private respondents refers to another piece of land.
Thus, they argue that the compromise agreement constitutes a cloud on their title. They prayed, among other things, for the quieting of their title and that they be adjudged lawful owners of the subject land.
The trial court believed petitioners. It sided with petitioners by declaring them owners of the subject land by virtue of the absolute deed of sale dated 06 January 1948. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premi-ses considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs and declaring the defendants to be the lawful owners of the land in question.
5 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling. It held that the land renounced by petitioners was the subject land and that it was made in favor of Gregorio Valdez, thus:
WHEREFORE, premi-ses considered the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring plaintiffs as owner of the land in question, and ordering defendants-appellees to vacate the same.
With costs against defendants-appellees. Aggrieved by the aforecited ruling, and their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals, petitioners assert before us that signatories were signing. Thus, typewritten in the agreement are the following entries:
SEGUNDO RAMOS FELISA RAMOS
Applicant Applicant
FELIPE CABERO
Oppositor
ASSISTED BY:
ATTY. ELISEO E. ATTY. NICANOR
VERSOZA CALDITO
Counsel for the Applicants Counsel for Oppositor
Soconi, Bugallon, Pang. Pozorrubio, Pang.
The persons whose names were typewritten on the compromise agreement signed above their names. Gregorio Valdez’s name, on the other hand, as well as the role he played in the execution of the document, was not typewritten on the document.
His signature, however, appears on the same line as the phrase “assisted by” just above the signature of Atty. Caldito. Petitioner Segundo Ramos swears that he did not see Gregorio Valdez sign the document at the time of the execution of the same.
13 Witness for petitioners, Leonardo Quesora, who was present at the time of the execution of the compromise agreement, likewise testified that he did not see Gregorio Valdez sign.
14 Moreover, none of the private respondents or their witnesses testified as to having witnessed Gregorio Valdez sign the compromise agreement.
It is axiomatic that a contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof.
15 A person who is not a party to a compromise agreement cannot be affected by it.
16 This is already well-settled. Thus, in Young v. Court of Appeals
17 we stressed: The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioner can enforce a compromise agreement to which she was not a party.
This issue has already been squarely settled by this Court in the negative in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Cadampog (7 SCRA 808 [1963]) where it was ruled that appellant is not entitled to enforce a compromise agreement to which he was not a party and that as to its effect and scope, it has been determined in the sense that its effectivity if at all, is limited to the parties thereto and those mentioned in the exhibits (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Aguirre, 7 SCRA 112 [1963]).
It was reiterated later that a compromise agreement cannot bind persons who are not parties thereto (Guerrero v. C.A., 29 SCRA 791 [1969]).
Consequently, Gregorio Valdez not being a party to the compromise agreement, his heirs (private respondents) cannot sue for its performance.
Be that as it may, private respondents additionally harp on the reference to their father made in the body of the compromise agreement itself which they claim is proof of renunciation of subject land by petitioners in favor of their father, to wit:
2. That the applicants Segundo Ramos and Felisa Valdez hereby also quitclaim and renounce whatever rights in the document registered under entry No. 377847 annotated at the back of O.C.T. No. 48824 of Gregorio Valdez; Contrary to the position taken by private respondents, the reference to their father, Gregorio Valdez, seems to us to be a mere description of the land being renounced.
Nothing in the compromise agreement would suggest that the renunciation of the subject land was to be made in Gregorio Valdez’s favor. Verily, for this Court to interpret the stipulation as conferring some right to a third person (i.e., stipulation pour autrui), the following requisites must concur:
1. There must be a stipulation in favor of a third person;
2. The stipulation in favor of a third person should be a part, not the whole, of the contract;
3. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person, not a mere incidental benefit or interest;
4. The third person must have communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation; and
5. Neither of the contracting parties bears the legal representation or authorization of the third party.
18 To constitute a valid stipulation pour autrie, it must be the purpose and intent of the stipulating parties to benefit the third person, and it is not sufficient that the third person may be incidentally benefited by the stipulation.
19 In herein case, from the testimony of petitioner Segundo Ramos who is undoubtedly a party to the compromise agreement, and from the rest of the evidence on hand, any benefit which accrued to private respondents’ father was merely incidental.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 1997 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 48, insofar as it dismissed the complaint filed by herein private respondents, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
************************************************************
1 Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Jorge S. Imperial and Ramon U. Mabutas, Jr. concurring (Rollo, pp. 28-45).
2 Decided by Presiding Judge Alicia Gonzalez-Decano.
3 Rollo, p. 47.
4 Except for Conrada Valdez who is Gregorio Valdez’s daughter-in-law and Danilo and Mario Valdez who are his grandchildren (RTC Records, p. 48).
5 Rollo, p. 24.
13 TSN, 17 February 1992, p. 12; TSN, 18 February 1992, p. 6.
14 TSN, 29 January 1992, p. 11.
15 University of the Philippines v. Philab Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 152411, 29 September 2004, 439 SCRA 467, 480.
16 Banzagales v. Galman, G.R. No. 46717, 21 May 1993, 222 SCRA 350, 356.
17 G.R. No. 79518, 13 January 1989, 169 SCRA 213, 218.
18 Id., p. 219.
19 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, p. 433.
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